

DISSENT

MARTIN LUTHER KING

Lewis Coser

How the Young Entered
Politics in 1968—
And Transformed It

Vaclav Holesovsky

THE CZECH REVOLUTION

Luis Mercier Vega

MYTH OF THE GUERRILLAS

Allen Graubard

Herbert Marcuse—
One-Dimensional Pessimism

David Riesman

RETURN TO HIROSHIMA

Plus: *Jervis Anderson: Black Writing—The Other Side; Michael Walzer: A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen; Gordon Haskell: Problems in the ACLU; Ben Halpern: A Letter from Israel*

MAY-JUNE 1968

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Students & the Draft

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT was prepared before President Johnson's announcement that he would institute an incomplete ban on the bombing of North Vietnam. Our hope is that events in the next few months—a cease-fire, negotiations toward peace—will render this statement unnecessary. Our hope is that a turn toward peace will have as its immediate consequences a sharp reduction of draft quotas and the dropping of the Spock-Coffin indictments. Nevertheless, we believe it is important to maintain public pressure on these issues and therefore publish the following statement exactly as it was written and agreed to by those who signed it.

A significant number of young Americans have decided they must refuse military service in Vietnam, even if the consequence will be their imprisonment. Precisely how many will abide by their judgment to the bitter end, we do not know. Nor does it greatly matter. For it should strike every sensitive American as a fact of the greatest urgency that a good many of our most serious and idealistic students feel compelled to take this step. It signifies a moral revulsion from the country's policies in Vietnam which it would be utterly foolish to dismiss and coarse to mock.

We know some of these students. We know them as among the best of their generation—sincere, selfless, brave. If this country does not listen to their testimony, if it simply scorns them as “draft dodgers” or proceeds to impose legal penalties, then there will occur, among other disastrous consequences, a terrible alienation between generations that could only damage our hopes for a new upsurge of social progress in the U.S.

We share the view of the resisting students that the war is politically insupportable and morally reprehensible. We wish therefore to state for the public record the following opinions:

Where students and other people of draft age refuse to obey the draft on grounds of individual conscience, regardless of whether or not their refusal rests on a belief in a “Supreme Being,” we respect and sympathize with their decision. We pledge ourselves to support them in their conscientious objection and to provide whatever material and moral aid we can in case they are subject to prosecution.

At the same time we would strongly urge a liberalization of the draft regulations to permit such acts of conscientious objection to a particular war or kind of war. There is no cogent reason why conscientious objection must, in 1968, be based on a formal religious system or be regarded

as legitimate only if put forward as an objection to all wars. It is entirely possible to hold to moral imperatives and apply them to specific events on the basis of secularist and/or humanist persuasions.

While supporting those students who as a result of serious conviction and mature reflection decide they cannot fight in this war, we do not find ourselves in accord with movements of "radical resistance."

When draft refusal is put forward as a matter of conscience, it should be honored intrinsically; but when put forward as a political strategy for ending the war (or reconstructing U.S. society) it must be examined like all other political strategies, that is, in terms of likely consequences, productive or counter-productive. In our opinion, draft refusal as a systematic strategy for ending the war (or reconstructing U.S. society) is likely to prove self-defeating. Lacking the support of more than a tiny fraction of the American people, such a strategy might make the task of ending the war in Vietnam still more difficult by confounding the issue of the war itself with the issue of "draft evasion," something that could well elicit among large sections of the population repressive and chauvinist responses.

(continued on page 196)



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—by George Lichtheim

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Right now, especially in view of recent encouraging events, we believe that the best way of rallying the American people to the need for a sharp change in our Vietnam policy is through public and electoral activity, which can include popular demonstrations, work in the primaries, and continued agitation.

But however we may differ with some of the draft resisters on tactical grounds, we affirm our solidarity with them in support of their conscientious decisions. Moreover, we believe that the right to advocate—and counsel—such a course on the draft is protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We therefore propose to join in support of Dr. Spock, the Rev. Coffin, and their co-defendants, through public agitation against their prosecution and financial help to defense committees.

The U.S. now finds itself in a crisis of unprecedented gravity. Shall this country, in the willful pursuit of a war that millions of Americans find dubious and a smaller but still notable number of us find odious—shall this country now proceed to prosecute and throw into jail thousands of its finest young people, precisely the ones who in other circumstances might take the lead in social reconstruction? We urgently and firmly declare that the answer must be: No!

Signers: (organization or institution listed for identification only)

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In this Moment of Grief

April 6

FOR ALL OF THREE DAYS there was hope. Lyndon Johnson announced he would not run again; a bombing pause, of sorts, had been declared for North Vietnam; Hanoi's response indicated that negotiations might at last begin to end the war. We felt this to be a vindication of democracy. We saw it as evidence that with enough popular pressure and involvement, detestable policies could be changed and the men who spoke for them dislodged from office. For three days it seemed as if finally this country might take a turn toward reason and reconstruction.

And then came the news of the murder of Martin Luther King.

•

LET THERE BE no rhetoric. By the time this will be read, you will have had enough of that. All of us know what a loss we have suffered. All of us know what the disastrous consequences are likely to be. What we cannot yet know fully is the amount of damage certain to be sustained within the Negro community itself.

In the murder of Martin Luther King we saw the other side of America. Yes, the events leading to President Johnson's withdrawal did—they still do—represent a triumph for democracy. But the murder of Martin Luther King shows the ugliness of American racism. It is a society, our America, that is shot through with racism from top to bottom and in which democracy is violated each day. The people who killed Martin Luther King may have been fanatics or lunatics, but they do not exist in isolation. They cannot be understood apart from the encasing atmosphere of violence and hatred which has always been a significant part of American life. Whoever pulled the trigger, the blood of Martin Luther King also lies on the head of George Wallace,

and on the heads of many others, North and South, high and low, who have enacted or tolerated the humiliation of the American Negro.

No one can fail to understand why American Negroes should now respond with rage—or even violence. There comes a moment when a man cannot take any more, a moment at which he no longer cares to reason or think. His only recourse is to strike a blow. His only assertion of selfhood is to smash his fist, at a white policeman or through a store window. And he has to do this even if he knows that his own destruction will result—perhaps especially when he knows.

Yet if we still wish to save this country, we must say with absolute firmness: whoever counsels or acquiesces in violence is totally irresponsible. If we wish to keep American Negroes from being butchered in the streets this summer, we must say with absolute firmness: whoever counsels or acquiesces in violence is helping pave the way for an American fascism.

Here is the two-sidedness, the terrible ambivalence of America: the power of democracy and the power of racism, the way of community and the way of blood, the value of fraternity and the value of hatred.

These words, together with the happier ones that follow on the next few pages, reflect that doubleness. As for ourselves, there can be no doubt which course we choose. In a day or two we shall join the thousands of trade unionists and other people who will march in Memphis, under the leadership of Bayard Rustin, to show their solidarity with the striking garbage workers for whom only a few hours ago Martin Luther King spoke.

And yet, remembering that voice, who can contain his grief?

I. H.

A Triumph For Democracy

RIGHT NOW, A BIMONTHLY is not exactly the most convenient medium for commenting on the rapidly shifting and enormously exciting political events of the past few days. It would be foolish, a few weeks before these words reach print, to say anything about the fluid tactical alignments of American politics. No matter; our readers must get enough of that every day.

About one thing, however, there can be no doubt, and we of the democratic Left ought to be the first joyously to affirm it: *the recent dramatic turnings in American politics, no matter how one estimates them in detail, represent a triumph for democratic processes and values.*

What made Lyndon Johnson say he would not run again? Perhaps his statement is a maneuver, though at the moment he seems to be sincere—whatever “sincere” may mean with a man like him. But regardless of what one may guess to be Johnson’s secret motives, it is absolutely clear that his sensational announcement signifies a recognition that his popular support has been corroded and that his policies have become increasingly unpopular. From one point of view it hardly matters whether Johnson “means it” or not. The mere fact that he took so extreme a step as declaring himself out of the race shows that he was forced to acknowledge the political realities. He was forced to acknowledge the successes of the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns; forced to acknowledge the growing opposition to the war; forced to acknowledge his all-but-universal unpopularity among the youth. He was forced to announce a partial end to the bombing of North Vietnam, an inadequate step but still one that opens the possibility of more serious initiatives toward peace. And this represents, perhaps belatedly, a triumph for the democratic process. What made that triumph possible was a complex combination of factors: popular protest, the courage of Senator McCarthy in declaring himself a candidate when no one else was ready to, the growing recognition among millions of Americans that we face an acute

crisis at home, etc. And the point is not that Lyndon Johnson suddenly had a conversion to the true and the good: we may well doubt that. . . . The point is that in a democratic society he had no choice but to acknowledge the political realities—those deep shifts in popular response which could not have been created or expressed without the opportunities provided by democracy.

Creaky and slow; sneered at by those who unreflectively accept its advantages; unromantic in the eyes of some who yearn to surrender their wills and persons to charismatic tyrants; full of faults which need urgent correction—that is democracy. Yet there is nothing more valuable, especially for those of us who continue to work for radical social change.

Nor is there a guarantee that democracy will always yield the political and social results we wish. There is only the certainty that without democracy our existence—political, social, moral, cultural—would be intolerable,

In the U.S. we have a lot going against democracy. Human failings and sloth. A political system in many ways outdated. An underlying form of economy, capitalism, which contains within itself profoundly authoritarian elements. A national tradition of violence. And much else.

Yet through aroused publics, through protest and politics, the seemingly rigid system which threatened us with the dismal choice of Johnson and Nixon was made to give. The thousands of students who plunged so marvelously into the McCarthy campaign had an electrifying effect. The courage of McCarthy himself stirred enormous numbers of people.

Democracy seems to have come through pretty well.

(For us there is one depressing aspect to the recent events, and that is the dismal role played by the labor unions. So often the bulwark of domestic social advance, the unions were sadly out of touch with the profound changes that took place in our political and social life. But about this, more in our next issue.)

Might it not be time for an end to certain sorts of pseudo-revolutionary posturings which have afflicted the Left in the last few years? An end to apocalyptic fantasies which often

come to no more than cop-out? And a turn, instead, to the hard work of radical social reconstruction? For we do not believe for a moment that the mere election of McCarthy or Kennedy is going to solve our problems, or that their election combined with an end to the war will remove the need for unremitting struggle in behalf of new radical programs.—I. H.

There follows directly after these remarks an article written by Lewis Coser a few days before Johnson's announcement. We have deliberately *not* changed a word of it, so cogent does it still seem.

Lewis Coser

How the Young Entered Politics in 1968 — And Transformed It

ALMOST ONE HALF of the population of the United States is now under twenty-five years of age. This unprecedented demographic fact is well on the way toward changing completely the texture of American politics, as the McCarthy campaign has shown in recent months. These political events confound those cynics and professional pessimists who for so long have tried to make us believe that the world of politics remains forever frozen into the pattern of two competing but similarly structured major parties that present no real choices for liberals or radicals. These crackpot realists, to use C. Wright Mills's telling characterization, forgot the young; no small matter.

When it comes to political organization and activity, the most precious commodity is time. Only those who have some free time on their hands can hope effectively to participate in the political game. In ideologically-oriented European parties, agitation and propaganda was largely carried out by militants who were willing to sacrifice leisure time in order to devote themselves to the furtherance of their parties' ideological goals. The major Ameri-

can parties, given their largely non-ideological character, have hardly ever been able to appeal to engaged political partisans.

Enthusiasm and passion for abstractly formulated and transpersonal ideals has in any case been uncommon in America, where pragmatic matter-of-fact judgments have tended successfully to scale down the impact of ideology. This is why the major American parties have traditionally been deprived of the support of the kind of committed militants on which European parties have been able to thrive for a long time. Nor have these parties been able, given their loose organizational structure, to employ many paid permanent officials in the manner of the British. They have relied instead on two main types of active supporters to do their organizational work, from manning local or regional party offices to ringing door bells: those aspiring to a political career and with time on their hands, and those engaged in politics for tangible returns in the form of patronage or various kinds of graft.

When trying to account for the different amounts of political participation among various strata in the population, Max Weber long ago introduced the useful notion of "disposability." He argued that men on regular work schedules, be it in farming or industrial or office work, were not likely to have sufficient free time to engage in politics in a regular manner. Caught in the routines of their occupations, they were not dispensable. In contrast, independent professionals, from medical practitioners to lawyers and newspapermen, or, in lower strata, from undertakers to preachers, could afford to arrange their work schedules so as to take off for fairly lengthy periods of political activism. Such men might also hope to profit professionally from the contacts made in their political work. This helps to account for the considerable overrepresentation of such professionals among active party workers in America.

Yet the American party system has never been able to rely solely on such volunteers for its regular operation. Their efforts had to be supplemented by regular party workers who were attracted by concrete returns in the form of patronage and petty or not-so-

petty graft. In a sense, the American party system has been financed by the taxpayer in the form of transfer payments out of the public till to deserving party regulars who have been willing to work hard in the hope of one or another pay-off after the election. This party system has been kept going by mobilizing electoral agents with time on their hands who, whether because of material or ideal interests, were willing to devote sizable chunks of time to their party's cause. Since there always have been only few such men, and since politics always has had a somewhat negative ring on the American scene, active participation, as distinct from voting, has been restricted to a small minority, and politicians have traditionally lived in a circumscribed world of their own.

This state of affairs, I would like to suggest, is now in the process of revolutionary change. And this change is coming about as the young invade the political arena.

Not only are there more young people today than ever before in American history, but a much higher proportion of them attend college. These young men and women command resources of time which are unavailable to almost all their elders. Whereas in the past the great majority of the young were caught very early in occupational routines, at present millions enjoy a moratorium during their years in college. In the colleges themselves, the pattern of supervision and restriction has been increasingly relaxed, and parental restraints and the inhibitions of parietal rules have almost disappeared. As a result, the college young are now in the position to dispose as they please of much of their time. And not only do they have large chunks of time at their disposal, they are more dispensable than any other major category of men and women in America. Where it might be difficult to quit a job in order to engage in political activities, it is easy enough to skip a semester in school or a few weeks of classes, especially with the often explicit or implicit support of liberal professors.

Not only do the young have time, they also are willing to participate in the political arena without expectations of material pay-offs. They still have immense resources of idealism—resources which tend to be quickly

depleted among their pragmatically-oriented elders. Having few occupation or family responsibilities, they have not yet acquired the habit of assessing their political "inputs" in terms of pragmatic and self-interested "outputs."

These structural conditions do not in themselves account for the current crusade. For the young to be willing to use their time for political purposes and social causes, there must be issues at stake that have acquired great salience in their perception of the world they live in. And so they have been ready to give of their time in the cause of peace or in the struggle for civil rights. More recently it needed the particular constellation of the Vietnam War, the callousness of the Johnson Administration, the cruel joke of the current version of the War on Poverty, and many other outrages with which we are all too familiar, to lead to what is now clearly a political revolt of the young. And it needed the emergence of a man who, just because he departed radically from prevailing political styles, being neither a party hack nor a demagogue, could appeal to the young.

EUGENE MCCARTHY, it seems to me, is in the process of changing our political life. He has been able to do so by bringing into the political arena tens of thousands of young people who have the energy, the time, and the idealism required to transform the political game. Eugene McCarthy has been willing to take risks. This is why he appeals to a generation that is also willing to take them. (Bobby Kennedy may appeal to the bobbysoxers, but what most student activists say about his opportunistic avoidance of risks is not fit to print even in a radical publication.)

New Hampshire has shown, and I am confident that Wisconsin and subsequent primaries will show again, that professional politicians will find it hard to shore up their traditional bulwarks against the sudden onrush of youthful activists. To be sure, not every political bastion of the Democratic party is likely to fall during this campaign. Mayor Daley is still going to be the Chicago kingfish next year; and not all machine politicians are likely to be structurally unemployed after the election. But something radically different

and qualitatively new has happened on the political scene—and the repercussions will be felt for many years to come.

TWO OBJECTIONS might be raised:

- Is this campaign not going to be just a flash in the pan, if for no other reason than that there is no ideological coherence and formulated program behind this thrust of youthful political enthusiasms?

- And what about the morning after the conventions, when—though this is not as likely by any means as it was a few weeks ago—we might after all be faced with a choice between Johnson and Nixon?

- As to the first question, it is true of course that no formulated political program sustains the efforts of the young, but it is true also that they are not simply responding to the appeals of a charismatic demagogue. The young idealists respond to a man whom they call Mr. Clean, whom they see as actuated by deeply-felt convictions. They respond to one who is said to have been for long a passionate student of the life of Thomas More. They respond to a man for all seasons. They have no clear-cut program, but they believe in certain fundamental human virtues—loyalty, spontaneity, compassion, courage—which they feel their candidate embodies. The measure of political inexperience, and a certain amateurish quality, are precisely what makes their politics so delightful. They sense that McCarthy, though of course a practiced politician, himself remains at bottom an amateur who has been willing to throw aside many of the usual political accoutrements. It may be all to the good that the McCarthy movement is not frozen into rigid ideological stances. The young activists are learning by doing—and thus appeal to what is a major strain in the American tradition.

- But what about the day after? Will the young enthusiasts just return to the campus in disgust and alienation if they should not manage to attain victory? Here much depends, I think, on the further course of the campaign. If the young manage only to bring out the vote and to drum up temporary enthusiasm without really affecting political institutions, the hangover after the election

might indeed be severe. But if they succeed in actually capturing at least some major institutional bulwarks, if they get hold of major pieces of the party machinery and in conquering the machine transform it, then the campaign will have been more than a flash in the pan.

The press has reported that hundreds of university students recently registered in the regular Minnesota Democratic party organization, turned out in force at party meetings, managed to outvote the regulars and to win the day for McCarthy, leaving Hubert Humphrey's hacks aghast. This is the way to proceed. In the long run the young cannot be effective if they venture only sporadically into politics. They must endeavor permanently to occupy the positions they have conquered, and they must reduce to impotence the political time-servers and party faithful if they are to help bring about a transformation of the American scene. If they manage to do this, at least in a number of key places, they will gain a confidence in their own abilities which will allow them to overcome whatever immediate disappointments may lie ahead. Furthermore, a majority of votes is not the only measure of success. The elation we all experienced after New Hampshire was due to the fact that McCarthy gained 42 per cent of the votes, not that he won in the technical sense. Even if the anti-Johnson forces were to get only 40 per cent of the votes at the Convention, this would be a major victory.

As long as the political scene looked as bleak as it did till McCarthy's entry, it clearly fostered the growth of nihilistic and despairing tendencies on campus. It is hence basically irrelevant for Seymour Martin Lipset to point out that the alienated activists of the New Left represent only a few thousand people on all the campuses combined. What is relevant is that in some inchoate manner they articulated what many others felt. They did not create nihilistic despair, they gave despair a voice. Now that the political scene moves again, now that a thaw has set in, those on the New Left who are not willing to recognize the new tide and remain stuck in their old stance are indeed likely to become isolated and without influence. To prat-

Vaclav Holesovsky

tle about "participatory democracy" and then withdraw into the security of tight little sects will not endear them to the new activists. When thousands of new men participate in the democratic process, those that accept "participatory democracy" only on their own terms will be seen as cop-outs.

An appeal not to remain out in left field is not an appeal for the traditional idea of "coalition politics." About this I have never managed to share the enthusiasm of some of my fellow editors. As long as the war lasts, it has no relevance to the political scene. And after the war, if I am right in my contention that the young are about to help restructure fundamentally some of the bases of American politics, the old coalition slogan will be as superannuated as Johnson's Great Society.

A LAST WORD about the entry of Kennedy into the race. He is undoubtedly attracting some support among people who would otherwise have been for McCarthy. Some of the old party pros and their intellectual hangers-on will now flock to him. It is conceivable that he will outpoll McCarthy in a number of primaries. Yet it would be unfortunate, I think, if McCarthy were to give up his campaign before the Convention. This would be seen as a betrayal by the masses of young men he has attracted. And they will not enroll under the tarnished banner of the man who always comes after, first after his brother and now McCarthy. Were Kennedy to take over the anti-Johnson forces, a high proportion of the young might leave. This must not happen. At the Convention some kind of arrangement between the McCarthy and the Kennedy forces might well be necessary in order to deny the nomination to Johnson. But until then nobody should exchange his McCarthy button for that of the former Attorney General.

GOOD GRIEF, CHARLIE BROWN!

Headline in the *New York Times*,
March 24, 1968:

**NIXON, IN WISCONSIN,
APPEALS FOR RISE IN LEVEL OF
DEBATE**

***The Revolution Begins
In Czechoslovakia***

IN TIMES LESS ACCUSTOMED to disappointment than our own, the recent events in Czechoslovakia would be cause for jubilation and toasts to the progress of freedom. As it is, they *are* cause for jubilation and toasts but at the same time for worry and apprehension.

The Czech people has been overwhelmed by the prospect of realizing long-repressed dreams. Since December, steps of liberation from the totalitarian system have been succeeding one another at a spectacular pace. Long-despised potentates, starting with Antonin Novotny, are being toppled. There has been an outpouring of free speech on radio, television, and in print. The censors are asking to be relieved of their duties, and police organizations plead to have their activities clearly circumscribed by constitutional guarantees of civil rights. Soviet and East German attempts at interference with domestic democratization are being firmly rejected. Amidst the debris of totalitarian organizations, society is beginning to reconstitute itself according to the authentic needs of social groups. People are not *asking* the government to have their rights and freedoms returned: they are *exercising* them—freedom of expression, assembly, petition, and also the beginnings of free association and organization.

All of this seems almost too good to last. As a Czech daily put it, expressing a widespread feeling: "How long will all this be permitted? When will it be 'forbidden'?" The writer Pavel Kohout has a nightmare vision of democratization being turned into the new Party line, and implemented in the old style by the professionals of the totalitarian *apararat*, hunting for deviationists among the democrats. Students ask Dubcek, the new Party chairman, at an impromptu midnight rendez-vous: "Where is the guarantee things will not return to *status quo ante*?" And Dubcek's answer: "You are the guarantee."

The gnawing doubt remains: does the outcome really depend only on the determination and the political sophistication of the

people? The bloody denouement of the East German uprising of 1953 and of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 have been a constant reminder of the Soviet will to intervene with military power. Is there still such a possibility in the case of Czechoslovakia? Undoubtedly yes, but the probability is diminishing.

The moment of greatest danger was in January, when Novotny and his forces were preparing a military coup to get rid of the liberal adversaries. If the coup had been set in motion and begun to fail, one could easily imagine Novotny invoking the Warsaw Pact to call for the assistance of brotherly armed forces. A threat delivered *après coup* (*manqué*)—the unceremonious proposal to hold military maneuvers of Warsaw Pact armies on Czechoslovak territory—was also unceremoniously rejected. This psychological blow was to some extent returned when unofficial spokesmen dropped unofficial hints that Czechoslovak soldiers would fight if confronted with a Soviet or East German invasion. Now that the Soviet Union cannot coordinate a military intervention with anyone in a high position, the chances of an intervention seem more and more remote. And even if there were any faithful at the top, Moscow may wonder about their dependability—once General Sejna, the principal organizer of Novotny's still-born coup, had fled and sought asylum in, of all places, the United States! Soviet regard for world opinion (e.g., for the enthusiastic endorsement of the Czechoslovak course by the Italian CP) may also count for something in promoting restraint, though, judging by the Hungarian experience, not for much.

How strong are the economic sanctions at the disposal of the Soviet Union? Not too strong, we believe. The Czechoslovak economy is in the midst of a difficult attempt to reshape its structure so as to become less dependent on Soviet-area markets and to integrate itself into the world-trade network. If the Soviet Union decided to cut off some crucial exports to Czechoslovakia, it would provide the Czechs with a perfect pretext to ask the West for economic help, which may be easily or even gladly granted, certainly by West Germany. Besides, there might be some crucial commodities Czechoslovakia could deny the Soviet Union in retaliation.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union seems to have such a vital interest in stopping the new developments in Czechoslovakia that a recourse to desperate measures cannot be absolutely ruled out. One may argue that Soviet restraint toward Rumania sets a reassuring precedent. However, it may be easier for the Soviet regime to stomach dissidence in international affairs than to attend passively to the disintegration of totalitarian systems within its vassal states. The concentration on domestic *political* revolution constitutes a greater threat to Moscow than any Titoist episodes. Ceausescu depends for his political life on a suitably totalitarian environment, as Tito used to; he does not threaten the stability of the Soviet power establishment. Democratic revolutions do; they reverberate throughout the area and feed the hopes and self-confidence of democratic forces elsewhere.

It is my deep conviction that in the long run a durable peace can be founded only on the ruins of the totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union itself. To the extent that there is such a thing as a spread of revolutions, Czechoslovakia may at this moment be contributing to world peace.

THINKING BACK TO the year 1956, one is led to muse on the possibility that a version of today's developments might have taken place at that time, 12 years ago. During the Hungarian revolution, Czechoslovak Communists were trembling out of fear the movement would engulf their country, too.

Could it be that if Czechoslovakia had gone beyond the brink at that time, the Hungarian revolution might have been saved and the Polish October pushed beyond the point at which Gomulka's consolidation of the regime was still possible? Current history is once more posing the problem of synchronization of events in East European countries, and it invites a comparison of Czechoslovakia and the enervating struggle between unequal forces in Poland.

Is there a chance that Poland now will follow the Czechoslovak example in the near future? It does not seem very likely. As one compares the internal situation of the two countries from afar, one is struck by the narrow social base of the current democratic

strivings in Poland. They have been confined to students and some university professors, with the rest of society idly standing by. One is also appalled by the anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual campaign, chosen by the regime to isolate the democratic forces from other social groups, particularly since there is a suspicion that the strategists of the regime may know what they are doing: perhaps they do have sure-fire ammunition in popular anti-Semitism. However, the main reasons for the isolation of democratic intellectuals in the current constellation of political and social forces may be of a more objective sort. Poland did not go through an economic recession—as did Czechoslovakia in 1963–65. The prestige of the regime was spared a shock of such magnitude, with the consequence that no substantial reform of the economic system appeared necessary. If this had been otherwise, economic reform might have prepared the ground for further social and political dislocations, as it did in Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, the relative weakness of Polish democratic tradition may also have something to do with the limited impact of students and intellectuals upon the imagination of the people. During postwar industrialization, the heritage of social and political backwardness might have been overcome had the growing working class been in open contact with the educated. However, the “contact” between the “progressive intelligentsia” and other social groups, under the supervision of totalitarian organizations and press, may have antagonized workers against intellectuals in general, and perpetuated the narrowness of their political outlook. It is interesting to note that Novotny and his supporters also tried the maneuver of inciting the workers against the reformers, though with much less success, it appears, than their Polish counterparts.

For the time being, then, Czechoslovakia will have to go it alone. The most immediate international repercussions will probably come through a normalization of relations with West Germany which are aimed, on the German side, at prying East Germany away from the bloc and the Soviet protector, and engaging Pankow in direct negotiations with Bonn. Assuming we are right in minimizing

the danger of outside pressure and intervention, the question remains whether, to use an old phrase, the revolutionary wave will not exhaust itself within Czechoslovakia itself.

This danger, of course, exists. The spontaneous outburst of democratic instinct (if one may call it that) has been accompanied by an astonishing degree of self-control on the part of the population. The logic of the democratization process leads straight to an exit from the Warsaw Pact and to an elimination, or at least a massive reduction, of the role of the discredited Communist party as an institution. On both counts, present spokesmen of democratic currents have shown their awareness of this logical outcome, while at the same time understanding the need for restraint in the immediate future. People seem to know intuitively that a hasty denunciation of ties with the Soviet Union would be an unnecessary provocation, and perhaps a superfluous one, since these ties have implicitly been devalued in fact. And for the time they are willing to work for democratization by using the Communist party framework as an instrument. The danger lies in the possibility that what has until now been deliberately accepted self-control might in time degenerate into a pretext for the imposition of barriers to further democratization. Pavel Kohout's nightmare would then become reality.

Thus far, the spirit of the nation does not indicate any loss of momentum. Morally speaking, the Czechoslovak population has lived until now with a weighty chip on its shoulder: a sense of national cowardice. Three historical episodes have been waiting to be abreacted: the Munich surrender, the Communist coup of February 1948, and passivity during the Hungarian revolution. I believe that Israel's ability to take its fate into its own hands last spring had a highly invigorating effect upon the morale of the Czechs. We have living evidence of this in the person of Ladislav Mnacko, the Czech writer who went to Israel last year to gather material for a book on this very subject: the courage of a small nation. Now that historical events have offered the Czechoslovak people an opportunity to redeem their true or imaginary guilt-by-lying-low, they seem to be stubbornly resolved not to let it pass them by.

Emil Mazey

Writes a Letter to George Meany

We print below the essential portions of a letter sent by Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer of the UAW, to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO.

DEAR GEORGE:

January 15, 1968

I want to set the record straight.

Regardless of any differences of opinion we may have, I am obliged to call to your attention the utter falsity of certain defamatory statements made by you at the AFL-CIO Convention in Miami, and I believe it is your obligation to make a public retraction.

At Miami when you were commenting on the conference of the National Labor Leadership Assembly For Peace, you stated that you had read the resolution passed at our Chicago meeting "in the *Sunday Worker* two weeks before the meeting took place." That statement is a deliberate lie. You also said, "That meeting was planned in Hanoi by a special committee that went there." Another outright lie.

I would like to believe that you were misinformed, but that is difficult, since you twice claim *personally* to have read the resolution in the *Sunday Worker* two weeks before it was passed. That was impossible, of course, because the resolution was not printed in that or any other paper before it was passed. Nor can I believe that you really thought that a group had gone to Hanoi to plan the meeting. If you had, doubtless you would have named the persons involved.

What you have done is to cast aside the tenets of trade union morality and truth in favor of falsehood and demagoguery. You have equated dissent with disloyalty, and in twisting the facts you have slandered brother trade unionists including Pat Gorman, Frank

Rosenblum, Al Hartung and myself. None of us are thin-skinned. I have been blasted by many kinds of people in the course of my career and I welcome your disagreement with me. But that welcome does not include an invitation to so twist the truth as to accuse me of disloyalty.

You owe an apology to the millions of union members all across this nation for your fancy arithmetic in that same speech which led you to conclude that they approved of the Vietnam war by a margin of 600 to 1. The Gallup Poll found, as reported in the *New York Times* of January 3, 1968, that 43 per cent of the rank and file of organized labor feel that the war is wrong. . . .

Your conduct in this matter raises serious questions as to your personal integrity and your capacity to lead in the American Labor Movement. The technique of the big lie, the use of character assassination and the suppression of dissent must not become the hallmarks of the American Labor Movement. I believe that you know you did not speak the truth in Miami. The only issue is whether you are sufficiently honorable and man enough to admit it.

I call upon you to retract the false statements you made in Miami.

Sincerely,
EMIL MAZEY
Secretary-Treasurer
International Union, UAW

Mirror of Our Crisis

Economic Consequences of the New Federal Budget

MUCH OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET presented to Congress last January is already outdated. Expenditures for defense will considerably exceed the amount originally provided, while budgeted civilian outlays, as well as appropriation requests to support future expansion of civilian programs, will be cut back. These changes, however, do not affect the basic tendencies and dilemmas reflected in the budget. It seeks to finance the pursuit of international policies which, because of the growing military and technological prowess of adversaries, now exact (and will continue to exact long after the war in Vietnam has been settled) a large, possibly expanding share of national resources. At the same time, the budget seeks to fund programs dealing with deepening crises at home. Yet the fiscal system on which it draws has manifestly become too weak to sustain the financial demands made upon it.

It has become an accepted truism that international objectives conflict with domestic ones, and to trace inadequate provision for domestic programs to that conflict. The problem is not rooted, however, in the allocation of resources available to the government, but in the allocation of resources available in the economy as a whole. It is a problem not, or not merely, of government policy, but one that raises basic issues of social power: were the public sector to draw on the private sector to the full extent of "needs"—needs as defined, say, by the Administration in regard to foreign affairs, and by the Kerner Commission or the Freedom Budget in regard to domestic matters—a very much higher level of taxation than prevails at present would be required, as well

April 14, 1968

as controls on wages, prices, and investment.

Such measures could not be considered as dealing merely with a wartime emergency; they would be of indefinite duration, just as the controls on outflows of dollars for direct investment abroad, meant at first to be "temporary," have proved to be permanent. Such measures would hardly be acceptable to American society, any more than they were to other societies in analogous circumstances in the past 20-25 years: all eventually retrenched their foreign "commitments," since these had ceased to make political sense and since maintaining them would have spelled an economically ruinous enlargement of the power of the state.

That "America can do both"—extend the welfare state *and* fulfill its "obligations" abroad, as President Johnson and George Meany assured each other in a recent conversation at the White House—is belied by the budget, even though the country's enormous capacity to produce lends credence to the statement. The Federal Budget has, in fact, risen at a lesser rate than the national product, particularly when the "special expenditures" for Vietnam and social security payments (which are self-financing) are excluded: in fiscal 1969, total outlays minus those two items will equal 18 per cent of GNP, compared to 19 per cent in the late fifties. It is true that federal spending for health, education, manpower programs, and public assistance has been rising strongly—from \$5.2 billion in 1960, when it accounted for 6 per cent of the budget (minus social insurance) to a scheduled \$16.8 billion in 1969, or nearly 12 per cent of the budget. But over the same period, expenditures for

defense, veterans' services and benefits, interest on the public debt, international affairs, and space exploration—all of which may be regarded as interlinked in the support of the world position of the United States—have increased from \$74 billion in 1960 to an estimated \$113 billion in the coming fiscal years; as a proportion of budget outlays (again minus social insurance), such expenditures will have declined from 81 per cent to 77 per cent.

The indicated trend in welfare-state outlays must be viewed against the social decay which these outlays are meant to counteract. It is not news that they fall short of requirements, but by how much is not so well known. According to the Kerner Commission Report, manpower programs provided training opportunities for less than one-half of the unemployed in Detroit in 1967 (unemployment being measured on a conventional basis, that is, excluding the underemployed and those not looking for, although still able to, work); for less than 20 per cent in Newark; and for less than one-third in New Haven.

Similar gaps between funding and needs were found in education: under certain provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in aid to disadvantaged children, only 31 per cent of eligible students were assisted in Detroit in the 1967-68 school year, 72 per cent in Newark, and 40 per cent of secondary-school students in New Haven. Adult Basic Education, also a federal program, reached 2 per cent of eligible beneficiaries in Detroit, 6 per cent in Newark, and 4 per cent in New Haven. As regards housing, major federal programs have assisted in the building of "a maximum of 758 low-income housing units . . . since 1956" in Detroit, according to the Report, equivalent to 2 per cent of substandard units in that city. But some 8,000 low-income dwellings were demolished for urban renewal over the same period, indicating severe deterioration in the housing conditions of the poor. In New Haven, widely considered a

model city, low-income housing replaced 14 per cent of substandard units, but 6,500 dwellings, mostly low-income, were demolished for urban renewal and highways. Major federally assisted welfare programs reached 19 per cent of poor persons in Detroit in 1967, 54 per cent in Newark, and 40 per cent in New Haven.

It may safely be assumed that the Commission's findings for these three cities illustrate a *general* pattern of substantial discrepancies between available funds and actual needs as defined by the government's own tight standards.

THE TREND IN EXPENDITURES related to the international posture of the United States is more difficult to evaluate. The end of fighting in Vietnam would, of course, spell a more or less gradual reduction in total defense spending, at least for a period. Technological imperatives, however, are bound to keep military outlays at high levels, quite aside from the political and economic pressures working in that direction. These imperatives are exemplified by the conversion of Polaris submarines to the more powerful Poseidon system, by the construction of new-design nuclear-powered ships and fast-deployment logistics ships, all of which adds \$600 million in 1969 to the Navy's ship-building procurement authority alone. Defense research and development, together with atomic energy R & D, are due to increase by 8 per cent, to \$10 billion in 1969. While the space program is scheduled to contract further, the Defense Department's own space research effort will continue to expand. Continued advances in military technology are bound to result from R & D programs, and hence in rising levels of expenditures for military hardware, new generations of weapons, and new weapons systems. The evolving military technology of adversary nations to some extent compels an increasingly costly R & D effort here, and it is likely that the conflict between military and civilian claims on resources will persist

ment has been reached, and the military-industrial complex is in decline.

Given the relationship of political forces in the United States, it comes as no surprise that, on the revenue side, the budget reflects the caution of its formulators and preserves the status quo in the distribution of the tax burden, notwithstanding all talk about "austerity." As has been indicated, however, the scale of budgeted expenditures requires a much stronger fiscal system than the one available. The Administration has banked heavily on the "fiscal dividend"—the increment in federal revenue due to growth in the national product—in order to fund increases in the budget; but these have run much too high to be financed so painlessly. Moreover, the fiscal dividend is easily overestimated when economic growth slackens. In fiscal 1969 the Administration anticipates federal receipts to rise to \$12 billion, on the assumption of an increase in GNP of \$60 billion. Total receipts would still fall an estimated \$21 billion short of scheduled expenditures, unless taxes were raised. The Administration has accordingly requested a tax boost estimated to yield \$3 billion in the current fiscal year, and \$13 billion in fiscal 1969—whose enactment, however, still remains in doubt at this writing, since Congress has conditioned it on sharp cutbacks in the budget. These cutbacks are the more difficult to make if only because they would erode the political support of the Administration.

The reasoning of Congressional conservatives in delaying the requested tax hike is simple: a huge deficit will not only be widely interpreted as profligacy on the part of an irresponsible Administration, it also exerts powerful financial pressures in the economy which are politically damaging, and therefore of themselves compel expenditure cuts.

Economists generally accept the thesis that when resources are fully employed—and that they are is evidenced by the low average unemployment rate for adult males, extraordinarily high female labor-force par-

ticipation, and growing absorption of manpower by the armed forces—government purchases not covered by tax revenue tend to raise the price level. It is not necessary here to examine the subtleties of this argument. Suffice it to note that wholesale and consumer prices have been rising sharply over the past three years; that while money wages have also increased, real wages have barely advanced at all since mid-1965, even while output per man-hour has improved; and that the economic position of the poor and of low-income earners has deteriorated along with underfinanced public services. In addition, the heavy financing needs of the federal government have contributed to raising interest rates to historic highs.

The proposed tax boost (or surtax) would not by any means remedy the weakness of the fiscal system; as indicated, it would cover but a portion of the expected deficit. It would also worsen the economic condition of the average wage and salary earner. The Administration has made much of the small impact the surtax would have on family income, and has claimed that the surtax would still leave federal tax payments of the average family below the levels that obtained prior to the 1964 tax cut. To support this claim, it has printed what must be regarded as a rather deceptive table of illustrative figures in the budget document, as well as in the Economic Report of the President. According to one example in the table, a family of four earning \$7,500 a year and taking the standard deduction would pay \$737 in 1968 (including the surtax), compared to \$877 in 1963. This example leaves out of account the effect of inflationary prices on family income as well as of higher social security levies.

Let us assume that the Consumer Price Index will move up as much this year as it did in 1967, or 2.8 per cent. Then its rise since 1963 will have amounted to 12 per cent. A 1968 family income equivalent in purchasing power to \$7,500 in 1963 thus amounts to \$8,400. The federal income tax

until an international disarmament settlement (including the surtax) on such an income would be \$903, or \$62 more than in 1963—not \$140 less as represented in the published table.

Furthermore, between 1963 and 1968, social security tax rates and the maximum wage base to which these rates apply were raised considerably. Payroll deductions have risen from \$174 in 1963 to \$343 in 1968 (on an annual basis) for those whose annual pay equals or exceeds the maximum wage base (\$7,800 at present).

Thus, allowing for changes in purchasing power and social security levies, the family in the example cited paid \$1,051 in *total* federal taxes in 1963, and will pay \$1,246 in 1968, or \$195 more. The income *net* of such taxes would now fall somewhat short of its 1963 equivalent in purchasing power. In view of the pressures on family income which these illustrative figures suggest, the widespread if mistaken resistance to costly programs of social reconstruction is understandable.

AS A RESULT of the inflationary tendencies engendered by the budget, international price differentials have tended to shift against the United States, spurring increases in imports. Exports of goods and services still show a substantial surplus over imports, but that surplus is shrinking, and has become less of an offset against (dollar) outflows of private capital, government grants, and sharply rising dollar payments for U.S. military transactions abroad. The contraction in the trade surplus is by no means the only, or even the main reason for the deterioration in the balance of payments, but it has contributed to the loss of confidence in the dollar.

Although productivity abroad long ago caught up with productivity here, and the dollar has ceased to be the only "hard" currency, it nevertheless remains the key monetary unit in international transactions. That it is so largely reflects outdated con-

ceptions of American power and influence on the part of the U.S. financial establishment—conceptions hailing from the time of World War II and the first postwar decade when the dollar was the extension of the only strong and viable economy in the world, and when U.S. balance-of-payments deficits were hardly noticed and were amply covered by a large gold hoard. That era is gone, but the link of the dollar to gold, although attenuated, is still stubbornly maintained. Weakening confidence in the dollar has drained the gold stock, but it still represents one quarter of official gold holdings outside the Soviet bloc and China. Were the dollar-gold link to be dissolved, and were the dollar to be defended like other monetary units simply through sales and purchases of foreign currency, as some experts have proposed, severe constraints on dollar outflows would be necessary. A much harsher choice would have to be made as to whether to stop dollar investments abroad (although these yield profit remittances) or restrict military expenditures, whose balance-of-payments effect last year amounted to \$3 billion.

It would go beyond the frame of this article to delve further into the problems of the dollar. Let it simply be noted that America's power to impose international financial arrangements which permit, at the same time, large military expenditures and profitable business ventures, is waning. But the choice has been made: the capital-richest country has decreed restraints on capital outflows to a capital-starved world, rather than pursue politics leading to reduction in military expenditures abroad. Analogously, there are domestic political limits on the extent to which the American government can finance its war-centered budget by deficits; these limits, too, have imposed a choice, and urgent programs of social welfare have been curtailed. The candidacies of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy indicate, one hopes, that the interests of society will not be indefinitely sacrificed to the pursuit of fruitless foreign postures.

The Myth of the Guerrilla

WHERE DO THE GUERRILLAS come from? From which social strata, which environment? The answer can save us from many errors, for it eliminates almost the whole propaganda literature on guerrillas, both pro and con.

Most of the leaders, organizers, and volunteers of Latin-American guerrilla groups are intellectuals of middle-class origin. Workers and peasants are rare. True, an occasional transport or building worker may be found among the guerrilla fighters, and some peasants or agricultural workers may join a guerrilla group that establishes a *foco* (center) in their area. But proletarian elements are not the founders of guerrilla movements, nor are they characteristic of them.

To Latin Americans, all this is obvious. A simple reading of the newspapers in countries where guerrillas are active will prove it. News items report casualties, dead and wounded, and prisoners; names and professions are given, and the vast majority are those of students and sons of professional men—of doctors, government officials, bankers, and governors. And almost all are young. The first guerrilla imprisoned in Bolivia was Jorge Vasquez, student, son of a well-known historian. The five *focos* created in Peru in 1965 were set up by Luis de la Puente, lawyer; Gonzalez Fernandez Gasco, university professor; Guillermo Lobaton, journalist; Hector Bejar, journalist; Elio Portocarrero Rios, law student.

Here we come up against a contradiction between a vocabulary borrowed from European socialism, with generous use of the terms “working class” and “poor and landless peasants,” and a different reality that is

authentically Latin-American. If we should use the Marxist phraseology that is *de rigueur* among their sympathizers, we would say that the guerrillas are of ruling-class and middle-class origin.

A deeper analysis shows—as Latin-American sociologists like Fals Borda and Albornoz have demonstrated—that the Venezuelan guerrilla movement was born at the University of Caracas. On the Caracas campus the methods of urban terrorism and of mountain fighting were perfected; and from there came the movement’s theoreticians—men like Professor Humberto Cuenca whose books on the university, the army, and the revolution exalted the role of the students.

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COLOMBIA IS AN EXCEPTION regarding this view on the social origins of the guerrillas. There *la violencia*, a bitter civil war between liberals and conservatives, started in the 1940’s and lasted until the 1956 agreement which arranged for the Presidency to alternate between the two parties. In Colombia, the guerrilla bands and detachments of all allegiances are made up of peasants. But today most of these armed groups no longer exist, and city-based political organizations are trying to manipulate their survivors. A new guerrilla movement has appeared and has been much in the news, but its members are mainly students.

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WHY DID INTELLECTUALS, and especially young intellectuals, take up arms under conditions that were often suicidal? The answer is, of course, not simple. First of all, there is a generational motivation which, by defi-

THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA

nition, is ever renewed, and in a period of great social changes, as now in Latin America, it gains special importance. The father is the profiteer, the conformist, the hypocrite; the system to which he owes his fortune or power keeps the son out of leadership and authority. For the new generation, the system is not only morally to be censured—it also fails to offer avenues for promotion. The reaction of the young man is classic. Convinced that a new regime will offer him better opportunities than the established order, he goes into an ideological *maquis*—even if he stays quietly at home, as in the great majority of cases he does.

Another point to remember is that revolutionary factions often proliferate among the social strata that aspire to leadership—though any social system that holds out a prospect of jobs and power to its young intelligentsia offers an attractive lure. In many Latin-American countries, however, universities produce a surplus of diplomas which are unrelated to the economy's needs, and so political or industrial advancement is narrow and restricted. Student extremism can thus be seen as part of a general phenomenon: the pressure of intellectuals, professionals, and technicians in a society where they cannot find social space.

WHAT MODEL can appeal to the young intellectual? Yesterday, it was the example of Mexico, with its national epic, its popular wars, its struggle against foreigners, its revolutionary party in the government. In Mexico there is an unwritten but real guarantee that all the country's university graduates can participate and partake in the responsibilities and advantages of power.

CUBA HAS DEMONSTRATED, since 1959, that even a small country can make its revolution work, and that the great powers cannot stop it. The Cuban Revolution has a strong romantic appeal: the revolutionaries of the *26 de Julio* were a small band of 12 men

when they launched their struggle. Can there be better proof of the virtues of voluntary action? Some of these arguments have a ring of scientific certainty, fortified with quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Finally, the practical argument is made foolproof with a comfortable theory founded on the inexorable March of History, which abolishes most problems apparently invented by the lukewarm and the bureaucrats to curb revolutionary action.

Now there is a theory of guerrilla warfare. It did not exist when a handful of Cuban exiles disembarked in 1953 for their struggle against Batista. Until the day Batista fell there was no question of Marxism-Leninism, politico-military power, anti-Yankeeism, solidarity with the socialist camp, or struggle on a continental scale. Judging by the speeches, manifestos, and appeals of the *26 de Julio* movement, and even by the declarations of the first months of 1959, the only purposes were a true parliamentary democracy and a friendly collaboration with Washington.

PROCLAIMED BY ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, the theory came later. It was born of an a posteriori interpretation of the Cuban experience. It then generalized this experience, to apply it to all of Latin America

What does this theory say? First, that guerrilla warfare has only one aim: the seizure of power. Second, that it must be led by only one politico-military group. The guerrilla army is not an agency used by a party; it *is* a party. Third, if guerrilla war is to begin, grow, and triumph, it must be planted in a favorable ground: the peasant environment. Far from the cities which corrupt; far from organizations which, even if working-class or democratic, are conceived for reformist tasks and tolerate the power which must be brought down. To be sure, action in the cities, the struggles of the labor unions, political parties, and student associations are important; but they must be sub-

ordinated to the politico-military leadership "in the mounains," which is out of reach of political deals and compromises.

The characteristic feature of Guevara's theory is that it represents a technique for seizing power—a *counter-state*. In this it differs totally from the socialist concept—all socialist concepts—of the *counter-society*. Until now, on the doctrinal plane at least, all socialist schools have put their hopes in an evolution of society itself or in a revolution led by strata of the population within that society. The new thesis is: seize power.

To bolster and justify this theory, Guevara did not analyze in detail the national situations of Latin America. Like the young Régis Debray who followed him with much less experience but all the more assurance, Guevara merely presented certain factors which he considered evident and favorable: the growing pauperization, the privileged classes which can stay in power only by complicity with American imperialism, the collisions between the exploiter and the exploited which pose ever more clearly a problem of force.

So we first have the Cuban experience and the revolutionary Havana government born of that experience. Next, we have the theory that claims to base itself on the Cuban experience. Finally, there are the guerrillas themselves. But—the guerrillas contradict the experience.

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IN GUATEMALA, there are two guerrilla movements: the MR 13 of Yon Sosa, and the National Liberation Army of Cesar Montes, who succeeded Luis Turcios Lima upon his death. Both movements were born in a rebellion against the dictator General Ydigoras who ruled Guatemala in 1960. Yon Sosa had been an army lieutenant, Turcios a second lieutenant. For several months, the young resistance movement was easy-going, and friendships between the rebel officers and their old, regular army colleagues often helped the guerrillas get sup-

plies and keep in contact with the cities. Then the guerrilla *foco* became politicized. Yon Sosa came under the influence of a Trotskyist group, and Turcios broke with him and turned to the Communist party. But the repression by the Ydigoras government increased, and the army organized clean-up operations wherever guerrillas were active. Contact with the cities became difficult. Groups of the extreme Right took action against anybody suspected of sympathizing or cooperating with the guerrillas.

Now Yon Sosa is prudently trying to maintain his guerrillas' hold in a remote area. Cesar Montes, Turcios' successor, called *El Nino* (The Child) because of his youth, has chosen a strategy of movement. But it is a movement of perpetual retreat; there is no apparent possibility of taking the initiative.

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VERY DIFFERENT is the story of the Venezuelan guerrillas. In Venezuela violence exploded in Caracas, where a solid terrorist organization was quickly set up with the aid of the MIR (the Movement of the Revolutionary Left), a militant group which had split off from the government party, the Democratic Action.

At the time, the democratic regime had just succeeded the Perez Jimenez dictatorship and was still new and fragile. But the strong and intelligent President-elect Romulo Betancourt managed to gain the time needed to build a new Venezuela. He also realized that the Democratic Action government was saved by its strong base in the labor organizations—in the Federation of Venezuelan Workers, and in the rural Peasant Federation.

At first, the Communist party was hesitant; but it soon joined the movement of direct action, for fear of being out-flanked from the Left and of losing its hold on the young.

In 1962 the military rebellions of Carupaho and Puerto Cabello were crushed by

the army. But they left a legacy: military experts now joined the city fighters who had turned guerrillas. The police and the army soon recovered from this surprise. They studied the lessons of civil strife that had taken place in other countries, and soon they began to make life difficult for the terrorists, who had alienated public opinion by some murderous actions.

The general elections of 1963 were to decide whether the Betancourt experiment was genuinely popular. The extreme Left claimed that the people of Venezuela rejected this "electoral farce." But despite propaganda and threats, the great majority of Venezuelans voted for the Betancourt government. Soon thereafter urban terrorism was replaced by rural guerrilla warfare.

The political atmosphere in Venezuela is becoming less and less favorable to the guerrillas. Leoni, the new President, has won over some opposition groups with his policy of a "wide base." He reconstituted his government several times, to make room for men who had previously backed the guerrillas or profited by their existence.

The MIR guerrilla movement has split into several factions, some in favor of violence, others demanding a return to legal political action. The Communist party was also shaken; the fighting militants tended to reject the control of the political apparatus. When the Politbureau was temporarily out of commission because its members were in exile or prison, the military command of the Armed Forces of the National Liberation, which has a Communist majority, proclaimed itself autonomous, as did the National Liberation Front.

Since 1966 there is a new political alignment among Venezuela's guerrillas; it is composed of MIR militants and Communist leaders. It enjoys the support of Cuba, and sets itself up as a revolutionary force opposed to the Communist party. Polemics, exchanges of theses—then of insults—between the Venezuelan CP and the guerrilla leaders Douglas Bravo and Fabricio Ojeda,

soon moved into the sphere of international Communist politics. There now is a break between the Communist party of Venezuela and that of Castro's Cuba.

Such disturbances do not favor military action; and the guerrillas are now reduced to a small number and are operating in three isolated areas.

IN COLOMBIA TOO, contrary to the assertion of well-organized propaganda campaigns abroad, there is a distinct decrease in the number of guerrilla *focos*, the strength of their fighting units, and the size of their operations. Besides, there is no love lost between the detachments controlled by the Colombian CP led by Manuel Marulanda (called *Tiro Fijo*—Sure Shot), and the Army of National Liberation whose spokesmen are Fabio Vasquez and Victor Medina. Here as elsewhere, the Communist bureaucracy is accused of curbing the guerrillas instead of encouraging them.

The most dramatic aspect of the present situation in Colombia is the peace-making alliance between the liberals and conservatives, which limits itself to putting an end to violence. It does not aim at finding humane and progressive solutions to the grave social problems that afflict the people. For a dozen years there has been purposeless, blind, and bitter violence. It has largely ceased now; but the social problems that did unleash it remain unsolved.

OF THE PERUVIAN guerrillas only the dead, the prisoners, and the exiles are left. In Peru, the movement was started by urban revolutionary groups in five *focos* which were chosen primarily for geographical reasons and had no support from the workers or roots among the peasants. The Peruvian guerrilla movement would have made sense only if it could have participated in a vast offensive on a continental scale. Its leader, Luis de la Puente, no doubt conceived of it in that perspective. His operations greatly

alarmed the government and opposition parties and caused disputes between the President and Parliament; but as soon as a decree charged the army with "restoring order" in the guerrilla zones, the game was up.

The Peruvian army does not resemble Batista's old Cuban army. It views itself as the guardian of the great national interest and as an arbiter between the political parties; it has a politics of its own. Once in action against the guerrillas, the army merely asked for a chance to prove itself. Its detachments took the initiative: they constantly bombed, harassed, and finally liquidated the guerrillas. The "bite and flee" tactics of the guerrilla strategists could not be applied to an army that bit and advanced.

The great rural Indian population, which is moving slowly but irrepressibly in the last few years toward the reconquest of its lands, did not respond to the guerrillas. There is a discernable break between the trenchant, logical, yet unrealistic revolutionary positions of city intellectuals, and the peasants' tactic of constant pressure which is devoid of ideology but is acquiring the characteristic of a real revolution.

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THE GUERRILLA WARFARE attempts in Argentina's northwest (1963-64) and Brazil's Matto Grosso (1966) are already past history. In these two areas the creation of guerrilla *focos* was not linked to any specific critical situation, and so neither group gained any popular base. The decisions for action for these *focos* were made in the cities. Moreover, both the Argentine frontier border police and the Brazilian army are well-functioning machines which cannot be penetrated by the theses of antirevolutionary and student circles of the extreme Left.

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NO LATIN-AMERICAN GUERRILLAS, extinct or still fighting, sustain the ideas demanded by the theory of Che Guevara. The counter-state cannot escape the phenomena of the society it intends to conquer. The society lives on and transforms itself.

The guerrillas are not in fact the sole revolutionary center which can subordinate the many other manifestations of political and social life. The peasants have remained hostile to the guerrillas and refractory to their propaganda. The army is not necessarily a simple tool of a power or decadent by nature. It is, in a number of cases, the backbone of the state. It may even behave like a political party, and it can, under certain conditions, display initiative and enterprise. Nor are those in political power always absurd in their actions or lacking in imagination.

The guerrillas can progress and triumph from the small beginnings of a nucleus of revolutionary will only if the actions of the governments and leading classes are so crude, clumsy, and cruel that the people, and especially the most disinherited, can see no way out except for armed struggle.

The latest guerrilla experience, that of the Southeast Bolivian Resistance movement which was associated with Guevara himself, also does not seem to correspond to his theoretical scheme.

We must be prudent and ask the preliminary question of whether Nancahuazu was a guerrilla *foco* or a training camp. Such data as we have would indicate the latter. The choice of the place and the composition of the group suggest that the aim—at least the short-range aim—was not to create a guerrilla movement for Bolivia but rather a school for guerrillas in an area close to Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

But if, as the pro-guerrilla propagandists abroad say, it was really intended to launch a guerrilla war in Bolivia, under the conditions of 1966-67, then it was an unseasonable adventure, even in terms of the theory. Bolivia went through a profound revolution in 1952, whose results are land reform, nationalization of the tin mines, and arming of strong contingents of workers and peasants. The country has no class enemy, easily named and identified, who is traditionally hated.

THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA

In the power structure the military are preponderant, but one shouldn't be so blinded by formulas as to lose sight of simple facts. General Barrientos is a product of the revolutionary MNR party. Only three years ago, the miners' leader Juan Lechin asked him to be his Vice-Presidential candidate in the next elections. The MNR leader Victor Paz Estenssoro, who was then President and is now in exile, asked him to do the same thing, running with him. Barrientos is solidly popular in his native region of Cochabamba; his partisans there are peasants who have guns and can handle them.

The guerrillas did not install themselves in the areas where the tin miners are concentrated. Their camp was set up in the low tropics of Eastern Bolivia, whose few inhabitants are small farmers, worried not about a nonexistent land problem but about the problems of living in a "green hell." Any offensive would have to pass from the forests to the high valleys or the Altiplano—and this means climbing mountains 10-12,000 feet high.

The only advantage of the guerrillas—a good third of them non-Bolivians, the rest students, revolutionary militants, and a few recruited in the "base" itself—was their initial superiority over the army. The guerrillas included veterans of armed struggle, notably in Cuba. Their arms were modern. They knew the country well, after living in it discreetly for several months—whereas the army patrols were in a strange territory, and consisted of recruits from the Altiplano, with only three to four months' barracks training.

And so for a few weeks the guerrilla groups ran rings around the army. But then the military machine started functioning; and 2-3,000 men surrounded the area. Soldiers from the forest zones began to "rake" the suspect zones. The raw recruits learned while they fought. The end is known. It came exactly as in Peru—despite the presence of Che Guevara.

GUEVARA WILL CERTAINLY gain the tribute of those for whom his disappearance was a great relief.

First, the secretaries of Communist parties will salute his sacrifice, and continue to resist his tactics by all the means at their disposal. Next Fidel Castro, who could not bear to have at his side a revolutionary of the stature of the Argentine doctor, will pay his respects.

The great exchanges of ideological arguments between Chinese partisans and the followers of Moscow are useless to Latin America. The Soviet Union uses as best it can the old party bureaucracies. The Chinese have no official apparatus or commercial interests in these parts, so they can afford to preach radical methods. As for Castro, he is a chief of state, and as such must define a foreign policy that will enable him to last. Viewed in the light of principles, his actions are contradictory; he trades with Franco Spain and imperialist Britain; he bows to the Soviet Union, to which he owes his subsistence, but which he defies in Latin America.

The explanations governments give are not indications of their true intentions, and their ways of burying Che Guevara are no indications of their policies.

What, then, is left? The theory of Che Guevara has thus far not stood the test of experience.

In this period of great transformations that confront almost all Latin-American countries, the crudity of guerrilla methods, their romanticism, their adolescent courage, but also their taste for total power and their oligarchic contempt for the masses whom they judge incapable of achieving their own emancipation, will doubtless be replaced by a less exalted but no less difficult search for a revolution that would start from below; a revolution made by nonprofessionals, a revolution that starts from—and returns to—the people.

Translated by I. A. LANGNAS

One-Dimensional Pessimism

A Critique of Herbert Marcuse's Theories

HERBERT MARCUSE'S *One Dimensional Man* appeared four years ago. Since then, it has been widely, and on the whole, favorably reviewed, read, and discussed. Accepted by many as the long-awaited work that "tells it like it is," Marcuse's essay has assumed near-canonical status among some of the most serious and thoughtful of the New Left. An incisive and original discussion of community organizing in *Studies on the Left* led off by announcing that *One-Dimensional Man* was to be assumed as the theoretical underpinning for the detailed and specific analysis which followed—though the philosopher's theory could be taken to be sometimes downright incompatible with the authors' practice. In *New Left Notes*, the SDS internal journal, Marcuse's special philosophical vocabulary appears as unproblematically as if it were part of ordinary language. Marcuse's reputation in Europe is tremendous, as attested to by a news item in the *New York Times* last summer which described the tumultuous reception he received from crowds of Berlin students. Recently a weighty *Festschrift* for Marcuse appeared, and in March a front-page review in the Sunday *New York Times Book Review* section proclaimed him as "the foremost philosopher of the New Left." Even in the "bourgeois" press, Marcuse has made it.

Clearly the work has wide appeal. But in my view it is a great disappointment. Given the real and pressing needs of theory-hungry American radicalism and the danger of overvaluing any attempt, especially one which seems to be deeply rooted in profound if obscure philosophical traditions, it is worth-

while even at this time to try to account for both the appeal and the disappointment. *One-Dimensional Man* is an attempt to give a "total" analysis of our society, encompassing all major aspects of thought and action. It claims to unmask hopes for any significant possibilities of change from within the system. The note of pessimism struck is so profound that to be critical is to appear superficial, unaware of the despair which must accompany true insight. An example can serve to show how the tone of the book can evoke such feelings. At one point, Marcuse inserts a quote from Ionesco, without comment, though clearly with approval.

The world of the concentration camps . . . was not an exceptionally monstrous society. What we saw there was the image, and in a sense the quintessence, of the infernal society into which we are plunged every day.

The quote is not explicitly related to the discussion of technological rationality in the midst of which it appears. What should one say? My feeling is *no*, but I feel hesitant and defensive about it. I do think the camps were exceptionally monstrous and I don't think they are, even "in a sense" the "quintessence" of the society I am plunged into daily (or Professor Marcuse either). Which isn't to defend the goodness of this society unless one's position is so "profound" that "not as bad as Auschwitz" is considered a positive defense.

The kind of position here taken by Marcuse makes profundity a little too easy and smothers analysis. From such a stance all qualifications can seem unessential, petty,

and superficial. The total statement is tougher, more absolute, more powerful, and more satisfying; but finally, if offered as description and explanation, it fails. For precisely the differences and qualifications it overlooks are essential for understanding our situation, especially if understanding is related to decision and action. The vision of pessimism may express part of our mood, as in the Beckett novels which Marcuse commends, but offered as multi-dimensional analysis it can be numbing. It can lead to a sense that no action is really relevant or significant in a situation so totally awful and devoid of possibilities.

The book is an essay in philosophical sociology, an attempt to grasp the essential defining characteristics of a form of society by means of an analysis of its ideology. Marcuse's mode is to specify *the* ideology of the society as a whole in terms of particular realizations of general categories. We are given descriptions of particular uses of propaganda as exemplifications of the general category of "*the* language of the society," a particular view of modern atomic physics as *the* philosophy of science, a particular style of philosophy now dominant in England and important in America as *the* philosophy of "advanced industrial society," a particular approach to method in social science ("functionalism" and "behaviorism") as *the* social science of the society, and so on.

This style is carried through even in the more rhetorical passages, as in Marcuse's statement that *the* face of our time is seen in the novels of Samuel Beckett. The unqualified nature of this style incorporates fundamental ambiguities, empirical and methodological. First, a characterization of the general category—Art, Philosophy, Science, Language—is stated. As usual, such general description of what Art or Philosophy has always been are at best dubious. Then the realization of the general category for advanced industrial society is described in terms of the root metaphor of "one-dimensionality." *The* art, *the* politics, *the* language,

the social science, *the* philosophy are one-dimensional; they lack the possibility of transcendence or negation, possibilities always present in previous societies. These realizations are expounded in terms of particular examples, often extreme examples, the worst aspects of whatever activity or category is being considered. The argument is not an inductive empirical one, though empirical pronouncements are often made in the course of the argument. (We are told what *the* people think, how *Time* magazine affects *the* reader. No empirical basis for such claims is given, no qualifications are offered; exceptions are not analyzed.)

The effect of the empirical claim is really dependent upon the conceptual claim that the "totalizing" syntax is justified; that the examples or particular realizations of the general category are the defining, essential ones. No real argument justifying the "essential" constructions is, in fact, given (just as there is no argument to support the claim that the Nazi death camps are the quintessential image of the society we live in). What drives the discussion along is the repetition of the root image, the emotional appeal of extreme and powerful examples, and crucial confusions between empirical and conceptual questions involved in notions like "prevailing universe of discourse and action," and "possibility of transcendence."

HOWEVER DIFFICULT THE LANGUAGE often is to those who are not at ease in Marcuse's Hegelian idiom, the general thesis and overall structure of the argument are quite clear. The thesis is as follows:

The advance of modern post-Galilean science and the technology based upon this science have made possible an industrial society that is able to achieve a tremendous and constantly increasing productivity. Politically, the effect of this development has been to destroy the basis of revolutionary protest, to damp down social conflict to the point where historical agencies of social change disappear. In Marcuse's words:

Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing social change—qualitative change which would establish essentially different institutions, a new direction of the productive process, new modes of human existence.

... the capitalist development has altered the structure and function of these two classes [bourgeoisie and proletariat] in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation. An overriding interest in the preservation of the institutional status quo unites the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society.

What follows is the disappearance of meaningful protest as a society develops which instills the false needs it then satisfies. Society conditions a population to support its own irrational domination while thinking itself to be free and rational.

... the technological controls appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests—to such an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and *all* counteraction impossible ...

The intellectual and emotional refusal "to go along" appears neurotic and impotent. This is the socio-psychological aspect of the political event that marks the contemporary period: the passing of the historical forces which, at the preceding stage of industrial society, seemed to represent the possibility of new forms of existence.
(Italics added.)

The result is a false consciousness, a deceptive "Happy Consciousness," a "preconditioning," an indoctrination which securely integrates the society around its productive apparatus and makes impotent or meaningless any protest.

Thus emerges a pattern of *one-dimensional thought and behavior* in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that by their content transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and its quantitative extension.

At the conclusion of the book, Marcuse writes:

The enchained possibilities of advanced industrial society are: development of the productive forces on an enlarged scale, extension of the conquest of nature, growing satisfaction of needs and faculties. But these possibilities are gradually being realized through means and institutions which cancel their liberating potential, and this process affects not only the means but also the ends. The instruments of productivity and progress, organized into a totalitarian system, determine not only the actual but also the possible utilizations.

Marcuse's discussions of particular topics are designed to illustrate and substantiate this general theme. The metaphor of "one-dimensionality" expresses the disappearance of fundamental oppositions in our society, those oppositions which can be indicated by such traditional pairs as "fact-value," "is-ought," "reality-appearance," "potential-actual." The dimension which is dissolving is that of man's perception of the injustice, irrationality, and oppression which characterize the actual existence of all historical societies. This perception was always accompanied by a vision of a better, truer, freer existence, as has been conceived in art, philosophy, and religion; though such vision was presented necessarily in a disguised and sublimated form.

This metaphor expresses Marcuse's sense of the frightening uniqueness of advanced industrial society. The very society which has, in Marxian terminology, produced the material means for the leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom, has accomplished this in such a manner as to perpetuate "domination." Even more important, this domination, characteristic of "technological rationality," destroys the possibility of transcending the domination. This unique closing-off of possibility, this destruction of an entire dimension of human existence cannot but be the most frightening and depressing development in man's history.

In an obvious sense—implies Marcuse—this is the best and the worst of times, but the “bestness” is superficial and the “worstness” profound.

THE FIRST “STUDY” in the book is of “one-dimensional society.” The thesis is that technological society has made it possible to incorporate the proletariat into the system, in fact as well as in consciousness, by means of the welfare state. Using as background this conception of the welfare state as a stable form of oppression, Marcuse describes the concomitant cultural integration under the heading “The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation.” The claim here is that “high culture,” by being absorbed by the system which uses it as a commodity, loses its essential function of being sublimated protest. The alienation, the embodying of the tension between the actual and the possible, beauty as the *promesse de bonheur*—these essential characteristics of all art are disappearing. The massification of culture as a byproduct of democratization and technological advance has undermined the very substance of art, its critical potential, and its alienated truth.

In the sphere of sexuality also, apparent progress is seen as really a worsening of the situation. Admittedly, erotic energy is freed in contemporary society. But Marcuse conceives of the “sexual revolution,” the “desublimation,” as worse than the former repression since

the greater liberty involves a contradiction rather than extension and development of instinctual needs . . . it works *for* rather than *against* the status quo of general repression—one might speak of “institutionalized desublimation.”

Pleasure is allowed, but only in acceptable forms which dissolve those claims that are unreconcilable with the established society. In this manner, further submission is generated. The result is “The Happy Consciousness,” “the belief that the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods.”

Marcuse extends this cultural analysis to the “closing of the universe of discourse.” He wishes to show how “behaviorism” and “functionalism” characterize the language and thought of our society and destroy the capacity for critical two-dimensional language and thought.

Discourse is deprived of the mediations which are the stages of the process of cognition and cognitive evaluation. The concepts which comprehend the facts are losing their authentic linguistic representation. Without these mediations language tends to express and promote the immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence, the thing and its function.

Marcuse uses the term “operationalism,” as expounded by the physicist P. W. Bridgman, to characterize the identification of a concept with a set of operations. This “total empiricism” restricts the meaning of concepts to the representation of particular operations and behavior. Marcuse considers this type of “operationalism” and its counterpart “behaviorism” to be the “predominant trend in philosophy, sociology, and other fields.”

This is a very substantial claim, but Marcuse does little to substantiate it. Bridgman’s views, along with the logical positivist position of which they were the most extreme expression, have been subjected to quite devastating critiques, both from within and without the “neo-positivist” tradition. Similarly, such methodologies in social science continue to receive effective criticism; and for many scientists and philosophers, such extreme behaviorism as Marcuse constructs is a thoroughly refuted position. (See, for example, Noam Chomsky’s brilliant and scathing review of Skinner’s *Verbal Behavior*, and Charles Taylor’s recent *The Explanation of Behavior*, a subtle attack on behaviorism in psychology written by an analytical philosopher who was a leading figure in the English New Left of the late 1950’s.) The same dialectical situation of

accepted position and critique applies to anthropology, sociology, and political science as well.

IN A BROADER AND VAGUER SENSE of "behaviorism" and "positivism" than Marcuse's, there is such a predominance in American social science. The kind of "scientism" with its proclaimed "value neutrality," which characterizes much work in social science, often cloaks ideological support for the system in the guise of "scientific objectivity," as Marcuse shows in unmasking some examples of such work. But this sort of predominance is not startling to a radical, especially one who is conscious of Marx's contributions to the theory of ideology. This society is not exceptional in having key institutions like universities dominated by trends and approaches that are ideologically tied to and supportive of the status quo. What would be exceptional and uniquely "one-dimensional" is the disappearance of an opposition. But Marcuse does not demonstrate this, and the book misses what would be helpful and revealing in this context, namely a sense of the dialectic of the disputes and radical critiques being made within the disciplines.

Marcuse's view would clearly be that my comments are totally superficial; that these positions are not merely dominant but actually definitive of the activity for *this* society because they are truly the expression of the form of Reason which is embodied in advanced industrial society. The opposition is ignored and implicitly ruled out of being part of *the* society, and the ideological and institutional dominance is transformed into a monolithic conceptual bind. This form of argument comes out quite clearly in the use of examples. The author explicitly puts forward his examples as illuminatingly representative, although little argument is offered other than the feel of how, being extreme examples, they appeal to and reflect our fears. What results is a kind of armchair sociology of knowledge, a truncation of re-

ality, and a curious ambiguity in the extension of crucial terms.

For example, in the discussion of "functional," "operational," and "behavioral" language referred to, Marcuse wants to characterize the "prevailing modes of speech" as making the expression of opposition impossible. The explication of concepts in terms of functions is said to result in a one-dimensional language of "magic-ritual formulas."

Marcuse attempts to illustrate the thought-impeding style of this language in terms of advertisements for luxury fallout shelters, RAND Corporation "war game" instructions, specimens of political huckstering, news-column heads, and a passage from *Time*. The claim is that "clean bomb" and "harmless fallout" are "only extreme creations of a normal style." The passage from *Time*, also noted as an "extreme example," is analyzed in this manner:

A hyphenated attributive construction creates a fixed syndrome: "Georgia's high-handed low-browed governor . . . had the stage all set for one of his wild political rallies last week." . . . The governor, his function, his physical features, and his political practices are fused together into one *indivisible* and *immutable* structure which, in its natural innocence and immediacy, *overwhelms the reader's mind*. . . . Terms designating quite different spheres or qualities are forced together into a solid, *overpowering* whole. . . . The effect is again a *magical* and *hypnotic* one.

The kind of "good" language characterizing the possibilities of previous societies is exemplified for Marcuse by *The Communist Manifesto*. (I think this might be called "loading the comparison." Are we to take it that *the* language of nineteenth-century bourgeois-feudal Germany, the "prevailing universe of discourse," is best represented by the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels? If not, why this particular sort of comparison?

A critical aspect of this *a priori* sociology can be brought out by noting an ambiguity

in the reference of crucial terms, a tacit amendment to the "total" claims of Marcuse's syntax. Take the analysis of *Time* language: the reader's mind is "overwhelmed," the structure is "indivisible and immutable," the whole is "solid and overpowering," the effect is "magical and hypnotic." At another point, Marcuse says: "The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment." The tacit amendment to such characterizations is that neither the author nor the radical reader is included in "the reader" or "the people" (even if one sometimes looks, with anger and disgust, at an issue of *Time*, or if one owns a car and a stereo). My question is—how does Marcuse know so much and so exactly about the reader's responses? From a brief analysis of *Time*-ese, from the evidence of syntax? The sociological questions—who reads *Time*, what variety of responses are there, is there skepticism, does the same "language" and response characterize, say, the *New Yorker*, *Scientific American*, *Partisan Review*, *Fortune*, and *Ramparts*—are immediately raised in my mind. The author, however, does not seem to feel that there is anything more to be learned or that what might be discovered could make a difference in one's understanding.

But Marcuse also says: "the new touch of the magic-ritual language rather is that people don't believe it, or don't care, and yet act accordingly." Is it really all so clear? Is there any range between being hypnotized and "not believing"? No complexity or shading of response? Isn't there anything to be discovered about the nature of compliance and support, the apathy, the areas of dissent? What is the implication of the fact that we are not included—we have seen through it, we fight against it, write critical books, publish magazines, organize "free universities"? Why is it that the others don't (can't, won't)? Marcuse's "totalizing" analysis of extreme examples is not a sufficient answer.

The most detailed critique of the possibilities of the "language" of the society is presented in the central section of the essay, the discussion of "one-dimensional thought." This is the most "ideological" of the analyses, for Marcuse assumes that "it is the sphere farthest removed from the concreteness of society which may show most clearly the extent of the conquest of thought by society".

Unfortunately, this section is the weakest part of the book. The subjects are no less than science and philosophy in general and specifically in our society. The discussion of the essential nature of philosophy and its origins among the Greeks is extremely compressed, and, for me, almost impossible to follow with any confidence. The intent is to characterize good philosophy as "two-dimensional," dialectical, contradictory, able to come "to grips with reality," in Marcuse's phrase. Only "dialectical thought," he seems to be saying, retains the tension between "is" and "ought" (and of the other oppositions mentioned at the beginning of this article). This kind of thought emphasizes the necessity of changing the apparent reality in order to bring into being a truer, more rational, and hence more real reality. (In Marcuse's words, "Dialectical thought understands the critical tension between 'is' and 'ought' first as an ontological condition, pertaining to the structure of Being itself.") This "two-dimensionality" involves the notion of "another logic," "another universe of discourse."

There is good rhetoric here, but not much more. At no point does Marcuse clarify the notion of a "logic" or of "laws of thought." This would be necessary if one wanted to show how "formal logic" is a narrow and essentially conservative mode of thinking, a "logic of domination," "non-transcendent in its very structure."

The discussion depends upon unexamined ambiguities in the use of "logic," "contradiction," "real," and other related terms. Although we are supposedly given a contrast

between "good" logic and "bad" logic, at no point is the formal study of "logic," as in Aristotle or Frege, distinguished from the idea of "logic" as referring to coherence and consistency of thought and communication. "Logic," in this general sense of deductive logic or rules of inference, seems to exist in all languages and in all societies. In this sense, "logic" is a "linguistic universal." The "dialectic" as a style, a recommendation to conceive the world in terms of conflicting forces, within a context which should always be seen as characterized by possibilities for transformation, is not, therefore, a question of "logic," properly conceived. It is one of intelligence and insight. A logical contradiction will be invalid even in a good society, when all social "contradictions" will have been dissolved.

THE DISCUSSION OF "GOOD" THOUGHT is the context for an analysis of the nature of science and its philosophy. The line taken is the familiar one that science took man out of nature, separated value and fact, destroyed a nature conceivable in terms of "final causes," dissolved matter into abstract equations.

Marcuse's analysis of mathematical physics and the philosophy associated with it is singularly unenlightening. It is dogmatically stated, based on a pastiche of quotes from various philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists. We get little sense of the kind of discussions these quotes may be part of; or why a certain philosopher's statement, say W. V. Quine's personal and controversial formulation that "objects continue to persist only as 'convenient intermediaries,' as 'obsolescent cultural posits,'" is to be taken as properly and essentially characterizing the general terms "physics" and "modern philosophy of science." ("Obsolescent" is Marcuse's own misinterpretive interpolation.) Without a proper "dialectical" sense of the debates, such use of quotes gives only an arbitrary picture of Marcuse's own construction, especially misleading if

it can be assumed that most readers don't know much about quantum mechanics or special relativity theory.*

The key claim is that science "develops under the *technological a priori* which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organization." For Marcuse this means that scientific rationality determines a society of technological domination in which everything, including man, is treated "functionally" and "instrumentally." He wants

to demonstrate the *internal* instrumentalist character of this scientific rationality by virtue of which it is a *a priori* technology, and the *a priori* of a *specific* technology—namely, technology as a form of social control and domination. . . . Science, by *virtue of its own method* and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man.

Since Marcuse's discussion of science and its philosophy is so inadequate and mistaken, the claimed connection between science in general and domination is left completely undemonstrated.

But isn't the question itself wrongly posed? Science has not *led* to domination, even to a particular form of domination. It has been a crucial factor, of course, in the material and ideological transformation of the West, and now, increasingly, of the entire world. But the activity of science arose

* It is interesting to note that this approach to science and its philosophy is almost identical with that given by Hannah Arendt in *The Human Condition*, a book which in many ways resembles *One-Dimensional Man*. (Neither writer will thank me for this comparison.) The same essays by Heisenberg, giving philosophical interpretations which are highly controversial and are in any case obscurely and inadequately argued, are accepted without question as definitive of modern science and its philosophy. There are also striking similarities in the respective analyses of "functionalism" and "behaviorism" and the dreaded but expected "brave new world"-style behavioristic future for post-industrial mass society. But ironically, Miss Arendt writes from a profoundly conservative antirevolutionary perspective while Marcuse is revolutionary and Utopian.

in a society which was characterized by all sorts of tyrannies and domination, and many of the liberating forces of our age are essentially related to ideas of science and the various ways in which these have been interpreted. These include the development of socialism, Marxism, psychoanalytic theory. I don't mean to say hurrah for science; like logic, it is part of the general framework in which we think and act. The question should not be how science has maintained domination, which would have been better maintained by "non-science," but why didn't the development of scientific thought, by and of itself, lead to the free society? To ask the question this way is to see immediately that blaming or exonerating science is unhelpful at best. Why should science have accomplished this? What about everything else—the social institutions, character structures, beliefs, vested interests, which characterized the society within which science developed? What we need and Marcuse doesn't supply is a sense of the interplay between scientific ideas, technological developments, and the beliefs and values of man, as this interplay works itself out in history.

FOR MARCUSE, the "one-dimensional thought" toward which science has led is seen most clearly in the "positive thinking" of "one-dimensional philosophy." This philosophical ideology, the "school" of linguistic analysis, is claimed to be a travesty, a pseudo-philosophy, at best inconsequential, at worst tragically dangerous.

Marcuse's discussion of linguistic philosophy raises the general question of ideological analysis, as much by what it doesn't say as by what it does. If we take examples of ideological analysis like Mannheim's study "Conservative Thought" or Sutton's *The American Business Creed*, we find an analysis of "ideological productions" related to the individuals who produced them or adhere to them. These individuals are described as members of particular groups, characterized in terms of roles, institutions, and social

structure. Thought and social structure are mediated by a theory of some sort—crude self-interest theories, Marxist theories of class interest, "strain" theories of the sort prominent in American social science.

Marcuse's critique of linguistic analysis completely ignores the questions raised by this schema of ideological analysis. Social and institutional questions are not raised. Nor are the political positions of the people involved. The national traditions of English philosophy and its relation to linguistic analysis are not discussed. The claim is that, in crucial ways, this philosophy represents a radical break with all previous philosophy, even with the "two-dimensional" empiricism it evolves from.

What Marcuse hopes to show is that this philosophy reflects the positive thinking of advanced industrial society. This project would seem to entail a subtle and accurate description and analysis of linguistic philosophy. What we find instead is another instance of the fallacious kind of argument used throughout the book.

Marcuse takes as given that linguistic philosophy is a philosophy with clear and definite doctrines. "It identifies as its chief concern the debunking of transcendent concepts; it proclaims as its frame of reference the common usage of words, the variety of prevailing behavior." According to Marcuse, such philosophy permits no negativity toward the existing practices of society.

The self-imposed restriction to the prevalent behavioral universe makes for an intrinsically positive attitude . . . the pre-bound analysis succumbs to the power of positive thinking.

How these doctrines were proclaimed we are not told. Would the God believed-in by religious linguistic philosophers count as a "transcendent concept"? What exactly is meant by "debunking"? Does Marcuse mean that any attempt to criticize society is considered meaningless by the linguistic philosophers? What is meant by "the variety of

prevailing behavior"? And what is his evidence for characterizing linguistic analysis as adhering to "philosophical behaviorism"? (This subject of "action" and "behavior" is one of the most important areas of dispute *within* the "style," though if Marcuse's analysis were a reader's only acquaintance with this philosophy, he would not have the slightest idea of the existence or nature of such disputes.) As usual, we find the monolithic tone—Linguistic Analysis believes this and Linguistic Analysis makes it impossible to do that.

THE EXAMPLES Marcuse cites to illustrate his claims are from Wittgenstein and Austin, the two major figures of postwar British philosophy. Marcuse tells us that "silly scraps of language that sound like baby talk" guide the analysis of such philosophers. For example, he says "Wittgenstein devotes much acumen and space to the analysis of 'My broom is in the corner.'" A lengthy quote from Austin's essay "Other Minds" is added. These examples are supposed to support Marcuse's claim that this style of philosophy is destructive of philosophic thought, "and of critical thought as such."

This is a rather damning indictment, and one would have expected some sense of context, *at least* to be told what the analyses mentioned were used for. As it is, Marcuse does not give the slightest hint of the purpose of Wittgenstein's analysis of "silly scraps of language."

However, Marcuse does assure us that if such scraps appeared in Hegel, "they would be revealed as inappropriate or even false examples." But inappropriate or false examples of what? Does the sentence "My broom is in the corner" carry written on it that it will always and in all circumstances be an inappropriate or a false example? Since we are never told what Wittgenstein uses it as an example of, how are we to know even that he takes it to be a true example, in the sense that a truly profound

philosopher would show it to be false? Similarly for the quote from Austin on the basis of which a reader might think that Austin had written an essay on ways of being hesitant or on the taste of pineapples. But in fact the essay quoted deals with basic problems of epistemology. Professor Stanley Cavell, one of the most provocative interpreters of both Austin and Wittgenstein, characterizes Austin's methods and their effects in the following manner:

He asks for the difference between being sure and being certain, but what is uncovered is an initial survey of the complex and mutual alignments between mind and world that are necessary to successful knowledge. He asks for the difference between expressing belief and expressing knowledge (or between saying "I believe" and saying "I know") and what comes up is a new sense and assessment of the human limitations, or human responsibilities, of human knowledge, and so on. (S. Cavell, "Austin at Criticism," *Philosophical Review*, April 1965.)

Of course there is disagreement even among those who are vaguely called "analytical philosophers" on the worth and implication of the work of Wittgenstein or Austin. But Marcuse is clearly not interested in this nor in recognizing how such stuff could have ever been considered as possibly fruitful philosophical activity. I think that there is a difficult and important task to be done in the analysis of thought-styles and emphases and their relation to more general social circumstances (and analytical philosophy is a good case to work on). But this implies that the works themselves must be treated with appropriate subtlety and even sympathy. To put Wittgenstein down by mentioning a sentence he uses as an example really smacks of philistinism and is unworthy of Marcuse. One could apply this sort of critique to Kant or Descartes with the same result. Making the relevant substitutions in the Marcusean argument, we come up with: "Kant devotes much acumen

and space to the analysis of '5+7=12' " (a piece of second-grade arithmetic); "Descartes devotes much acumen and space to describing the melting of a piece of wax." The last step in the argument is to leave the reader to try to discover what on earth could have been in the minds of these so-called philosophers.

THE CRUCIAL POINT in Marcuse's attack is the repeated insistence that linguistic analysis makes "negative thinking" impossible; that it surrenders to "ordinary language"; that it doesn't subvert the given facts, as true philosophy should; that it leaves language in "the repressive context of the established universe of discourse"; that it gives a "behavioral explication of meaning." The contention is that this philosophy makes it impossible to think critically about our society because of its unquestioning acceptance of "the established universe of discourse and action."

This last phrase is basic to Marcuse's critique and appears frequently throughout the book. It is based upon a fundamental ambiguity of Marcuse's analysis which emerges most clearly in his polemic against analytical philosophy. In philosophy of this sort, questions of language are in general questions of meaning, and, as Cavell emphasizes, are simultaneously questions about the "world." One concern, among others, is getting clear on how we use words and thus on the conditions and problems of meaning and understanding. This is *not* equivalent to accepting the limiting of "meaningful" to "what most people say" or what is politically or socially acceptable to the majority or to the ruling elites. What is at stake is what *we* ourselves say and mean, when we talk about pain or love or fear or truth or freedom. And it is simply not the case, as Marcuse dogmatically states, that "to begin with, an irreducible difference exists between the universe of everyday thinking and language on one side, and that of philosophic thinking and language on the other." It is not the case

because I grew up and live in a "universe of everyday thinking and language," and it is by means of this language, used subtly, intelligently, and critically, that I learn valuable new concepts and new possibilities of meaning, including "philosophic" meaning.

If the difference were truly "irreducible," it would be impossible to explain the meaning of new terms, say "dialectic" or "transcendent." "The established universe of discourse and action" should be taken to mean "what can be meaningfully said and done." (This universe includes radical ideas and radical actions, as well as conforming behavior and television commercials.) The sliding between the statistical and conceptual connotations of this key phrase has been noted several times before. In the derogatory sense of "established universe," to be within it or to accept it uncritically is to lose the possibility of being negative, radical, critical, original, and so is to be "one-dimensional." But in the other sense, and it is this sense I associate with the best possibilities of analytical philosophy, there is no limit except meaningfulness (and establishing this is a problem, not an assumption to begin with).

What can be said in "ordinary language" is that this society is lousy in many ways; that it is immoral to waste vast resources in maintaining irrational and oppressive institutions while most of the world starves; that the lives of many people, both in the U.S. and in the countries with which it is involved, are twisted and their potentialities distorted by the prevailing values and practices of this affluent society; that there could and should be more beauty and truth and justice in the world. The refusal to accept the propaganda of the Establishment, the decision to protest and to live in socially and politically disapproved ways are as much a part of the universe of meanings as are the most conformist actions. That the number of such radicals may be small does not settle the question of what can be *meant*. It implies that, as always, those who are willing to go beyond generally accepted arrange-

ments and values will be in a minority and can have no guarantee that their vision will win out.

This core ambiguity causes much of Marcuse's critique to miss the mark. That philosophers discuss academic topics at all instead of attacking current political and social arrangements might seem to present a problem, given Marcuse's conception of philosophy. But then every other life activity except direct political action or critique would fall under a similar criticism. Why discuss problems of causality in physics when this is the world of Hiroshima and Auschwitz; why take time listening to music and going to see movies when every minute our government is committing murderous atrocities; why produce Molière comedies or paint abstract canvases when people are starving? I don't find these questions silly, but each of us has to find and live out his own answers.

Why then does Marcuse pour so much scorn and ridicule on this little-known part of the academy, so out of proportion as a target, given the subjects of the other parts of the book? My feeling is that Marcuse is expressing his anger and frustration at the apparent impotence of thought to break through, to bring about the necessary radical changes in consciousness he sketches in the concluding section on "The Chance for Alternatives."

THIS WHOLE SECTION should be read against the background of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, an essay that developed at greater length the utopian concepts which constitute Marcuse's vision of a "good" future. In *One-Dimensional Man*, the key concepts are "pacification of existence," "freedom," "liberation." The vision is that the "project" of scientific rationality would surpass its present structure and direction, and would become "metaphysical" again; industrialization would take new forms. Values would be translated into needs which would develop on the basis of "non-repres-

sive sublimation." The vision must necessarily be sketched programmatically ("liberation of the imagination," "redefinition of needs"), for there is a real limitation of the established universe of discourse.

The ambiguity between the conceptual and the empirical accounts both for the power of Marcuse's vision to express despair and for the confusions of his analysis. It reappears strikingly in his somber conclusion. He reaffirms his faith in "critical reason" but finds its powerlessness a source of despair. The quality of the despair can be related to Marcuse's Marxian framework. One-dimensional society, however wasteful, ugly, oppressive, and crippling for man, seems increasingly capable, by its irrational rationality, of containing social change, and containing it by consent, as it were. This implies the disappearance of real forces, of definite social groups whose existence would compel them toward the abolition of oppression. Without these social groups, determined in their very existence by the nature of the society which brought them into being, can any change come? Can theory, however critical, become practice in some other way; by changing consciousness within the affluent society, for example?

For Marcuse it seems that the answer must be no. This is the way history *must* work. His despair and anger translate themselves into the depressing sense that thought itself is becoming impossible. Even those seemingly favorable signs, like the civil-rights movement, must be seen as part of "the catastrophe of liberation," as signs of how totalitarian the society is becoming. For now even the most materially oppressed groups will be brought into the system; and whereas a blatantly oppressed and despised Negro population was by its very existence, if not in its consciousness, a threat to the system, a Negro population with apparent political power and opportunities for seeking significant economic advance will lose this existential aspect of "negativity." It would seem

to follow that peace movements, SDS, left-wing magazines and books can be taken most significantly as signs of the increasing power of the system, ways of letting-off steam, part of the society's fooling itself into thinking it is free and open whereas the true reality is otherwise. Better, it would appear, the old McCarthyite terror or worse, outlawing of student protests, police censorship of political publications; at least this would force some people to face the underlying truth.

This contemporary version of "the worse, the better" could hardly be more despairing and pessimistic. That hardly anyone in his most thoughtful moods could desire such a situation seems obvious. We want our freedoms and rights, and we think it is worthwhile to work for simple material gains, however small, for people whose lives are ground down by poverty. But, given the frustrations of a commitment to a vision of radical social change, the frequent failure to accomplish small goals—let alone the great transformations which are the ultimate motivations of hopefully "radical" projects like organizing a community union project in the Newark ghetto, being a SNCC worker in Mississippi, or forming a draft resistance movement—how can one avoid moods of deep pessimism? Such moods are not, finally, an accurate indication of our complex sense of where we are and what we can do. But my feeling is that much of the appeal of the book stems from Marcuse's evocation of this mood of blanketing and apparently omniscient pessimism, his rooting the frustrations of failure in an impressive if obscure philosophical frame which projects a society that makes "transcendence" in any area impossible.

TO A GREAT EXTENT this Marcusean pessimism is related to a romantic involvement with the image and rhetoric of the great revolutionary moment, the kind of apocalyptic transformation where one can see with satisfying certainty the success of one's

efforts in reaching the deepest goals of the radical vision. For Marcuse, the disappearance of the possibility of realizing this vision (for all the reasons that the book notes) provides a simplifying if despairing canon of historical interpretation. If rising standards of living, the elimination of sheer material oppression, the development of a semi-welfare state, the liberation of sexuality, etc. are factors in the conditions making the vision of revolutionary transformation completely illusory, then they are finally bad. What is ignored is the actual meaning of these changes to the people who experience them as real improvements, however meager they seem in the light of the Utopian vision of the end of all psychic repression and the transformation of man's instinctual structures.

The analyses in the book are attempts to justify this simplifying pessimism. But as I have tried to demonstrate, Marcuse's argument fails to support his thesis which, itself, is not interestingly new. In various forms it is the recurrent nightmare of an automated, sterile, passive "brave new world." Finally, the argument misleads by not matching our sense of the ambiguity of our situation, its confusing "two-dimensionality": as regards our political possibilities, the art we respond to, the dynamic of science, the meaning of sexuality. By denying this felt ambiguity within our own lived experience and by assuming an almost *a priori* pessimistic knowledge of the state of "the people," the meaning of increasing prosperity and welfare, the possibilities of art and sexuality, Marcuse has translated a justified sense of staggering and sometimes unique difficulties of successful "transcendence" and opposition into an unjustified vision of an almost complete conceptual impossibility. In this way, Marcuse has been able to construct a frightening metaphor of bleak pessimism.

But the real help we need is not in giving nightmares an intellectual structure. It is in beginning to answer questions about the

politics of the "totalizing" and "post-totalized" society. The old agents of history may disappear or be absorbed, but what will the new social and psychic strains and discontents be like in the prosperous, post-industrial society and how will the discontent, dissatisfaction, and alienation be made politically relevant, at least potentially? Should the movement be one of resolute opposition, gathering in and giving activity and space to those who become conscious of their alienation, thus hopefully building an area of "negativity" in American society which could become relevant in future situations the nature of which we can't yet clearly conceive? Or should attempts be made to work at least partly within the established institutions of the society, to attempt to affect, even if only marginally, the actual and potential destructiveness of American power, and to help in the totalizing process which is going on and will provide the context for a possible new politics? These questions are hard to formulate in

a clear way appropriate to the ambiguity of our situation, just as it is hard to explain the meaning of the unexpected phenomenon of the transformation not of "high culture" which Marcuse fastens on, but of mass culture in the form of, say, the Beatles or Bob Dylan or the movies.

A discouraging projection of despair built up by bad argument doesn't touch these questions; and despite the appeal of the tone to many young radicals, the analysis is indifferent between radical perspectives of community organizing and uncompromising opposition and, so to speak, "moderate" perspectives of coalition politics and working within the system. The whole spectrum of possibilities is swallowed up in the "catastrophe of liberation." We may not reach the understanding we need, but if we do, it will be with a little help from our friends; and that Marcuse, for all his intelligence, passion, and commitment, does not help, is the measure of the book's failure and my disappointment.

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Problems in the ACLU

MICHAEL HARRINGTON'S ARTICLE in the March-April DISSENT admirably presents the moral-political issues involved in various forms of "resistance." The American Civil Liberties Union has recently been compelled to grapple with these same problems from its own special angle. Which practices should it defend in the courts as constitutionally protected? Which should it support as positive contributions to the democratic process? Are there some which, no matter how one judges their tactical effectiveness, are properly outside the protection of the law?

National publicity was recently accorded to a difference of opinion in ACLU over whether the Union should give direct legal services (full representation in court) to the defendants in the Spock-Coffin *et. al.* indictment, or should file an *amicus curiae* brief in which it would address itself to those aspects of the indictment which endanger First Amendment rights. Such a narrow difference of opinion would hardly seem to warrant sensational publicity. Much of what the press wrote was faulty, especially the reporting of John Leo in the *New York Times* and *Village Voice*. But the reporters did sense correctly that underlying this tactical dispute there is a deep-going difference of opinion on the role the ACLU should play in these difficult times, and, beyond that, on the condition and destiny of American democracy.

The differences may, in part, be an inevitable accompaniment of the very rapid growth of the organization during the past decade. At one time, ACLU lacked the resources to take on any but pioneering "fron-

tier" issues. It had little organizational muscle with which to follow up the pathbreaking Supreme Court decisions won by its volunteer lawyers. But today thousands of members serve on chapter and affiliate committees and boards of directors. A budget of almost \$2 million and the professional staff on national and affiliate levels makes this possible and has greatly increased the organization's effectiveness.

All this has happened at a time of a rapid decline of many civil rights organizations, and the absence in American society of a political movement capable of uniting and channeling the drive for social change. The temptation inevitably arises to use ACLU itself as a political instrument, rather than as a guardian of the channels through which political change may be won.

The seeds of the present tensions in ACLU can be traced back to its defense of civil disobedience and defiance of local laws and practices in the South, even when such actions seemed to exceed the free speech and association doctrines of Supreme Court decisions. In explaining its defense (and, in a sense, support) of such practices, ACLU tended to give a number of different kinds of reasons:

1. Southern laws or local police ukases violated by the "movement" were clearly unconstitutional, and would be overturned by the federal courts. Thus, no disobedience of a valid law was really involved. The "violations" of law were in the nature of traditional test cases, even if hundreds or thousands of violators had stepped forward to make the tests.

2. The movement's objectives were, in the main, civil libertarian. Thus the usual relation between the ACLU and its clients was changed. The ACLU was not, in this struggle, solely a defender of civil liberties. It was, in addition, a passionate participant in the struggle for equality. It not only sought the *right* of Negroes and their white supporters in the South to march, speak, integrate schools, register and vote—it shared their objectives.

3. The Southern power structure's open defiance of constitutional guarantees, its willingness to engage in frame-ups, false arrest, perjury, subornation of juries, etc., within the system of Southern justice, and to support vigilante murder and arson outside it—all this changed the rules of the game for ACLU as it did for the "movement" itself. ACLU's usual stance of defending only those cases which are "on their face" violations of civil liberties was obviously naive if not irrelevant in a society such as this. It was the Union's duty to try to raise an umbrella of legal defense over every individual in or near the civil rights movement, almost regardless of the nature of the charge against him. (This meant, above all, direct representation and a client-lawyer relationship very different from ACLU's tradition.)

4. Finally, civil disobedience (and much more, up to and including armed self-defense) in these circumstances was consistent with devotion to democratic ideals. The obligation to observe valid laws while trying to change them is removed in a society in which the majority (or a ruling minority) systematically denies or violates those rights and liberties that make the democratic game meaningful for all. Only pedants could insist on the rigorous observance of abstractly valid laws (on the ground that ultimate vindication was likely in the federal courts) when the day-to-day reality for the movement in the South was a confrontation with

brute force hiding behind a transparent screen of formal legalisms.

AS THE EXCITEMENT of these dramatic battles in the South gave way to the tensions of the political struggle over Vietnam, there has been a strong tendency to transfer organizational attitudes and practices which were appropriate libertarian responses to the earlier struggle to a different kind of war between different opponents and on a different battlefield.

If the ACLU (and especially its Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee) could serve as a sort of house counsel to the civil rights movement in the South, why not perform the same function for the embattled antiwar movement, and especially for that section of it whose resistance to the draft brings it into direct confrontation with the law?

Are not the U.S. government's actions in Vietnam (and hence the economic, social, and military measures required to support them) as illegal and unconstitutional as Governor Wallace standing in the door? Are not the soldiers on guard against an announced plan to occupy and paralyze the Pentagon performing a role indistinguishable from that of the Alabama State Police on the Selma overpass? Are not the obstacles put in the way of getting new parties on the ballot equivalent to the cynical disfranchisement of Negroes in Mississippi?

These kinds of comparisons have not proved too persuasive within ACLU. The special conditions of the struggle in the South was created not *primarily* by the fact that immoral social practices were institutionalized (Jim Crow), but by the wholesale, systematic violation of civil liberties which was resorted to in the effort to maintain them. One advantage of a legalistic tradition and training is that court-made law relies heavily on *distinguishing* the circumstances in which a given act may be banned from similar ones in which it is legal. Thus the ACLU Board of Directors has re-

sisted the kinds of arguments that identify the present circumstances with those imposed on the civil rights movement in the South.

But other logical skeins may be more difficult to unravel. ACLU has defended acts like burning flags or draft cards as "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment. Demonstrations, sit-ins, kidnapping navy recruiters, burning down ghettos—who could deny that people who do such things are "saying something" to society? But clearly a point is reached at which the element of "symbolic speech" in an action may be over-ridden by other elements. Should the ACLU try to propose general criteria or guidelines on the limits of defensible demonstrative actions, limits beyond which it, as an organization, will not seek to defend them? Or shall it act like a private lawyer ready to defend all persons arrested in the course of expressing themselves, leaving it up to the courts to draw the line of legality?

One of the indices of a society's civilization is its willingness to make room for the acting-out of a wide variety of deeply-felt beliefs or stubbornly held opinions. That is, after all, what we mean by "conscience" in the argument over the exemption of conscientious objectors from obligations the government puts on the general citizenry. And there is a legal principle that when the government imposes a burden on a citizen, it can be required to show that the harm done the individual is essential to the effectuation of a lawful public purpose.

Does it follow from the previous two propositions that anyone who asserts a stubbornly held opinion that a given law is wrong or bad must be exempted from its provisions as a matter of constitutional right, unless the government can prove that universal compliance is necessary to the effectuation of a lawful purpose? Such a proposition was rejected by ACLU two years ago.

But as the war in Vietnam grinds along, an increasing number of Americans become

persuaded that its continuation reflects not only on the wisdom of the Administration, but on political processes which seem inadequate to compel it to change its policies. Some go beyond criticism of specifically American political mechanisms to reach generalized conclusions about the failure of the idea of democracy.

This sentiment finds a certain echo in ACLU too: The democratic process, the marketplace of ideas, and freedom of speech have become a snare and a delusion. Resistance, insurgency are "meaningful" ways of dealing with the realities of how power is seized and used. The quicker ACLU sheds its old notions that its mission is to keep the political and judicial processes civilized, the better. It can only become "relevant" as the legal arm of the new insurgency.

It is perhaps ironic that such views should find advocates in the American Civil Liberties Union, of all places. But then, on second thought, it does not seem so strange. One of the fascinating paradoxes of our society is that its least democratic political institution, the judiciary, has proved essential to the preservation and extension of democracy. One consequence of being too long and too heavily involved with this paradox can be a tendency to cynicism about the political capacities of a nation which requires such a mechanism to save its own freedom from itself.

THE EXISTENCE OF A JUDICIARY with the power to review and overturn legislative enactments and administrative decisions is a deviation from pure democracy. Implicit in the separation of powers is the notion of the need for an institution set apart from and, if you will, above the political battle, whose job it is to keep any majority from trampling the irreducible rights of a political opposition.

In this country the private, nongovernmental, special-purpose organizations also play a unique role in keeping ours a relatively open society. And one of the essential

features of such organizations is their willingness to stick to the relatively narrow, pragmatic task each has set for itself. In this sense they are unlike the major political parties on the one hand (who are, in large measure, loose alliances of political job-holders) or the ideological sects on the other (who develop a complete *Weltanschauung* for their members).

What success the ACLU has enjoyed in its chosen field has resulted, in large measure, from its ability to recruit to its leadership people holding widely diverse socioeconomic-political views, and to persuade a fairly broad and influential section of American society that its purposes are really limited: to maintain due process in the judicial system; protected dissent and advocacy in politics; freedom of expression in the arts and academies; and equal protection of the laws for all without distinction.

Inevitably, in a time like this, the pressure arises to enlist the ACLU in the political battle itself. And there are plausible arguments: the war itself is unconstitutional and immoral, and will constitute an increasing threat to civil liberties if it continues. Therefore ACLU should oppose the war, rather than merely defending the right of individuals and parties to do so. Men are indicted for refusing to register for the draft, or to serve when called, or for counseling violations of the law. In many instances ACLU's legal support would be given on First Amendment, due process, or equal protection grounds. But if ACLU itself proclaims the war illegal or unconstitutional, its voice can be joined with its clients' voices in wholehearted denunciation of the war; and it can oppose prosecutions of persons for violating laws passed to further the war, no matter how valid or unrelated to civil liberties such laws would otherwise be.

Such a posture would mean, of course, that civil libertarians who support the war, or opponents of the war who believe that American democracy requires (and permits) that it be stopped at the polls rather than by a political strategy of civil disobedience or guerrilla resistance, would tend to lose confidence in ACLU's role. Failure to adopt such a position (or to conduct ACLU litigation as if it had been adopted) exposes the Union to loss of support from sincere members to whom the war is such an overriding threat to democracy that no holds are barred in trying to stop it.

There lies much of the difficulty. The most fruitful role for ACLU cannot really be deduced from one's answer to the question: are you opposed to the war in Vietnam? For an opponent of the war, like myself, can believe that an effective ACLU will serve the antiwar cause best by just keeping the democratic channels open in America; and that to be truly effective, ACLU must preserve its hard-won disinterestedness.

But, to be perfectly frank, I do not know whether I could maintain that position if I believed that the war signals the death of meaningful democracy in America. If our democracy is really finished, or if each day the war goes on this country and the world suffer a greater catastrophe than our civilization can bear, then sacrificing the role ACLU might play in future years would be a cheap price to pay, if by plunging it into the political struggles now we could hope to end the war in Vietnam one day sooner.

After all, I am concerned with ACLU's effectiveness because I think it will continue as an essential instrument in the fight for civil liberties. And that struggle will stretch as far into the future as I can see. That is a stubbornly held opinion on the condition and destiny of American democracy.

Black Writing: The Other Side

One ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body whose dogged strength keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both Negro and American. . . .

—W. E. B. DuBois

WHEN PEOPLE SAY “the Negro struggle,” they usually have in mind those groups and activities that represent the effort to achieve the democratic integration of American institutions, an effort inspired by the belief that the Negro, whatever his differences, is as American as anybody else. Seldom, and only recently, are they also thinking of groups and activities dedicated to the achievement of black power, black nationalism, and black separatism.

It is the same with Negro writing. Most people mean the term to apply to those writers and works that, while rooted in Negro experience and reflecting a Negro viewpoint, have addressed themselves to a general audience and have affirmed the principle of a Negro American identity within American culture. Only a handful of people consider as Negro writing that segment which is aimed exclusively at a black audience—at the psychic and political needs of black people—and which is inspired by a belief in racial and cultural separatism. The reason is simple. Not many people know about the writers who hold to this belief; with one or two exceptions, their work and their ideas are not widely publicized.

Their general outlook is summed up in a

remark by LeRoi Jones, himself the most prominent black nationalist literary figure: “Let no one convince any black man he is as American as anybody else.” This is not, we must admit, sheer fantasy; it may not be informed by moral vision, but there would seem to be a good deal of social evidence to support it. In any event, if the majority of Negroes still tend to resist Jones’s injunction, it is not because it does not sound true to them, but because in their moral imaginations it cannot be allowed to become true. (Their history and their experience in America would have no meaning otherwise.)

And it is not only black separatists that the majority of Negroes have to resist, for on some of the fundamental questions of Negro American life today there is a remarkable correspondence between the outlook of black separatists and that of white bigots. Murray Kempton, in remarking upon one aspect of white bigotry, observed not long ago that anything in this country that is given to Negroes is no longer worth having—a remark which, in fairness to Kempton, should not be read as an account of his own attitude. The majority of Negroes will resist this notion on the same basis that they resist Le Roi Jones’s notion that

they are not as American as anybody else, because both views mean essentially the same thing.

Black nationalists, however, are not only convinced that all of this is true; they are certain it represents the terms on which the majority of white Americans are going to finally make up their minds whether or not the principle of equality itself is worth sharing with Negroes. Thus they have lost interest in the idea that America itself is worth having. Blackness has emerged in their minds as the only absolute worth affirming. Of prior importance now is the necessity to celebrate its beauty and its dignity; to create a literature in its behalf; to achieve its political freedom; and to mark it off as a separate and independent enclave of cultural sensibility and social outlook.

ALL OF THIS marks not only a disillusionment and an end of communication with the society at large, but also a break with, or a reaction against, that traditional attitude in black writing which has consistently upheld the value of such communication, which has called attention to those grievances in the society that needed to be redressed and those virtues in both black and white life that needed to be affirmed. It is this attitude that has made the older writers very Negro and very American at the same time, and that places them in what for want of a better term must be called the serious intellectual mainstream of American writing.

A list of the Negro writers who have functioned in this way would be very long indeed, but it would include such significant names as James Baldwin, Gwendolyn Brooks, Ralph Ellison, Lorraine Hansberry, Chester Himes, Langston Hughes, John Oliver Killens, Ann Petry, Melvin B. Tolson, Jean Toomer, John A. Williams, and Richard Wright. Aside from the special racial experience that determined or influenced their perspective on American life,

their social and moral attitudes were shaped by some of the same forces that shaped the outlook of many other American writers who matured between the early 1920's and the late 1950's. Some of the factors that come most readily to mind are: the tradition of Western literature itself; the early politics of Communism at home and abroad; the two world wars; the great Depression and the New Deal; the Spanish Civil War; the invasion of Ethiopia; McCarthyism and the Cold War; Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the Eisenhower years in America.

What Ellison finds about the sources and motivations of his own writing can apply to many of the traditional Negro writers as well:

The point of our struggle was to be both Negro and American and to bring about that condition in American society in which this could be possible. . . . Fiction became the agency of my efforts to answer the questions: Who am I, what am I, how did I come to be? What shall I make of the life around me, what celebrate, what reject, how to confront the snarl of good and evil which is inevitable? What does American society mean when regarded out of my own eyes, viewed by my own complex sense of the present? How, in other words, should I think of myself and my pluralistic sense of the world, how to express my vision of the human predicament, without reducing it to a point which would render it sterile before that necessary—though enhancing—reduction which must occur before the fictive vision can come alive? . . . More important and inseparable from this effort was the necessity of determining my true relationship to that body of American literature to which I was most attracted and through which, aided by what I could learn of the literatures of Europe, I would find my own voice.

THE YOUNG BLACK NATIONALISTS are not so. They are indifferent to the history of Western literature, and they find that they are not interested in issues and problems of human experience that do not have an imme-

diate bearing upon the life they live as blacks. Thus some of the themes that most stir them are the continued existence of racism in America, the emergence of Africa, the revolutionary politics of the Third World, the life and death of Malcolm X, and the war in Vietnam.

Aside from LeRoi Jones and, recently, William Melvin Kelly, one is not likely to come upon the work of these writers, most of them poets, unless one reads such publications as *The Journal of Black Poetry*, published in San Francisco; *Black Dialogue*, a literary quarterly published on the West Coast; *Negro Digest*, published in Chicago; and *Soul Book*, *Liberator*, and *Freedomways*, published in New York. Some of those who are most admired as black nationalist writers are the poets Lawrence Neal, A. B. Spellman, Ed Spriggs, Youssef Raghman, Willie Kghostitisile, Marvin Jackman, Don Lee, Sonia Sanchez; fiction writers C. H. Fuller, Jr., and Charles Russell; and playwrights Ed Bullins and Ron Miller.

Not surprisingly, they find political and aesthetic inspiration in the works of Fanon, particularly his exposition in *The Wretched of the Earth* of the three phases in the development of native writers. In the third phase, says Fanon, the native writer "turns himself into an awakener of the people; hence comes a fighting literature, a revolutionary literature, and a national literature." Responding to Fanon's prescription, C. H. Fuller writes in the July 1967 issue of *Liberator*: "Many black writers and artists . . . are consistently refusing, in the name of individuality, creativity, and freedom of expression to move toward Fanon's final stage, where the bulk of the black community is waiting. We, the black community, seek direction, solutions to our problems and our needs . . ."

There are others whose ideas stop short of political and cultural revolution but who believe no less in the need to develop a separate black culture and literature. Says

John O'Neal, one of the founders of the Free Southern Theater:

Our feeling is that black writers must develop in the context of black audiences. Only in this way can their work have immediate relevance and avoid the necessity of having to explain to white audiences what blacks already take for granted. We do not see ourselves as playing a political role, but we realize that what we do has political implications.

If there is an ideological position in the spectrum of resurgent black literary thinking that ought to be defended and does not violate the interests to which art and literature are committed, it is the one taken by Douglas Turner Ward of the Negro Ensemble Company when he calls for

a theater concentrating primarily on themes of Negro life, but also resilient enough to incorporate and interpret the best of world drama—whatever the source. A theater of permanence, continuity and consistency, providing the necessary home base for the Negro artist to launch a campaign to win his ignored brothers and sisters as constant witnesses to his endeavors. This is not a plea for either a segregated theater, or a separatist one. Negroes constitute a numerical minority, but Negro experience, from slavery to civil rights, has always been of crucial importance to America's existence. There's no reason why whites could not participate in a theater dedicated to exploring and illuminating that experience if they found inspiration in the purpose.

WILLIAM MELVIN KELLY AND LAWRENCE NEAL are two of those who speak out strongly in behalf of the necessity for black separatist writing. In the case of Kelly, his conversion to separatism has been relatively recent, beginning perhaps with his last book of fiction, *Dem*, of which he says: "I've written it for black people. I've turned the whole process on its head. Instead of writing about what American society has done to black people, I've tried

to write about American society in terms of what it is doing to itself and what it is. If black people read it, they can understand what America is and why it is doing what it is doing to them."

His first three books—the collection of stories called *Dancers on the Shore* and the novels *A Different Drummer* and *A Drop of Patience*—had been written from a broader perspective. In a short preface to *Dancers* he had found it necessary to remark:

An American writer who happens to have a brown skin faces this unique problem: Solutions and answers to the Negro Problem are very often read into his work. . . . At this time, let me say for the record that I am not a sociologist or a politician or a spokesman. Such people try to give answers. A writer, I think, should ask questions. He should depict people, not symbols or ideas disguised as people.

In itself, there is nothing deplorable or surprising in the fact that a writer's sensibility or outlook changes; indeed, one of the personal uses of fiction or art to those who make it is that it offers them a way to discover and explore the drifts and tendencies in their development. This shift in Kelly's outlook, whatever questions of belief or aesthetics it might raise, is also, I think, a sincere effort to resolve or understand certain contradictions in his social background, his education, and the reality of what it means in America to be black.

Kelly, a native New Yorker, is now 30 years old. He was educated at the Fieldston School and at Harvard. He has taught literature at the New School for Social Research and at Bard College. Last summer, with his wife and young daughter, he left New York to live in Paris. Two weeks before he left, he told me:

I USED TO FEEL we were totally cut off from Africa but the more I look into it the more I realize how African we are. We have taken Christianity and given it things it

never had before. The whole business of trance and talking tongues are very African things.

I am going to Paris not because I love the French so much but because I want to learn to speak French. Then I can speak to other black people who speak French. I'd also like to learn Arabic and Swahili. I want to write books that black people can understand, books that really express African experience. The older black writers have been talking mainly to the white man. Some of us, the younger ones, want very much to talk to black people. I don't see any point in talking to the white man about what he has done to us, since I really believe that he knows. What the black writer must do is, first of all, analyze for black people what has been done, starting with the facts; telling black people about the nature of Western society and then trying to formulate some type of philosophy that will help us get free.

I think of myself, at least, formerly, as one of the most integrated people that the society has produced. And because I was one of the most integrated, I was one of the most messed up mentally, one of the most brainwashed. All the private school and Harvard education I've had is something I've had to get over. I think that one of the problems about an integrated person is that he is most at home with white people but feels most inferior to white people. On the other hand, he feels most superior to black people but most afraid of black people. . . .

In some of the reading I've done I've found that African writers and most non-Western writers do not make a separation between art and life. Art and life and politics are all tied together. To carry the weight of our ideas the novel has got to be changed. We are trying to tap some new things in a form which is not our form. So we must introduce some changes in the form. There is precedence for this. American writing is not the same as European writing. And Twain broke it open by using vernacular narrative in writing. He changed it to bear the weight of his ideas. We have to change it too to bear the weight of ours.

Our literary tradition is essentially the African literary tradition which is not a written tradition. It is basically oral and I think black writers must begin to think in some of those terms, to use the fantastic oral language that has developed.

If I find any fault with the older black writers, with the exception of Richard Wright, it is that they have been working too much in the Western literary tradition and not enough in the African tradition. This is one of the things I want to do. I don't want to do anything in the psychological tradition. I think that the mythic, and supernatural, tradition is much more the way we think. I find nothing in Ellison that I can use. I find nothing in Baldwin that I can use. LeRoi Jones and I are about the same age, and I feel that there are some similarities and some differences. But on the whole his sensibility is the one I'm closest to. He may have been talking to white people, there's no telling what he's doing now. I have a feeling he is getting further away.

There's no basic reason why we should talk to white people. Dostoevsky did not talk to the Germans but to the Russians. Proust did not talk to the Russians but to the French. And we have to talk to our own people. . . . A book like Claude Brown's book may be very interesting as a sociological document, but he's not really telling people of Harlem anything that they don't know already. What we have to do is to tell black people of Harlem things they don't know. I've been reading quotations from Chairman Mao and one of the things he says is that first we should look at the facts. I don't think the mass of black people yet trust black writers, because the black writer has yet to tell them anything they can use. . . .

Most people mention *Native Son* when they talk about Richard Wright. But the book I think of when I talk about Wright is *The Outsider*, the book he wrote after he left the U.S. Wright was saying in that book that we cannot solve our problems within the Western political spectrum, that we must find our own political philosophies,

and that we must renounce both the Right and the Left in America because both of them are racist in their outlook. I am interested in this myself because a lot of people condemn Wright for having left the country. I think our problems cannot be solved within the framework of America. It's like a dog trying to find its tail, or a man trying to psychoanalyze himself. . . .

I don't think that as a black writer I'm different simply because I'm a writer. It just happens to be the thing I do. Some people can do a number of other things. I think James Brown is every bit as important an artist as I am. I think he embodies more of Negro folk culture than a lot of the more sophisticated people. I think he transmits black culture in a profound way. I think a hundred years from now if people want to find out what black people were in this country they will be listening to James Brown's records rather than reading Ralph Ellison. Ellison is too far from them, and I think Baldwin is too far away from them. . . . What I am trying to get back to and forward to at the same time are the things that have remained the same about us and are the bases of our strength. They are the things that have formed our traditions, the things that have saved us. Some of these things have been that we do have an African viewpoint toward the society. As Malcolm says, "we don't say *our* government, we say *the* government."

One of the reasons I think we should try and remain separate is because right now we are not taking part in the exploitation of the rest of the world that America is carrying out. We are not responsible. I talk to other colored people from other parts of the world and they feel we are helping to put down their struggle. I'm not sure if in a hundred years we'll be able to say *our* government. I'm not even sure whether we'll be still around. White Americans in this country may well react in a very violent and vicious way. And here I agree with LeRoi. We have to try and do something quick because the history of this country has been one of violence, especially against the darker skinned people.

LAWRENCE NEAL, 29, was also born and raised in New York City. He presently lives on Riverside Drive, uptown. Neal, who studied literature and anthropology at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, considers himself primarily a poet ("I see everything as an extension of the poem") though he also writes literary and social criticism. Last year he edited an anthology of poetry in memoriam of Malcolm X called *Poems for Malcolm*. He is a friend and collaborator of LeRoi Jones. Both are currently editing an anthology of contemporary black writing to be published next fall. Neal's poems and essays have appeared in *Liberator*, *Freedomways*, *Soul Book*, and *Negro Digest*. In spelling out his commitment to what he calls "revolutionary humanism," Neal says:

THERE IS A GREAT MOVEMENT going on among writers who see themselves as a part of revolutionary change, writers who recognize that their work has to be a part of building the world. These are writers between the ages of 18 and 35. LeRoi represents probably the most obvious example of this. People see LeRoi as a kind of isolated phenomenon, which he isn't. He is the product of a whole lot of social forces. His work underwent dramatic changes when he came uptown and confronted the writers in Harlem—people like Roland Snelling Youssef Raghman, Hal Haines. He found there was a great deal of creative activity in Harlem, so his work now is related to this kind of undercurrent. The stance of these young writers is a Third World stance.

We see the world from the viewpoint of the oppressed. One of the misconceptions about those of us who have a nationalist thinking is that we have a kind of parochial nationalism focusing upon the way we see ourselves here, which isn't true. We talk about a global kind of humanism. The humanism of the Third World. The humanism that Fanon speaks about. We were even talking about these things before we read Fanon. We were linking our ideas to the developing world of the oppressed—Africa,

Asia, Latin America. . . . I don't see myself as an individual, per se, I see myself as part of a collective—my people—here in America and I see myself as an expression of this collective desire.

First thing we do is to take the work to the people. That's our most important consideration. We decide who is our audience, what is it that audience needs, and how we can best fill that need. We prefer to read our poetry to a black audience [rather] than to a white audience because we feel that is our first demand. We feel the forms given us by Western society have to be destroyed. Especially poetry. Most poets are traditionally tied to the text. Things written in books. We have poems that are worked into music—rhythm and blues, jazz forms. We improvise the forms, sing them and chant them; make a totally new form. Most of the forms in Western culture are for us dead. The poem as it exists today doesn't mean the same to me as it means to Robert Lowell or Stanley Kunitz or any number of white poets. To me the poem has to be something the people can identify with immediately and in an immediate situation. It has to meet some specific kind of life need. And that life need may vary from being aware of future possibilities to the collective need to move toward social change. . . . We are more interested in the ideas we can get from James Brown or the Supremes than what we can get from T. S. Eliot and Marianne Moore.

We believe that within black culture there is black life, folk culture, myth, and values that can be assumed by the writer and given back to the people to broaden their consciousness—and our own consciousness because we need them as much as they need us. We don't see ourselves separated from them. There is no alienation between me and the people in Harlem. I see myself involved in that particular life style. My work is about that. I try to make it about that. . . . The distinction between art and life should not be clear-cut. That's how it was in African life, anyway; life and art were totally integrated. . . .

I tend to feel that basically novels are a

middle-class pastime. Our people who are struggling don't have time for novels. Novels are written for a middle-class literate public and for other writers. You can see this by the very clear division in white society between art and life. Not so in black society. You identify with James Brown, he identifies with you. You identify with the Supremes, they identify with you. You identify with Stevie Wonder, he identifies with you. We are trying to do something that Western art does not do, which is to change people's lives. And we do this by using symbols that grow out of black people's collective experience. Black people should not spiritually identify with America for that means identifying with all the oppression being carried out by America abroad, for instance in Vietnam. . . .

Wright was the only writer who was seriously attempting to destroy this dichotomy between art and social change. He consciously set out to do it. He wrote an article in *Challenge* in 1937 called "Blueprint for Negro Writing," in which he was trying to get the black writer to be a revolutionary. Then when he wrote *Native Son* he turned away from that spirit. The address he makes in that novel is to white America, not black America. So Wright betrayed his own blueprint because he did not understand how to execute it. And it is not because black people wouldn't have read it or understood it. My mother has all the books Wright wrote. When I was six years old she had collected everything he had written then. She wasn't an educated woman but she knew what was going on in the world. She knew what Paul Robeson was talking about. She knew that black people were moving in the direction of race consciousness. Maybe she couldn't articulate it, but she had definite feelings about it. . . .

The fact of the matter is that many of our writers developed in the Communist party which was inadequate for their needs. What they should have been developing was a revolutionary nationalism. They were developing revolutionary ideas without the subsequent understanding of how the nationalist impulse works in black America. Black people have an undercurrent of na-

tionalism in their history. If a writer or a politician is going to affect social change he has got to understand this revolutionary undercurrent. The problem with Wright, Ellison, Baldwin, most of our black writers, is how to deal with this nationalism. Can we escape from it? Can we make peace with it? Or can we be absorbed by it?

So all the writers are trying to come to grips with this essential relation between themselves as writers and the Afro-American reality which is the reality that includes the desire to become a part of America and the desire to separate from America. This is the overall tension that runs through all of Afro-American history. . . . As a matter of fact, you can divide writers into categories based on how they have been able to deal with this tension. DuBois called it "double consciousness." That is the sense of being both American and black. However, most of the writers are trying to escape from it. . . .

Ellison, for instance, is fantastic, beautiful. But Ellison sees the black American problem and slips away from it. He doesn't reconcile it. But he is aware, extremely aware of what these tensions are. He is a very sophisticated man. The narrator in *Invisible Man* is primarily invisible to white America. We are not interested in that. I don't care whether I'm invisible to white America. The thing I fear is being invisible to black America, or to myself. The narrator of Ellison's story finds personal light at the end, but that light was never collectivized. Which means that the author puts his character in the same bag, in the same dilemma, as Western man. Ellison is particularly interesting when he talks about literature, literary forms, artistic forms, when he talks about craft. But he breaks down when he starts talking about politics. And, at that, he's talking only of Western literary craft. . . .

The ideas of Fanon are fantastically important. I would like to see more black writers gravitating toward his ideas. We are also interested in what writers like Senghor and Diop have to say. We are interested in social change, and any idea we use must be useful to our desire for social change.

THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS raised by these men with which no one can sensibly disagree, and with which the majority of older Negro writers do not in fact disagree. But one of the prices the younger writers pay for their indifference to the main tradition of Negro American writing, and the tradition of Western writing generally, is that they make demands which are not original, demands which have been made before and met before. For instance, no other Negro writer, young or old, has made more serious use of the myths, symbols, and styles of Negro life than Ralph Ellison; no other writer has been as committed as he has been to affirming what William Kelly calls "the things that have formed our traditions, the things that have saved us." And if there is a Negro writer who has taken upon himself the burden of resolving the tensions of Negro American culture, it is also Ellison. We cannot, of course, be indifferent to any trends that can extend the imaginative possibilities of literature, and therefore it is probably true that a still more extensive effort can be made to pump into the bloodstream of American writing some of the rich idioms of Negro speech and some of the muted nuances of the black psyche.

The fundamental questions raised by the young black nationalists concern the wisdom or desirability of cultural and literary separatism, and whether or not all of this can furnish or sustain a viable aesthetic or a viable moral principle for art. Which reminds one of Dostoevsky. He is not, despite what William Kelly says, the most appropriate figure to invoke in support of separatist writing. His importance in the tradition of Western writing rests as much on the fact that he made a great and universal art out of Russian experience as on the fact that diverse peoples of diverse life styles were able to find in his work images of their own situation. Obviously, black separatist writing has not left itself open to such

an accomplishment. By conceiving itself, both implicitly and directly, in opposition to the idea of any human community beyond the community of blacks, it commits itself, both implicitly and directly, to the celebration and perpetuation of those boundaries which in our time have been used as one of the principal weapons in the denial of justice and dignity to large populations. The finest or wisest tribute new generations can pay to such a history is not to ape it but go beyond it.

We would therefore want to reaffirm some of the tests we have always proposed for serious literature: whether the experience in which it deals is sufficiently transformed in the imagination to give it a decent chance of coming alive as art; whether, while rooting itself in what Isaac Rosenfeld once called "an obsession with the personal," it also manages to affirm commitments in behalf of a common humanity; whether it proposes, as Trotsky once remarked, a world that is more attractive than any other; or whether it merely submits itself to serving authoritarian or sectional expediences.

The allegiance of black separatist writers to only the last of these options indicates clearly enough that whatever may be our interest in preserving the idea of an art that is complex in texture and democratic in concerns, nothing could be further from their interest. In which case, and at which point, criticism as we know it may well have no further work to do. And this may therefore be as good a time as any for the skeleton of "Marxist" criticism to re-emerge from the American intellectual cabinet in which it has been gathering dust for almost 30 years.

This is to say, of course, that there is nothing new in some of the intellectual—or is it anti-intellectual—tendencies of black separatist writing. C. H. Fuller, in the article quoted earlier, further states:

Where are our writers? Off somewhere imitating Europeans or reflecting on their

own lives and frustrations to no present purpose. . . . Once we accept that black people need no longer assimilate the culture or dwell, without hope of solution, on their collective experience in this country, the continued preoccupation of artists in these areas comes into serious question.

WELL, THIS, IN DIFFERENT WORDS, has been said before. In the thirties, such Communist literary intellectuals as Joseph Freeman, Michael Gold, and Granville Hicks were saying that if writers were to portray what was vital and hopeful in the American spirit they could not avoid allying themselves with the revolutionary class struggle. Of course, Granville Hicks has not thought such thoughts for almost three decades now, and in terms of the stillness that has settled for so long over "proletarian literature," it seems, from the vantage point of today, to have been nothing more than a temporary delirium.

William Phillips's and Philip Rahv's rejoinder to the proletarian critics of the thirties could well, for what it is worth, be suggested to the black neoproletarians:

The writer's success cannot be gauged by immediate agitational significance, but by his recreation of social forces in their entirety. . . . And here it is necessary to stress what many writers tend to forget: literature is a medium steeped in sensory experience, and does not lend itself to the conceptual

forms that the socio-political content of the class struggle takes most easily.

When all this is said and done, however, one cannot deny either the causes of agitation or some of the cultural tensions that have driven these writers to conceive themselves and their art with ethnocentricity and a degree of hostility.* One of the causes of this attitude is the slowness with which the majority of white Americans have approached the task of conceding dignity and humanity to Negro American life styles and the consequent rejection that this implies of the principle of Negro American equality.

This slowness is echoed in a remark by Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan in their *Beyond the Melting Pot*: "The Negro is only American and nothing else. He has no values and culture to guard and protect." Since "American," in the meaning of that statement, is synonymous with "white American," it can only suggest that Negroes have nothing to affirm in this society but white American cultural values. Or it can mean that whatever there is of Negro life forms is not worth either guarding or protecting. In either case, it is an insult, and represents one of the white American attitudes that have driven militant black writers into the necessity of affirming, to the exclusion of everything else, the values and the styles of their own community.

Even those Negro writers who remain fixed in their commitment to a plural Negro American cultural identity would repudiate the claim that they have nothing to guard or protect. They insist, in fact, that the Negro is not American except as that implies an integration of cultures and sensibilities, a coexistence of the more desirable values of white American culture with those

* While a distinct note of anti-Semitism is to be found in some of LeRoi Jones's recent writing, that may well be his personal aberration. None of the writers I spoke with made any mention of anti-Semitism. The impression one gets is that they do not consider anti-Semitism to be a necessary support for the black nationalist position.

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for change to become effective*

values of their own subculture which, particularly when judged by their own selves, are worth affirming. Being Negro American, therefore, has, as Ellison says, to do with

the memory of slavery and the hope of emancipation . . . it has to do with a special perspective on the national ideals and the national conduct . . . with forms of labor and with forms of pleasure; with sex and with love, with food and with drink . . . with places of worship and places of entertainment; with garments and dreams and idioms of speech; with manners and customs, with religion and art, with life styles and hoping and with the special sense of predicament and fate which gives direction and resonance to the Freedom struggle. . . .

It has been the effort of Negro writers holding this special view of Negro American life to affirm it without, in the attempt, being seduced into making an absolute of blackness or conceding the absolute of whiteness. It has been a task of enormous difficulty and requiring enormous courage and an enormous willingness to bear the burdens of Negro American history in behalf of achieving a more humane and democratic society. Perhaps it is a mistake to expect that all Negro writers will take a similar view of their history. People bear burdens the best way they can, and some bear them best by not bearing them at all.

A WORLD MORE ATTRACTIVE in our time, whatever else it means, must also mean a world that has outgrown the pro-

ductive uses of the provincial imagination; a world in which dignity and humanity can be discerned beyond the definitions and the limits of tribe; a world in which one does not have to be in a particular place at a particular time among a particular people before one can live as a man.

An America more attractive means no less. Yet, so far, at any rate, one of the tragedies of being American is that so few people are equal to the task. Few people have found a way to be American that does not involve the denial either of the claims or the humanity of somebody else. And when the task becomes too difficult, there seem to be too many bridges to too many national and ethnic origins across which too many people are ready to escape. If America has been the most democratic gift to man in modern times, that gift still lies unclaimed.

Every now and then I have a strange vision of America: a vast, empty, and silent land, all its factories abandoned, and from which—there being no further practical reason for anyone to remain here—all the tribes have fled to their old ancestral homes. America: a gift that defied taking, the simple mysteries of whose meaning were too terrifying to confront: like some deep, silent and challenging woman's love, in the achievement of which no man was man enough to risk himself. This may not be the most inappropriate note on which somebody, someday, can end a novel on America.

A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen

Two Cheers for Participatory Democracy

IMAGINE A DAY in the life of a socialist citizen. He hunts in the morning, fishes in the afternoon, rears cattle in the evening, and plays the critic after dinner. Yet he is neither hunter, fisherman, shepherd, nor critic; tomorrow he may select another set of activities, just as he pleases. This is the delightful portrait that Marx sketches in the *German Ideology* as part of a polemic against the division of labor. Socialists since have worried that it is not economically feasible; perhaps it isn't. But there is another difficulty that I want to consider: that is, the curiously apolitical character of the citizen Marx describes. Certain crucial features of socialist life have been omitted altogether.

In light of the recent discussions about participatory democracy, Marx's sketch needs to be elaborated. Before hunting in the morning, this unalienated man of the future is likely to attend a meeting of the Council on Animal Life, where he will be required to vote on important matters relating to the stocking of the forests. The meeting will probably not end much before noon, for among the many-sided citizens there will always be a lively interest even in highly technical problems. Immediately after lunch, a special session of the Fishermen's Council will be called to protest the maximum catch recently voted by the Regional Planning Commission. And the Marxist man will participate eagerly in these debates, even postponing a scheduled discussion of some contradictory theses on cattle-rearing. Indeed, he will probably love argument far better than hunting, fishing, or rearing cattle. The debates will go on so

long that the citizens will have to rush through dinner in order to assume their roles as critics. Then off they will go to meetings of study groups, clubs, editorial boards, and political parties where criticism will be carried on long into the night.

SOCIALISM, OSCAR WILDE ONCE WROTE, would take too many evenings. This is, it seems to me, one of the most significant criticisms of socialist theory that has ever been made. The fanciful sketch above is only intended to suggest its possible truth. Socialism's great appeal is the prospect it holds out for the development of human capacities. An enormous growth of creative talent, a new and unprecedented variety of expression, a wild proliferation of sects, associations, schools, parties: this will be the flowering of the future society. But underlying this new individualism and exciting group life must be a broad, self-governing community of equal men. A powerful figure looms behind Marx's hunter, fisherman, shepherd, and critic: the busy citizen attending his endless meetings. "Society regulates the general production," Marx writes, "and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow . . ." If society is not to become an alien and dangerous force, however, the citizens cannot accept its regulation and gratefully do what they please. They must participate in social regulation; they must be social men, organizing and planning their own fulfillment in spontaneous activity. The purpose of Wilde's objection is to suggest that just this self-regulation is incompatible with spontaneity, that the requirements of citizenship

are incompatible with the freedom of hunter, fisherman, and so on.

Politics itself, of course, can be a spontaneous activity, freely chosen by those men and women who enjoy it and to whose talents a meeting is so much exercise. But this is very unlikely to be true of all men and women all the time—even if one were to admit what seems plausible enough: that political life is more intrinsic to human nature than is hunting and cattle-rearing or even (to drop Marx's rural imagery) art or music. "Too many evenings" is a shorthand phrase that describes something more than the sometimes tedious, sometimes exciting business of resolutions and debates. It suggests also that socialism and participatory democracy will depend upon, and hence require, an extraordinary willingness to attend meetings, and a public spirit and sense of responsibility that will make attendance dependable and activity consistent and sustained. None of this can rest for any long period of time or among any substantial group of men upon spontaneous interest. Nor does it seem possible that spontaneity will flourish above and beyond the routines of social regulation.

Self-government is a very demanding and time-consuming business, and when it is extended from political to economic and cultural life, and when the organs of government are decentralized so as to maximize participation, it will inevitably become more demanding still. Ultimately, it may well require almost continuous activity, and life will become a succession of meetings. When will there be time for the cultivation of personal creativity or the free association of like-minded friends? In the world of the meeting, when will there be time for the tête-à-tête?

I SUPPOSE THERE WILL ALWAYS be time for the tête-à-tête. Men and women will secretly plan love affairs even while public business is being transacted. But Wilde's

objection isn't silly. The idea of citizenship on the Left has always been overwhelming, suggesting a positive frenzy of activity, and often involving the repression of all feelings except political ones. Its character can best be examined in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from whom socialists and, more recently, New Leftists directly or indirectly inherited it. In order to guarantee public-spiritedness and political participation, and as a part of his critique of bourgeois egotism, Rousseau systematically denigrated the value of private life:

The better the constitution of a state is, the more do public affairs encroach on private in the minds of the citizens. Private affairs are even of much less importance, because the aggregate of the common happiness furnishes a greater proportion of that of each individual, so that there is less for him to seek in particular cares.

Rousseau might well have written these lines out of a deep awareness that private life will not, in fact, bear the great weight that bourgeois society places upon it. We need, beyond our families and jobs, a public world where purposes are shared and cooperative activity is possible. More likely, however, he wrote them because he believed that cooperative activity could not be sustained unless private life were radically repressed, if not altogether eradicated. His citizen does not participate in social regulation as one part of a round of activities. Social regulation is his entire life. Rousseau develops his own critique of the division of labor by absorbing all human activities into the idea of citizenship: "Citizens," he wrote, "are neither lawyers, nor soldiers, nor priests by profession; they perform all these functions as a matter of duty." *As a matter of duty*: here is the key to the character of that patriotic, responsible, energetic man who has figured also in socialist thought, but always in the guise of a new man, freely exercising his human powers.

IT IS PROBABLY more realistic to see the citizen as the product of collective repression and self-discipline. He is, above all, *dutiful*, and this is only possible if he has triumphed over egotism and impulse in his own personality. He embodies what political theorists have called "republican virtue"—that means, he puts the common good, the success of the movement, the safety of the community, above his own delight or well-being, *always*. To symbolize his virtue, perhaps, he adopts an ascetic style and gives up every sort of self-decoration: he wears sans-culottes or unpressed khakis. More important, he foregoes a conventional career for the profession of politics; he commits himself entirely. It is an act of the most extreme devotion. Now, how is such a man produced? What kind of conversion is necessary? Or what kind of rigorous training?

Rousseau set out to create virtuous citizens, and the means he chose are very old in the history of republicanism: an authoritarian family, a rigid sexual code, censorship of the arts, sumptuary laws, mutual surveillance, the systematic indoctrination of children. All these have been associated historically (at least until recent times) not with tyrannical but with republican regimes: Greece and Rome, the Swiss Protestant city-states, the first French republic. Tyrannies and oligarchies, Rousseau argued, might tolerate or even encourage license, for the effect of sexual indulgence, artistic freedom, extravagant self-decoration, and privacy itself was to corrupt men and turn them away from public life, leaving government to the few. Self-government requires self-control: it is one of the oldest arguments in the history of political thought.

But if that argument is true, it may mean that self-government also leaves government to the few. For, if we reject the discipline of Rousseau's republicanism (as we have, and for good reasons), then only those men and women will be activists who volunteer

for action. How many will that be? How many of the people you and I know? How many ought they to be? Certainly no radical movement or socialist society is possible without those ever-ready participants, who "fly," as Rousseau said, "to the public assemblies."

Radicalism and socialism make political activity for the first time an option for all those who relish it and a duty—sometimes—even for those who don't. But what a suffocating sense of responsibility, what a plethora of virtue would be necessary to sustain the participation of everybody all the time! How exhausting it would be! Surely there is something to be said for the irresponsible nonparticipant and something also for the part-time activist, the half-virtuous man (and the most scorned among the militants), who appears and disappears, thinking of Marx and then of his dinner? The very least that can be said is that these people, unlike the poor, will always be with us.

WE CAN ASSUME THAT a great many citizens, in the best of societies, will do all they can to avoid what Mel Tumin has nicely called "the merciless masochism of community-minded and self-regulating men and women." While the necessary meetings go on and on, they will take long walks, play with their children, paint pictures, make love, and watch television. They will attend sometimes, when their interests are directly at stake or when they feel like it. But they won't make the full-scale commitment necessary for socialism or participatory democracy. How are these people to be represented at the meetings? What are their rights? These are not only problems of the future, when popular participation has finally been established as the core of political and economic life. They come up in every radical movement; they are the stuff of contemporary controversy.

Many people feel that they ought to join

this or that political movement; they do join; they contribute time and energy—but unequally. Some make a full-time commitment; they work every minute; the movement becomes their whole life and they often come to disbelieve in the moral validity of life outside. Others are established outside, solidly or precariously; they snatch hours and sometimes days; they harry their families and skimp on their jobs, but yet cannot make it to every meeting. Still others attend no meetings at all; they work hard but occasionally; they show up, perhaps, at critical moments, then they are gone. These last two groups make up the majority of the people available to the movement (any movement), just as they will make up the majority of the citizens of any socialist society. Radical politics radically increases the amount and intensity of political participation, but it doesn't (and probably oughtn't to) break through the limits imposed on republican virtue by the inevitable pluralism of commitments, the terrible shortage of time, and the day-to-day hedonism of ordinary men and women.

Under these circumstances, words like citizenship and participation actually describe the enfranchisement of only a part, and not necessarily a large part, of the movement or the community. Participatory democracy means the sharing of power among the activists. Socialism means the rule of the men with the most evenings to spare. Both imply also an injunction to the others: join us, come to the meetings, participate!

Sometimes young radicals sound very much like old Christians, demanding the severance of every tie for the sake of politics. "How many Christian women are there," John Calvin once wrote, "who are held captive by their children!" How many "community people" miss meetings because of their families! But there is nothing to be done. Ardent democrats have sometimes urged that citizens be legally required to

vote: that is possible, though the device is not attractive. Requiring people to attend meetings, to join in discussions, to govern themselves: that is not possible, at least not in a free society. And if they do not govern themselves, they will, willy-nilly, be governed by their activist fellows. The apathetic, the occasional enthusiasts, the part-time workers: all of them will be ruled by full-timers, militants, and professionals.

BUT IF ONLY SOME CITIZENS participate in political life, it is essential that they always remember and be regularly reminded that they are . . . only some. This isn't easy to arrange. The militant in the movement, for example, doesn't represent anybody; it is his great virtue that he is self-chosen, a volunteer. But since he sacrifices so much for his fellowmen, he readily persuades himself that he is acting in their name. He takes their failure to put in an appearance only as a token of their oppression. He is certain he is their agent, or rather, the agent of their liberation.

He isn't in any simple sense wrong. The small numbers of participating citizens in the U.S. today, the widespread fearfulness, the sense of impotence and irrelevance: all these are signs of social sickness. Self-government is an important human function, an exercise of significant talents and energies, and the sense of power and responsibility it brings is enormously healthy. A certain amount of commitment and discipline, of not-quite-merciless masochism, is socially desirable, and efforts to evoke it are socially justifiable.

But many of the people who stay away from meetings do so for reasons that the militants don't understand or won't acknowledge. They stay away not because they are beaten, afraid, uneducated, lacking confidence and skills (though these are often important reasons), but because they have made other commitments; they have found ways to cope short of politics; they have

created viable subcultures even in an oppressive world. They may lend passive support to the movement and help out occasionally, but they won't work, nor are their needs and aspirations in any sense embodied by the militants who will.

The militants represent themselves. If the movement is to be democratic, the others must *be represented*. The same thing will be true in any future socialist society: participatory democracy has to be paralleled by representative democracy. I'm not sure precisely how to adjust the two; I am sure that they have to be adjusted. Somehow power must be distributed, as it isn't today, to small groups of active and interested citizens, but these citizens must themselves be made responsible to a larger electorate. Nothing is more important than that responsibility; without it we will only get one or another sort of activist or *apparatchik* tyranny. And that we have already.

NONPARTICIPANTS HAVE RIGHTS; it is one of the dangers of participatory democracy that it would fail to provide any effective protection for these rights. But nonparticipants also have functions; it is another danger that these would not be sufficiently valued. For many people in America today, politics is something to watch, an exciting spectacle, and there exists between the activists and the others something of the relation of actor and audience. Now for any democrat this is an unsatisfactory relation. We rightly resent the way actors play upon and manipulate the feelings of their audiences. We dislike the aura of magic and mystification contrived at on stage. We would prefer politics to be like the new drama with its alienation effects and audience participation. Fair enough.

But even the new drama requires its audience, and we ought not to forget that audiences can be critical as well as admiring, enlightened as well as mystified. More important, political actors, like actors in the theater, need the control and tension im-

posed by audiences, the knowledge that tomorrow the reviews will appear, tomorrow people will come or not come to watch their performance. Too often, of course, the reviews are favorable and the audiences come. That is because of the various sorts of collusion which presently develop between small and coopted cliques of actors and critics. But in an entirely free society, there would be many more political actors and critics than ever before, and they would, presumably, be self-chosen. Not only the participants, but also the nonparticipants would come into their own. Alongside the democratic politics of shared work and perpetual activism, there would arise the open and leisurely culture of criticism, second-guessing, and burlesque.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of all these, even if they aren't marked, as they generally won't be, by responsibility and virtue. They are far more important in the political arena than in the theater. For activists and professionals in the movement or the polity don't simply contrive effects; their work has more palpable results. Their policies touch us all in material ways, whether we go or don't go to the meetings. And those who don't go may well turn out to be more effective critics than those who do: no one who was one of its first guessers can usefully second-guess a decision. That is why the best critics in a liberal society are men-out-of-office. In a radically democratic society they would be men who stay away from meetings, perhaps for months at a time, and only then discover that something outrageous has been perpetrated that must be mocked or protested. The proper response to such protests is not to tell the laggard citizens that they should have been active these past many months, not to nag them to do work that they don't enjoy and in any case won't do well, but to listen to what they have to say. After all, what would democratic politics be like without its kibbitzers?

A Letter from Israel

The following letter from Israel comes from a veteran figure in the American Labor Zionist movement and former editor of the Jewish Frontier; the views it expresses reflect those of a major segment of the Labor Zionist movement. For a somewhat different opinion, see the comment by Stanley Plastrik in our March-April issue, p. 109.—Ed.

WHAT EXACTLY WAS ABOUT to happen in June 1967, before Israel's decisive counterstroke, has been the subject of much debate in the European press. Reading the foreign commentators from this vantage point, one notes with mild astonishment how quickly those previously committed to the view that Nasser was a peaceful influence — certified experts like Eric Rouleau of *Le Monde* or the anonymous correspondent of *The Economist* — have returned to their old positions. And the people responsible for policy here were almost equally as certain, until May 1967, that Nasser would not start a war. And today, for all their caution, they do not expect another early Egyptian attack.

But no one here has any doubt about certain facts: we know in our bones that if they could (or felt they could) the Arabs would hit Israel at the first opportunity and, if they won, would liquidate both the Jewish state and the Jews. Everyone here knows about the Jordanian orders to troop units to destroy specified villages and kill their inhabitants; everyone knows about the lynchings of Israeli pilots who fell into the hands of Jordanian or Egyptian civilians; and everyone draws appropriate conclusions about his own prospects if ever Arab mobs were to riot in occupied Jewish areas. These, no doubt, are remote prospects, like the nuclear holocaust under whose pale shadow people live

in most of the world. But the excitable Israelis adjust to the menace of such extremities far more phlegmatically and with far fewer signs of morbid anxiety than do the low-strung Anglo-Saxons among whom I usually dwell.

Danger is not only threatening; it is an actual presence constantly attending life here. The mines laid on road and rail, the bomb deposited in a movie house, and the grenade tossed into a market place, the machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire upon fields and shelters, which are reported daily, are accepted in the very same way as the mounting toll of highway accidents. Statistically, the Israeli driver is a much greater menace to life and limb than the Arab saboteur and terrorist. It is surprising, nevertheless (if one thinks of it), that the public accommodates itself to a purposeful assault on its safety with much the same resignation that it shows toward a frightful accident rate. For those who come under continual fire at the Jordanian border, this involves a certain stoical discipline. For those who go touring on roads that are only rarely attacked or go shopping in Arab towns where terrorists strike only on scattered occasions, it is something else: it is simply an implicit calculation of the statistically insignificant chances of getting killed or wounded, similar to the habit of mind that lets people travel in airplanes.

For the fact is that the Israeli occupation

of Gaza and the West Bank—not to speak of Sinai and the Golan Heights, which are virtually empty—has been conducted with remarkable ease and effectiveness. It would not be surprising if after occupying thickly settled Arab areas Israel were to face guerrilla action on the Vietnamese or Algerian scale. This has been predicted, and a variety of Arab movements are trying to produce it. Perhaps some day they will succeed; but one doubts it. Nothing farther from the Vietnamese or Algerian models could be imagined than the actual present situation in Gaza and on the West Bank. The roads are not closed to Israeli travel, the villages not controlled by insurrectionists.

The Israeli occupation forces do not add to the hatred Arabs feel toward them by attempting direct rule; they leave all civil affairs—and a considerable amount of policing—to the previously existing Arab administration or to new local Arab authorities. So little is changed that the old trading patterns between Transjordan and the West Bank are still in good part maintained, with Israeli and Jordanian official connivance, if not co-operation. The amount of traffic between Israel and the occupied areas is impressively large in both directions—but customs inspections take place at the borders. Israelis are paying for all this startling “normality” with the high price of additional military service. But one wonders whether any occupying power has ever achieved so much pacification at the expense of so little military intervention; especially one occupying so long embittered a neighboring territory with such deeply interpenetrating borders.

WHEN ISRAELIS CALCULATE their chances of survival—as, like the rest of us, they no doubt do—the possibility of effective guerrilla attack is not usually considered. The more significant, though still vague, threat is that of having to face Russians playing (it is confidently hoped, in a minor way) the role of the Americans in Vietnam. Israelis, watching the local signs,

are gradually getting used to the idea that this is the contingency for which they must plan. The Russians now have not only technicians in Egypt able to man the missile-carrying ships, bombers, and tanks they supply; in Yemen, where Egypt showed its readiness to use poison gas, the Russians proved their willingness, if necessary, to pilot their own planes. The Soviet navy, as we know, is also posted in growing strength in the Mediterranean: a clear suggestion that a Cuban-style blockade of Russian arms shipments to Egypt by the Sixth Fleet would not go unresisted. Waiting in the wings are also the new American-style marines the U.S.S.R. paraded in its latest military celebration in Moscow. Israelis therefore calculate that if and when the blow falls, they will have to defend themselves against Russians—they hope not too many.

That is how the military threat is seen. But very few Israelis view this as the question of most urgent and immediate concern, but consider it a long-range threat against which they must arm themselves with appropriate deterrents. The immediate threat is still felt, though less so perhaps, after Eshkol's visit to the LBJ Ranch—the kind of diplomatic defeat Israel has learned to expect after its military victories.

Israel is not unique in its opinion that it is constantly misunderstood, that other people are unwilling, even if they were able, to appreciate its vital interests. This is such a universal complaint among all nations about each other that it is probably true in all cases; from which the usual conclusion can be drawn that it is not particularly true in any particular case. The callousness of the world toward Israel's vital interests is probably no greater—and, indeed, obviously less great—than toward the vital interests of Hungary or Cambodia, to choose a couple of more or less random examples. But if Israel can count on special attention from the world, it is for a very special reason: this is the people that is the prototype-victim of

genocide: and when one speaks of Israel's "vital" interests, one means indeed vital.

To Israelis, what they are asking is so natural that they cannot credit anyone with good will who withholds his support. Their demand is simply that the Arabs who recognized Israel by making war on it, should now, if they say they wish to give up belligerency, meet Israel in direct talks to make peace. The usual answers and analogies are quite familiar and totally unconvincing to Israelis: nobody, they know, can legally compel Arabs to recognize Israel, any more than West Germany can be forced to recognize East Germany, Peking to recognize Taiwan, and so on.

But all these parallels and precedents seem beside the point, and are, indeed, a smoke screen intended to hide the point. The purpose of the non-recognition of Israel is not an Arab desire to alter Israel's ideology, as they now think it advisable to say, or to incorporate it in a larger political union, as they also sometimes suggest. Cecil Hourani is the only Arab so far who seems to mean it when he says that if peace were made now, Israel could eventually be absorbed by the Arabs peacefully. Other Arabs who say that Jewish statehood and Zionism are the danger, and not the 2 million Israelis, mean something else: they mean extinction, not absorption. And the proof is in their attitude to direct peace talks: Hourani would evidently accept such talks and take his chance on the future; other Arabs claim to be terrified of talking to Israel. They want the powers to force Israel to accept unilateral surrender of its present defensive position, if not also retreat to the 1947 partition boundaries, and allow the restoration of the whole Arab refugee population to its onetime homes, before they will begin to negotiate what remains—*i.e.*, the liquidation of Zionism and of the Jewish state. What would become of the 2 million Jews would not be a matter for negotiation. This would become merely a domestic question to be settled by the Arab nation.

This is not, I would say, a rational policy. It is pure Oriental fantasy. But, like all fantasy, it has a powerful base in the ego defenses of the Arabs. It happens also to be a fantasy for which the Arabs, owing to the immense strategic advantages they have to offer, can always find friendly support from one or another aspiring power. And so long as this is the case the Israeli demand for direct peace talks becomes "impracticable," as it is the custom to say these days.

THIS SITUATION HAS PREVAILED for almost 20 years now, more or less the same period in which the whole world has had to live under the threat of possible annihilation. Like everyone else, Israelis have learned the techniques of coexistence, which are expedient for survival and blind to all other principles. They have not held rigidly to the principle that wars can end only in peace—such rigidity has been the Arab basis for claiming belligerent rights—but have accepted many partial arrangements for coexistence while still under active attack. There is no doubt, under continuing similar conditions, they will do so again, through the medium or under the pressure of third parties. Ships will be cleared from the Suez Canal, prisoners exchanged, families reunited, and trade relations with Jordan—to the extent that Jordan is interested—will be kept alive.

What makes this possible for Israel, to an extent hitherto undreamed of, is the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, Sinai (to the Canal), and the Golan Heights. Within these borders Israel feels it is able to withstand terrorist harassment indefinitely, and is in a better position than ever before (given adequate equipment) to repel any large-scale assault or to launch a decisive counterattack. No outside pressure—other than Arab participation in face-to-face peace negotiations—will make Israel consider relinquishing these positions.

The conquered areas, particularly the West Bank and the Golan Heights, are today

the most debated and discussed political issues in Israel. If one is to judge by public statements, the most popular opinion, by all odds, is for retaining and resettling the West Bank and much of the other conquered territory. But a number of people have privately expressed some strong doubt and opposition to this view. However, because of the foreign pressure to withdraw without a peace treaty—a proposal universally rejected in Israel by all but some of the Communists—opposition to annexation of the occupied lands is far less often and far less decisively voiced in public statements.

For a large and varied group of Israelis control of the West Bank area restores to Israel those historic sites where once the kingdoms of Judah and Israel existed, where the Temple stood, and Israel's prophets spoke. This patriotic and religious enthusiasm is heightened by the twenty years of exclusion from the sacred sites of Judaism. During all this time, as Israelis point out whenever the question arises, no voice was raised in defense of the religious rights of Judaism; and no one protested the demolition of synagogues by Jordan, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries which were destroyed to build a more imposing terrace and access road for a Jordanian hotel.

On the issue of Jerusalem, a city long predominantly Jewish in population and the strategic key to the whole center of Israel, the Israelis are not only determined but deeply indignant. The pressure regarding this point is universally seen as flowing chiefly from sources of religious anti-Semitism and only secondarily from concern about the future of one Arab state, Jordan.

Another element in the vocal support for immediate action to integrate occupied areas into the structure of Israel is not based on traditional Jewish sentiments but on leftist progressivism. This group—and it includes an occasional Arab who has taken a public stand—is eager to demonstrate, within the joint sections of partitioned Palestine—how the social problems and cleavages that con-

stitute the substance of Arab-Jewish relations can (according to them) be overcome by a positive approach. They want to allow the Histadrut to organize Arab labor and cooperatives on the West Bank, to promote vocational training in Gaza, solve the refugee problem within the reunited frontier, and integrate the new areas into the political and social structure of a reorganized Israel—thus recognizing a dual national composition. And they want to begin doing all this now. This group is fretful and impatient with the official policy which forbids all actions that could be interpreted as steps toward annexation, still in the hope of bringing the Arabs to the peace table. This is a vain hope, say these leftist critics.

If there is any Arab group that can break the present deadlock, it is the potential leadership of the West Bank Arabs. Such Arab leaders can do nothing as long as Israeli policy leaves open the possibility that they will be handed back to Hussein and suffer the kind of reprisals the Egyptians took after 1956 against officials who had cooperated with Israeli authorities during the occupation. Given a positive Israeli policy, however, such groups would gain confidence; and if they took steps toward peace, they would do so with the authority of authentic representatives of the Arabs of Palestine.

The vocal opinion in favor of integrating the occupied areas elicits a strong undercurrent of doubt and opposition. But there is no doubt about the necessity of holding the territories as long as the Arabs refuse to negotiate a full peace. Nor is there any question that the borders of the 1948/49 armistice agreements must be substantially altered, not only to include all of Jerusalem within the State of Israel, but also to eliminate the severe risks to Israel's security that these borders entailed. There is opposition to any general policy of permanent integration, and any immediate measures which point in this direction.

For many here the tie of sentiment and tradition, while undeniable, is not acceptable

as a basis for political attitudes. They look at the densely settled western slopes of the Samarian and Judean hills and recognize that this is Arab land, just as its dense Jewish population makes Israel Jewish. They are also frankly afraid of the rapidly increasing Arab population—afraid even though they believe that Israel could, if necessary, deal with any security or police issues that the Arab population might present. They do not want Israelis to rule others; and when the day comes to hand back Arab lands and Arab populations in exchange for peace, they would do so gladly, with a sense of relief, not as a reluctant *quid pro quo*.

This point of view, while it is an element in the attitude of many, fundamentally determines the political position of a minority of Israelis. So long as Arabs continue to refuse peace negotiations, those who hold this opinion are reluctant to voice it. Moreover, every day of occupation that passes makes a policy of Israeli inactivity more questionable, so that time works in favor of the integrationists.

In spite of all this, there are those who do not hesitate to state publicly, and on every possible occasion, the grounds on which they oppose any positive Israeli action toward integrating the occupied areas. The official Israeli policy remains one of mere occupation, avoiding, for the most part, *faits accomplis* that would prevent returning lands upon the conclusion of peace. The most articulate defense of this position—and, incidentally, the one most likely to sway Israeli public opinion—has come from some of the military. The first to express himself on this point explicitly was Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. More recently, outgoing Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin has given a full statement of the position.

THE VIEW OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY establishment (for that matter, of the entire population) has always been that only peace, and not victory, can truly stabilize Israel's position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Con-

sequently, peace and not victory must be the ultimate goal of military planning—always taking into account the fundamental consideration that a single defeat would mean the end of Israel. Thus Israel must always win; but only if it gains peace can its victories be meaningful. Peace, the doctrine says, will only come when the Arabs realize they cannot gain their ends by war. From 1948 to 1956, Israel tried to force Arabs to keep the quasi-peace of the armistice agreements by reprisal raids—a policy still retained. In 1956, Israel tried to force the Arabs on the battlefield to accept peace; and they hoped in 1967 that the crushing defeat—impossible to blame on allies, but inflicted by the force of Israel alone—would prove convincing. The military have had a very disappointing experience with their doctrine; owing, of course, to diplomatic circumstances beyond their control. But, as Israel is locked into its strategy by considerations of sheer survival, they are willing to give it another try. In counterattack against another Arab attempt to destroy Israel by belligerency, they believe that their new advanced positions would permit them to deal such severe blows to Arab political structures that the lesson might finally be driven home. And if not, Israel is forced to continue its policy of self-defense.

The position is obviously being driven to the point of absurdity, even considering the tolerance of our generation for grotesque situations. Because of this, Rabin—in a most articulate exposition of the doctrine sketched above—says plainly that the whole thing would gladly be scrapped for a primarily symbolic gesture on the part of the Arabs of sitting down to talk peace. Israeli military men today are ready to say that Israel would give up many of the highly advantageous positions it now occupies — in return for Arab signatures on a peace treaty. The exact territorial extent of the risks Israel would be ready to run in return for Arab acceptance of its existence remains to be seen. But Moshe Dayan has noted that the Syrians, of course, quite naturally fear Israel's military

positions on the Golan Heights, within such easy striking distance of Damascus. Only Dayan, perhaps, would dare say this to the Israeli farmers down below, who for years had to take a continual pounding from Syrian heavy weapons and artillery emplacements dug into these heights.

March 26

SINCE THE DAY-LONG Israeli raid on Fatah headquarters in Jordan, the focus of Israeli discussion has shifted. Current talk is no longer about the areas Israel occupied in the Six Day War. The main topic now is how to deal with Jordan.

It has been generally assumed that Israel's reprisal raids were primarily intended to exert pressure on Arab leaders. It still seemed reasonable to interpret Israel's air strike in February as a warning to King Hussein that he could suffer severe damage if he did not control the irregulars, who were in any case a threat to his rule. The official explanation of last Thursday's raid takes a sharply different line, emphasizing a note that has been sounded increasingly for some time now. The operation is not classed as a reprisal raid. Such a description is explicitly denied. Instead, it is said to be a preemptive attack.

This is, no doubt, related to legal positions worked out in Israel's Foreign Office. Israel insists on the strictly reciprocal nature of the cease-fire; notes Jordan's obligation to abstain from shooting or supporting or planning hostilities across the line; and asserts its rights under the U.N. Charter to act in self-defense. Yet nothing could be more unlikely than that Israel should adopt any policy today merely in order to make debating points in the U.N.

The reason has to be strategic. What it strongly suggests is that Israel no longer cares to prop up King Hussein. There is no suggestion that Israel wants to bring him down. The public is being prepared for a long series of Arab provocations and Israeli

counterblows, not for a quick knockout by Israel. Bringing down Hussein, or Nasser, for that matter, is something the Arabs could easily do soon enough for themselves. Nobody now expects any serious approach toward negotiations until the question of Arab leadership is settled.

A word about the Israeli reaction to last Thursday's action. The public does *not* take calmly, as a statistical risk, casualties incurred upon Israel's initiative. Deaths and injuries brought about in this way are counted individually by the whole nation, and the governing party is at once placed on the defensive by its rivals.

Some on the Israeli Left wonder whether the operation was not disproportionate, and how it has affected Gunnar Jarring's mission, which Israel is anxious to see continued. Other critics repeat their demand for rapid settlement up to the cease-fire line, and some criticize "excessive" precautions, taken to spare the Jordanian civilians, which cost Israeli lives and permitted many guerrillas and their leaders to escape.

As to the Jarring mission, it must wait on events. The notion that one proceeds from small agreements to larger ones has not worked very well. Precisely because Egypt refused to grant even token support to the idea that it could talk anything over with Israel, the project of releasing the stranded ship in the Suez Canal was doomed. Nevertheless, if the present new test of nerves and strength develops into another standoff, there may be some small tasks for both General Odd Bull and Gunnar Jarring to perform, in the perennial hope of paving a path to broader negotiations. The day following last week's battle there was a reunion of families across the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire line and the civilian traffic across the Jordan River resumed.

On the big question, when will the Arabs be ready to sit down with Israel and talk, the initiative remains irrevocably with the Arab leaders—if only one knew who they are likely to be.

Bob Kaufmann

The Brothel Concession in Vietnam

September 8, 1966

October 1, 1966

Mr. Laurence G. Pickering
Desk Officer for Thailand
U. S. Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Pickering:

I have noted that the government of Vietnam has approved the installation of brothels in that country, and am given to understand that these businesses have been established to serve our American military and civilian personnel stationed there.

It now appears that we are expanding our personnel in Thailand. I should like to know what qualifications would be required for me to set up one or more brothels in or near Bangkok (or any major Thailand city) to serve our men who are now or will be in that area.

If yours is not the proper office to process this request, I would very much appreciate your forwarding this letter to the correct office and informing me of the address. On the other hand, you may wish me to contact the Thailand government directly, without intercession by your department or this government. If I do not hear from you in the near future, I will presume this to be correct.

However, I believe that our government should be interested in assuring our men overseas of proper conditions, and further has a definite responsibility in helping our balance of payment structure, as this venture most certainly would.

Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Kaufmann

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

I refer to your letter of September 8.

Prostitution is illegal in Thailand, and the venture you contemplate would not be permitted by the Thai Government. In the event you would be interested in some other form of business activity there I would be pleased to send you information on private enterprise investment opportunities in Thailand.

Sincerely yours,
John Sylvester, Jr.,
Thai Desk Officer
Department of State
Washington.

October 10, 1966

Mr. Robert H. Miller
Desk Officer for Viet-Nam
U.S. Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.
Dear Mr. Miller:

Mr. Sylvester, of the Thai Desk in the Department of State, has informed me that prostitution is illegal in Thailand. However, reports from Viet-Nam indicate that not only is prostitution permitted, but that it is flourishing.

At the same time, reports also indicate that the American service man is being gouged, in that he is charged more than three and one half times that which a Vietnamese pays. Of further distress to me is the additional report that 40% of the Vietnamese prostitutes have venereal disease.

This represents an intolerable situation. I have personally appeared as a speaker before

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the Bay Area Ministers Association and determined, by questionnaire, the individual opinions of the members of this organization regarding the subject of prostitution in such areas. You will be interested to know that six of the ministers and nine student ministers approved of brothels to serve American servicemen in remote areas of the world under medically supervised conditions. (A total of eight did not approve.) A total of fifteen of these men approved American girls serving in such brothels, while only seven were opposed.

I should like to know what qualifications would be required for me to set up one or more brothels in South Viet-Nam to serve our men in that area. We could save time in the development of this mission if you could also inform me at the same time whether the American government would require or allow these brothels to be integrated, both from personnel and customer standpoints. I am certain that you will agree that properly supervised brothels, run to truly American standards, would be beneficial to our fighting men who are now forced to utilize obviously sub-standard, medically dangerous facilities. Not to be ignored is the fact that a substantial tax benefit would accrue to this nation by having this venture run by loyal Americans.

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest possible convenience, in order that we may organize properly for the most efficient, healthful, enjoyable service for our fighting men. Finally, your prompt answer will enable us to recruit attractive personnel, if the use of American girls is permitted.

Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Kaufmann

January 18, 1967

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

. . . Since you have expressed interest in establishing a commercial enterprise in Viet-Nam I suggest that you write directly to Mr. Eugene Kaplan, Director, Far East Division, Office of International Regional Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce and outline the nature of your proposal. I understand that his office can furnish you with information

on what is involved in going into business in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely yours,
Robert H. Miller, Director
Viet-Nam Working Group
Department of State
Washington

February 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

. . . You indicate that you were referred to this office by Mr. Robert H. Miller, Director of the Viet-Nam Working Group of the Department of State. I understand that Mr. Miller was not aware of the precise nature of the enterprise which you have in mind, and he thus assumed that your proposal had to do with a business operation servicing the Vietnamese economy. However, because your contemplated business venture would involve exclusively members of the United States Armed Forces, the project would be within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

I am therefore forwarding your letter to Lt. Col. Jack Posner, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, and you should be receiving a reply from him shortly.

Sincerely yours,
Robert M. Klein, Acting Dir.
Far Eastern Division
Office of International Regional Economics
U.S. Dept. of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230

March 4, 1967

Lt. Col. Jack Posner
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Colonel Posner:

It has been almost six months since I first communicated with the United States Department of State regarding the necessity for a decent brothel system for our boys serving in Southeast Asia.

State referred me to the Department of Commerce. Mr. Robert M. Klein of that office has assured me in his letter of February 14 that the Defense Department, and your office in particular, would have jurisdiction over the brothels.

I am delighted, after this extensive period of delay, to have been guided to the proper governmental agency to expedite this essential project. I am particularly delighted to be working with the Defense Department, in that the men in the military probably would have a greater understanding of the logistics and other problems involved than would, perhaps, the individuals in the Departments of State and Commerce. We have already made some extrapolations from the figures available to us. It is on these that we are basing some of our estimated needs. Dependent, of course, upon the day-to-day movements of our troops in Viet-Nam, we can expect to service an average of 40,000 men per week. Realizing that we would never have our establishments open on a Sunday, we can determine that we must be prepared to handle 6,666 men per day.

Allowing a maximum of 12 minutes per operation (some of course, will be far shorter, resulting in a somewhat shorter actual average time consumed) and some additional time for necessary ablutions and repairs, in a five hour work day, each girl would be able to service 20 men per day. We have never seen any official standards published on this, and hope that this will be satisfactory to your department.

Further, allowing 14% (average) cyclical lay-off time, and another 10% vacation and sickness allowance, the production of the individual girl will be reduced to an average of about 15 men per shift. This would mean that we require a total "on-site" production work force of 445 girls. We further anticipate that a certain percentage would be leaving to return to the states and/or to get married, and we would need a reserve corps of about 150 upon whom we could call for rapid replacements.

While we would provide our own medical staff for our organization, would it be possible for your medical department to provide examinations for the servicemen? This would be

a splendid method of not only limiting the spread of venereal disease occurring through the dreadful facilities presently available to our fighting men, but would have a positive effect of discovering and eliminating much of the existing disease.

It is immediately apparent that the recruitment of a large number of American girls that would join our effort might very well cause some security problems. Does your department have the facilities to check into the background of these girls, or should this task, in your opinion, be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

We want to be particularly careful not to have any subversives involved, in that we would not want our endeavor to get a bad name. I have further questions to discuss with you, regarding separation of officer and enlisted man facilities, integrated vs. non-integrated personnel and customer policies, staff visits to wounded men in hospitals (without charge, naturally), fee scales, etc., but will wait to hear from you about the first, more important questions I have raised in this letter.

It is a pleasure to be working with your office, and I look forward anxiously to an early reply.

Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Kaufmann

March 6, 1967

Mr. George Meany
President, A.F.L.-C.I.O.
Dear Mr. Meany:

As a loyal American, I am certain that you have been as concerned as I by the gouging of, and spreading of disease among our men in Southeast Asia caused by the present recreational facilities available to them. For the past six months, I have been communicating with the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense in regard to the establishment of brothels to serve and protect our fighting men in Viet Nam.

From the figures available to us, we have determined that our operation will require 455 girls. While the nature of the operation is such that we feel all parties will benefit most if the

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March 30, 1967

girls are paid on a piece-work basis, we are confident that the average earnings of the staff, not including fringe benefits, such as housing and medical care, will be at least fifteen dollars per hour. On a thirty-hour work week (no Sunday work is contemplated), each girl should earn a gross of \$450. However, we have computed a cyclical non-productive time of 14%, which would reduce the girls' average weekly earnings (over a four week period during which they would work only 21 days) to \$387. While we anticipate no difficulties in recruiting personnel, we do not wish to leave ourselves exposed to the charge that we are exploiting the workers. Therefore, we are opposed to any company union for our employees, and would prefer that they are represented in a manner that will allow us to develop an arm's length relationship with them.

We would be interested in learning whether you have any particular local that would be interested in this effort, or whether you think it more advisable to set up a new local.

Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Kaufmann

cc: Lt. Col. Jack Posner, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Same letter sent to: President, Western Conference of Teamsters, Burlingame, California.

March 22, 1967

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

Senator Kuchel is in almost continuous attendance at Committee meetings and Senate sessions and I am, therefore, responding to your letter of March 13. The Senator will appreciate the deep concern you express for the welfare of our troops in Southeast Asia.

Please be assured that this correspondence will be brought to the Senator's attention as soon as possible.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,
David C. Niklaus, Special Assistant to Senator Thomas H. Kuchel
United States Senate
Committee on Appropriations

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

Enclosed is a copy of the reply I received from the Department of Defense in response to my inquiry in your behalf concerning your desire to establish brothels in Vietnam for patronage by our military personnel.

The reply is self-explanatory, and it is hoped that the information will assist you in an understanding of the matter.

Be assured that I was pleased to look into the situation as you requested.

With best regards,

Sincerely,
George Murphy
United States Senate
Committee on Public Works

Honorable George Murphy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Murphy:

This is in response to your recent referral of a letter from one of your constituents, Mr. Robert F. Kaufmann, who solicits governmental cooperation and approval in his scheme to establish brothels in Vietnam for patronage by our military personnel.

As he indicated to you Mr. Kaufmann has previously presented his proposals to this Department. We find his proposals appalling and have informed him accordingly. Copies of prior correspondence from and to Mr. Kaufmann are enclosed for your information. Since the position of the Department of Defense in this matter is clearly set forth in the enclosed letter to Mr. Kaufmann I shall only reaffirm that position here.

For your information concerning Mr. Kaufmann's statement regarding venereal disease, we offer the following comments. We are always concerned by the presence of any venereal disease among our troops and share the desire of all those persons who would like to see a total absence of such diseases among our servicemen. Continuous efforts are made to control and eliminate venereal disease and to treat those individuals who, nevertheless, do contract some type of such disease. These

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efforts are meeting with an encouraging degree of success. During each of the past three years less than one-half of one percent of the military personnel in Vietnam lost time from duty while receiving treatment for venereal disease.

I trust that the information furnished herein will be of assistance to you in responding to Mr. Kaufmann. Your interest in matters pertaining to the Armed Forces is appreciated.

Sincerely,
William W. Berg, Brigadier
General, USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense
Asst. Secretary of Defense
(Military Personnel Policy)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Manpower (Military Personnel Policy)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

Robert M. Klein, Acting Director, Far
Eastern Division, Office of International Re-
gional Economics, Department of Commerce,
has asked this office to reply to your recent
letter regarding your interest in establishing
one or more brothels in South Vietnam to
serve American servicemen in that area.

We cannot concur in your proposal. The
Department of Defense is unalterably opposed
to prostitution in any form, whether in the
United States or in the sovereign territory of
a foreign country where our servicemen are
assigned. Any prostitution which may exist in
Vietnam does not have the sanction of nor is
it condoned by the Commander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, the American
Embassy, or any agency of the United States
Government.

Not only do we oppose prostitution, but we
take active measures to combat it. Responsible
military commanders are aware that our ser-
vicemen overseas are far removed from the
restraining influence of home and family and,
consequently, make intensive efforts to com-
pensate for this loss of moral restraints by
providing off-duty educational opportunities,
wholesome recreational outlets, intensive reli-
gious and character programs, and where
warranted, curfews, curtailment of liberty
privileges, and disciplinary action against
offenders.

Thank you for giving us the opportunity
to clarify the Department of Defense position
in this matter.

Sincerely,
R. W. Frieden, Captain, USNR
Asst. Dir., Personnel Manage-
ment

A P O R T E S

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Número 8

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Howe Martyn

The Kennedy Round And U. S. Power

THE NAME OF JOHN F. KENNEDY has been attached to a protracted session of bargaining for mutual tariff reductions, conducted in Geneva by the professional negotiators of the GATT countries (the adherents to the "General Agreement on Tariff and Trade" of 1947), and intended to promote international trade by progressive, multilateral relaxation of tariffs.

The "Kennedy Round" of bargaining followed after the U.S. Congress had passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1962. The Kennedy label suggested that a better world was being created, and it made criticism a sacrilege. The economic theory of the "Kennedy Round," however, was oversimplified, and its information on industrial organization was not up-to-date. Now the "Kennedy Round" stands in the shadow of President Johnson's 1968 save-the-dollar campaign which misplaces its emphasis and gives literal international trade priority over the spread of industrialization. Such pursuit of short-run national advantage in trade and payments destroys the hope for the growth of the less-developed countries.

The Geneva Tariff Agreements of 1967 were reached by representatives of the various GATT member countries who each were pursuing their own national advantage. However, a resolution in favor of more food aid from more of the advanced countries to those in need of it was passed at Geneva, but without the binding commitment on tariff deals. So far, the tariff deals affect mainly trade in manufacture among the industrialized countries—though these countries were already importing commodities they need without penalizing themselves with duties. They have found that their bargaining could not include matters affecting their domestic agriculture. The Geneva Tariff Agreements extend theoretical advantages to strong companies, in strong industries and in strong countries. And the Agreements' potential is in speeding-up the spread of innovations on an international scale—by

allowing new products to be market-tested by export, provided these are classified by customs officials as coming under categories covered by the Agreements. But the harm the Agreements do is in purporting to offer worldwide economic progress.

ADVANTAGES TO BE OBTAINED by the bargaining nations from reducing tariff barriers to international trade were presumed to be mutual. The theory was that specialization in production would be increased on an international level, that this would be accompanied by increased efficiency, and that therefore more, better, and cheaper goods would result for all. This theory seemed to provide a formula for policy, like the "containment" theory of defense. But the theory requires so many qualifications in any attempted application to particular countries and particular companies that it is practically useless. The theory that literal international trade is an economic panacea is under criticism among economists themselves, for ignoring the influence of the head start in manufacturing that some countries have obtained, and for the advantage accruing to a company that is located in an industrial community and thus is able to draw on pools of skilled labor, components, and capital.

This theory grew from a view of efficiency focused exclusively on the large factory and plantation. Even here it was short-sighted: it assumed that Ford's assembly line could be extended to infinity, whereas there comes a point when enlargement increases costs. In Ford's classic mass production, furthermore, interchangeable parts were fully as important as the assembly line. It often pays to buy components from independent plants; this permits the decentralization of assembly plants, and the creation of branches in different countries as well as west and south within the United States.

Benefits created by specialization can also become subject to "unfair" distribution among countries. Larger shares are obtained by countries capable of developing improvements in products and processes. And profit-earning innovations are more common in manufacturing than in the cultivation or extraction of traditional primary commodities. The rising levels

of processing that characterize modern industry (such as synthetic textiles, convenience foods) increase the advantage of the manufacturing country over the primary producer. Underdeveloped countries have indeed good economic reasons to seek emancipation from dependence on hewing wood and growing coffee.

A new consideration in industrial organization is that decentralization may yield substantial savings in cost of distribution which were overlooked in the theory of international specialization (partly because some of them were not knowable with any accuracy in the past). Some of these savings (or sales gains) accrue by making a product suit local markets as by special sizes and label language. The cost of distribution has increased in the importance it is now given in practical business, since the computer has begun to measure expenses and to show how much money can be tied up in inventories. Increased costs will occur because the path of distribution may be long (it might be from Cleveland to Calcutta), or because movement of a product may be sluggish, obstructed by lack of product-knowledge given by poor advertising, or by the red tape of customs declarations and currency controls. Wasteful costs can be caused by stockpiling among suppliers and distributors as well as in the manufacturer's receiving and shipping departments.

A further and serious objection to the principle of international specialization in production is that people want and need steady jobs, not merely the cheapest possible products. Such jobs are created by diversified manufacturing: much commodity production is seasonal and fails to provide occupation for higher and more varied talents and skills. Paying for improved employment opportunities directly through high prices for locally-made products may actually be cheaper than having governments collect taxes and then disperse subsidies.

Duplication of productive facilities among many nations has been a phenomenon of world industrial organization from the 1950's up to the diversionary and repressive governmental interventions of the Kennedy Round and the Johnson save-the-dollar program (and the similar and abortive efforts of Harold Wil-

son to strengthen sterling). The spread of manufacturing, in turn, has motivated and facilitated greater knowledge and skill as to the processes and cost of marketing, training of personnel for industry, and the managing of complex and widespread operations. The transformation of the basis of economic efficiency which results is exemplified by the progress of the multinational corporation, sometimes operating a chain of parallel businesses in as many as 50 countries. This development is becoming a subject of research in business schools, but it is not yet accommodated in the making of international economic policy.

THE DELUSIONS OF the 1967 Tariff Agreements lie in the claims of practical results as well as in the principle followed. First, as to their scope: \$8 billion of U.S. trade is said to be affected. What is this in an \$800-billion economy? Hardly the basis for a new era of economic expansion. The bulk of the equivalent concessions has also been made by the larger, more advanced countries, as the EEC group, whose leverage of foreign trade has been weakened by internal industrial integration. Second, as to the possible effect on prices: an average reduction of one-third in rates of duty is to be made; but this is to be spread over five years. Thus, on duties that were 15 per cent, the cut is 1 per cent per annum. Third, the reductions are only on landed costs, before all the costs and complications of modern internal distribution which include such "unpercentageable" factors as advertising and the influence of salesmen.

A dim consciousness of the limited effects on trade obtainable by tariff reductions was shown at Geneva by references to "nontariff barriers." It was agreed that these should be taken up at some time in the future. They are of two kinds—those created by deliberate policy and those inherent in the nature of modern business. The latter include the power of advertising and salesmen to harness the desire of people to buy a product they trust from people they know despite price differentials. Cheap soap gets nowhere against Procter & Gamble; cheap tools are not wanted by industrial purchasing agents, after they have experienced the reliability of Black & Decker. The deliberate kind of nontariff barrier was

demonstrated two weeks after the fanfare concluding the Geneva negotiations, when U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall refused even to allow foreign bids on Grand Coulee dam turbines on the ground that "it was important that U.S. firms develop the competence to produce such units" (*Washington Post*, July 15, 1967).

Agriculture produced great arguments in the Geneva tariff negotiations, including the undignified "chicken war" in which the United States fought European tariff protection of an industry starting to mass-produce poultry with retaliatory taxes on Volkswagen buses and on cognac. (What hope of a Churchill in the United States, which abjures both French brandy and Cuban cigars?)

Agriculture is simply not negotiable by governments; they have a primary responsibility to assure food supply. This happened to mean free trade, at one time, for one country—namely Britain. That was when the British Navy could assure supplies from overseas. Now Britain has a strategic reason to look to the wheatfields of France and accept the planned development of agriculture in the European Economic Community, though this does not seem to have been discussed publicly. The reason is that food supplies from overseas are now totally vulnerable to blockade from the air.

The delusion that tariff-cutting "liberalization" of international trade is either an economic panacea or a political possibility is exposed completely by the case of agriculture. Agriculture is a nationally-planned industry, wherever there is a capability to plan—including the United States. No government will allow the disruption of its planned resource allocations, especially the labor and income of voting farmers, by some other country's bargain surplus. And incidentally, government-subsidized, government-researched, and government-controlled U.S. factory-farms have increased their productivity faster than any of the "free" segments of the economy. This example obviously influences the agricultural program of the European Economic Community. It is illuminating to recall that soybeans, now a major U.S. crop and a big export, were once an import—from China.

THE 1967 GENEVA TARIFF AGREEMENTS would be merely an exercise in futility but for the fact that they have confused a situation that demands forward-looking and -thinking. False premises have left an opening for the false rebuttals of old-fashioned protectionism which is now being revived in the United States. People with liberal hopes for the world have been drawn into an irrelevant argument. Opportunity and need lie in the spread of industrialization. And this is already working miracles in national income figures and in the lives of ordinary people, in countries as diverse as Australia, Israel, Mexico, Japan, and the Philippines. Economic growth makes these countries good customers for the United States—and not free trade, which would swamp them.


Public attention needs to be redirected, away from the old tariff question, toward finding methods that will encourage the spread of integrated industrialization. There are great gains to be made, most significantly in the welfare of deprived people and in international political stability.

Richard F. Schier

Radicalism On the Cheap

"**A**BOVE ALL, NO PROGRAM," was Disraeli's classic prescription for conservatism. It would serve as well today for many among us who relentlessly assert their radicalism. Their programmatic sterility is surely a bizarre chapter in our political history. What has long been an honorable position has been converted into merely a defiant posture designed only to dramatize alienation from society. Meanwhile, the very essence of radicalism has been demeaned.

To be a radical in politics it is necessary to be more than simply ignorant of conventional politics. Radicalism is not just a series of expletives nor is it merely a mood of alienated intransigence. The radical is one who seeks to grasp complexities and not impatient to dismiss them. Radicalism requires, above all, intellectual dedication and perseverance.



This is scarcely the attitude, however, of the Berkeley activist who recently complained that: "The trouble with trying to understand politics and society as they are taught in the university is that everything seems so complex, so subject to a multitude of seemingly unrelated or contradictory constructions and interpretations."* This complaint was voiced as support for the value of direct action. Such direct action can, of course, be teamed to the pursuit of radical objectives; but the outlook itself, while indubitably activist, is not radical in any meaningful sense of the word.

We seem now to confront daily a brand of radicalism which is innocent of serious social theory, ignorant of political tactics, and contemptuous of history. Where once radicals were accused of providing answers to questions yet to be asked, we now observe professed radicals indifferent to both questions and answers. They react to complex events and

* Gerald Rosenfeld, "Generational Revolt and the Free Speech Movement," in *The New Radicals*, edited by Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, Random House, 1966, p. 215.

intractable problems, not by an effort at the understanding which must precede the formulation of radical solutions, but only by seeking to discern the proper attitude to be adopted. They prefer being radicals on the cheap.

We have long made the distinction between democrats and Democrats, republicans and Republicans. Perhaps the time has come to separate radicals from Radicals. The distinction is not one of old versus young or cynic versus idealist. It is rather between those whose commitment drives them to the hard intellectual work of developing, or at least learning of, the new solutions that genuine radicalism requires and those for whom the badge Radical is merely a mark of being *à la mode* in the restricted circles in which they travel.

ALL OF THIS is not to say that there are not any new ideas on the current scene. It is to say rather that many Radicals are unaware of their existence. Possessed of a political consciousness that is *virgo intacta*, they are innocent alike of the Freedom Budget and of the report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress. We have Radical educational integrationists who know not of the Coleman report, and Radical sympathizers with the developing countries who have not heard of the UNCTAD proposals of Dr. Raul Prebisch.

This is surely a curious state of affairs. It is made the more so when we reflect that this ignorance is characteristic of many who are scarcely less insistent on their being Intellectuals than they are on being Radicals. Their intellectual training gives them a marked verbal facility, but not originality of thought. Their political discourse is marked by a certain vividness of style but a dearth of substance. Their arsenal of political rhetoric consists, in fact, of the relentless even if somewhat imaginative reformulation of a handful of rather stale propositions.

The explanation for this phenomenon seems to lie in the quite deliberate isolation of so many Radicals from other radicals and of potential allies of the radical movement. They possess a remarkable degree of social homogeneity. Middle-class and upper-middle-class in origin, they are usually found in association

(sometimes as non-students) with an institution of higher education. They are carefully exclusivist in their social life, which they tend to identify with political life because so much of it consists of political conversation.

Such a Radical falls an easy victim to that sectarianism which is the product of exclusivism. Conformity becomes the price of membership in the sect, and dissent is counted as heresy to be punished by social ostracism. With each heretic excommunicated the sect is reinforced in its sense of communal virtue, but it also becomes smaller as a political force and more stultifying in its intellectual atmosphere. Radicalism is thus converted to Radicalism of Social Approval. Vogue becomes a surer guide to public affairs than knowledge or thought. Confident that their opinions are fashionable in the world in which they move, these Radicals forget Mill's observation that for each man the world consists of that with which he comes in contact. Or as Swift said, "It is the folly of too many to mistake the echo of a London coffeehouse for the voice of the kingdom."

A STRONG ARGUMENT for the strategy of coalition politics is the impulse to creative intellectual activity generated by the necessity to find policies that will unite divergent groups by reconciling their conflicting interests. Conformist Radicalism, when embraced by a group lacking significant social differentiation, cannot produce a significant political movement. It cannot even produce a lively intellectual environment. I happened to witness a nearly pure example of this in the spring of 1966, when a group of college-based Radicals decided to enter a candidate for Congress in the Democratic primary election in the Sixteenth Congressional District of Pennsylvania.

Impregably Republican in composition, the Sixteenth District offered the ideal circumstances for a Radical political adventure because, to borrow a phrase from Bennett Berger, the outcome was certain to be the nobility of defeat rather than the responsibility of victory. Assuming the name of Free Democrats (presumably to distinguish themselves from the plantation owners comprising the membership of the regular Democratic party), they entered the political fray.

The Free Democrats were fashionably accoutered with a biology professor as candidate, a chemistry professor as party chairman, a mathematics professor as campaign manager, and (an exquisite touch) a poet as chairman of the platform committee. Their Radical credentials were clearly established by making the poet the party spokesman.

THE PLATFORM itself proved to be interesting precisely because it was such a bore. Published almost simultaneously with the report of President Johnson's Automation Commission it proved to be, Vietnam apart, much less radical than the latter document which bore the signatures, among others, of the President of the Polaroid Corporation and the Chairman of the Board of IBM. Even the Vietnam plank, while it contained some Radical rhetoric ("Our government should stop lying to us about this war"), leaned heavily on an extensive quotation from a Mennonite magazine, not a customary fount of radical ideas, and reduced itself to a fuzzy embrace of the Enclave Theory coupled with an unrestricted offer of negotiation. On balance, it seems fair to say that the platform, again excepting Vietnam, will prove to have been well to the Right of the 1968 national Democratic platform, and perhaps the Republican as well.

And this is the point. The Free Democrats turned out to be Radicals whose disdain for conventional politics was unaccompanied by any acquaintance with radical alternatives. The world of radical ideas was obviously foreign to them and their attitude toward it was clearly one of avoiding entangling alliances. On even such manifest problems as nuclear proliferation or the population explosion they were silent. Both the platform and the subsequent campaign proved their Radicalism to be a mere quantitative liberalism. Their solution for domestic problems was simply to spend more money than President Johnson proposed to do on programs the enactment of which Mr. Johnson had labored to secure.

YET THESE RADICALS sincerely, and even somewhat ostentatiously, styled their effort as a radical one. They expressed this appraisal to one another and it met with general agreement. Amid such an atmosphere of smug self-satis-

faction a note of dissent would have been as disquieting as a fire bell in the night.

The smugness derived not merely from the fact of social homogeneity but from the nature of that homogeneity. A group of ghetto Negroes or Mexican migrant workers will also lack social diversification, but such groups are unlikely to exude a note of self-satisfaction. This smugness is a product of the middle-class nature of so much contemporary Radicalism. To be blunt, few Radicals have any direct and immediate stake in the problems with which they express concern.

Unlike Social Security or Medicare, for example, few of the current domestic policies being urged from the Left will benefit directly members of the middle class. Some, such as open housing or integration of Northern public schools, may even affect them adversely.

This absence of immediacy produces a marked note of aggressive dilettantism in the activities of many Radicals. *An unwillingness to compromise, which seems an index to the militancy and purity of Radical demands, may be born of the knowledge that failure carries with it no personal penalty.* The dictum that half a loaf is better than none has little appeal to the possessor of a full loaf.

George Bernard Shaw once remarked of a Socialist candidate whose unwillingness to compromise cost him his seat in Parliament, "I do think that Joe might have put up with just a speck or two on those white robes of his for the sake of the millions of poor devils who cannot afford any character at all because they have no friend in parliament." Necessity is the mother of compromise as well as of invention. It is this absence of necessity that helps explain that combination of uninventiveness and intransigence which characterizes so many Radicals.

Thus, avowed Radicals assure one another that the election of Lester Maddox as governor of Georgia is "a good thing in the long run." That this analysis commands little support among Georgia's Negroes gives them no pause, nor does that fact shake their conviction that they are the true friends of the Georgia Negro. Indications that the Governor may have holstered his axe handle seem, ironically, to have disappointed Radical hopes for hastening a showdown—in Georgia.

Another recent example of this same uninventive intransigence was shown in the attitude of some academics toward draft deferments of college undergraduates. Members of white, middle-class faculties at white, middle-class colleges and universities displayed great enthusiasm for the abandonment of rank-in-class as a basis for draft deferments. Their students could, of course, secure deferment by the alternative device of achieving the required minimum on the Selective Service College Qualification Test.

They seem not to have reflected on how simply abandoning the rank-in-class alternative, and consequent sole reliance on a paper-and-pencil test, would have affected the student bodies at colleges not so resolutely white and middle-class in composition. Nor were their objections to the use of rank-in-class accompanied by affirmative proposals that were calculated to remove admitted inequities in the draft system. It was enough for them to make a gesture of defiance even though the direct result, had their recommendation simply been accepted, would have been the quite reactionary one of exclusive reliance on an examination culturally contaminated so as to discriminate against students not themselves comfortably white and middle-class.

THIS UNCONCERN for the immediate plight of society's victims is part, of course, of a strategy of spoiling for the apocalypse that seems to derive more from Dr. Pangloss than from Dr. Marx. It is a luxury available only to those who have no direct stake in government policy. As part of a posture of revolutionary defiance it is becoming enough, yet too often such Radicalism serves the *status quo* hardly less faithfully than the most intractable defense of the existing distribution of privilege.

In politics as in life necessity is a spur to innovation. A political style that seeks merely to dramatize alienation (particularly when that alienation is often quite voluntary) has no need of ideas. But such a position cannot be called radical in any honorable sense of the word. The present need is for ideas. Producing them is more difficult than being chic, but since when has being chic been a radical goal?

David Riesman

Return to Hiroshima

DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA, by Robert J. Lifton. New York: Random House. 594 pp. \$10.00.

AS WE LEARNED after Hiroshima, a number of the scientists who had worked on the bomb were concerned about its implications from the outset. After 1945, many people in various countries sought to reorient their way of thinking about war and conflict, to take account of this new weapon which, science fiction become all too real, could end life as we know it. A few went to Hiroshima and wrote about it; others helped survivors; still others studied radiation damage and related matters. The survivors both of Hiroshima and of its somewhat neglected sibling in disaster, Nagasaki, also took a hand in the enormous effort to assimilate the consequences for their own personal lives, for the civic life of their cities, and for mankind. The psychiatrist Robert Lifton, who had lived and worked in Japan intermittently since the Korean War, undertook the task of interviewing survivors, leading and vocal citizens as well as less articulate ones, as part of the larger effort on which his book reports, to discover what sorts of damage the bomb did to personal well-being, social fabric, and the sense of continuity or immortality with which people live.

Lifton possesses some unusual qualifications. He had examined after the Korean War some of the American prisoners of war who had been disoriented in Chinese Communist captivity. In *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China*, he had presented case studies of men he had interviewed, mainly in Hong Kong, both Chinese and Westerners who had gone through often profoundly disturbing thought reform experiences. That book includes reflections on the residues of guilt (which exist in everyone) thought reformers could use and play upon, and it illustrates the

phenomenon of totalism as it manifests itself in milder forms in our own culture also, as in educational institutions or in psychotherapy. *Death in Life* deals with another extreme situation where the central theme is also guilt: the complex and paradoxical guilt of the survivor. Indeed the main focus of the book is on the kind of guilt that accompanies such an overwhelming experience as death, where the survivor feels that his own survival is somehow at the expense of those who died, a guilt reinforced in this case by the continuous encounter with death long after the bomb.

Death in Life draws on interviews with 80 of Hiroshima's bomb survivors which must have been, for a conscientious and sensitive American, extremely painful to obtain. The reader along with the writer is haunted by the opportunity of seeing in retrospect the frightfulness of the bomb and the way in which its legacy lives on in some survivors; nor does the book allow us to forget the forebodings for the future that this invention and use of the bomb awaken. The Japanese are inhibited in talking with each other about intimate experience, and this experience, so traumatic and so humiliating, they have found difficult to talk about with each other. Hence, a non-Japanese investigator is a help not only to other outsiders in interpreting Japanese reactions to the tragedy, but perhaps also to the Japanese themselves. As a concerned American through whom the Japanese could achieve a kind of symbolic reconciliation, Dr. Lifton had a particular role. Yet as an American, he also had to meet the objection that once again—as in the bomb and as in medical research on radiation thereafter—Japanese were being used as guinea pigs by the American invaders. Sometimes he was resented for stirring up old griefs and nightmares, although in other in-

stances he was welcomed as a stranger for the opportunity to talk freely about fears and shames. In the face of inner and outer resistance, Dr. Lifton pursued his work in the belief (which this writer shares), that Americans bear a special burden vis-à-vis the bomb, a special responsibility for understanding and for control.

There are writers of fiction and nonfiction, many of them of great talent, who have sought to force their readers to think about the unthinkable and the unbearable. I regard some of these writers as exploitative, in spite of the rationality of their warnings among which I include George Orwell's *1984* and Arthur Koestler's *Arrival and Departure* and even occasionally the work on the Nazi concentration and death camps. There can be a pornographic element in arousing our anxieties about war, totalitarianism, genocide, and other horrors, ancient and modern. Dr. Lifton's work has no suggestion of this: he recorded very honestly his own reactions, his feeling of being affected by what he terms psychic numbing, and his temptation to become unduly professionalized, in the process of having to cope with the recitals he evoked from survivors (called *hibakusha* by the Japanese), many of them maimed, some of them guilt-ridden, most of them unable to forget an event that was both literally and metaphorically earth-shattering.

Death in Life is extraordinary in neither succumbing to an American's understandable guilt and apologia vis-à-vis the bomb, nor resisting defensively Japanese criticisms of being exploited by American doctors. The book deals not only with survivors, but with the whole sequence of Japanese responses—military, medical, psychological, political, personal, and artistic. It describes some American responses; and finally, comparing the traumatic experience of the atomic bomb to that of the Nazi concentration and death camps, it reminds Americans (and others who cling to nuclear weaponry) of the irrevocable transgression of the even very tenuous limits on warfare by a weapon that instantaneously and indiscriminately destroys all life within its radius and far beyond, a weapon in quite a different category from that of those terrible instruments of mass destruction dropped on Dres-

den and Tokyo, Hamburg and Osaka.

In the course of the controversy over civil defense, now temporarily quiescent, I had immersed myself in some of the scientific literature on disasters, studies which had been sponsored by American authorities who had sent teams to cities where there were explosions or tornadoes to study how people reacted. It sometimes turned out that those who reacted best were policemen or firemen or other officials who had no relatives around to look after and to distract them from their assigned roles, while those who feared for their families might look first after them. But the rest of America was unharmed, and soon the Red Cross would come, and the National Guard to prevent looting, and the order of the universe was readily restored. Some, indeed, concluded that with careful civil defense the United States could absorb a nuclear attack and recover. Such thinking ignored the difference between "ordinary" bombing to which people were somehow able to adapt over a period of time—to find a way of life within the terror—and which did not have the capacity to bring about delayed death through radiation effects. Indeed, the effort to blur the somewhat mystical distinction between so-called tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons was in my judgment an immoral effort to erase one of the few limits which still bind the headstrong and often self-justifying Americans. The Hiroshima experience was wholly unanticipated. The city had prepared for fire-bombing by demolishing wide fire lanes, and many began to be perplexed about why (like Kyoto) the city had not been bombed. Apparently there was a feeble attempt at warning, but only one of Dr. Lifton's interviewees recalled seeing a leaflet American planes had dropped, with words so vague that, given the unrealistic atmosphere in Japan at the time, no one took them seriously.¹ The bomb fell without warning, after an "All Clear" had been soundel.

¹ I share the belief of many that the use of the atomic bomb to compel Japan's surrender without an invasion was almost certainly unnecessary, since the naval blockade was already forcing some Japanese leaders to seek negotiations which the dreadful doctrine of unconditional surrender made more difficult. Misunderstanding of Japan and the momentum of Army Air Force fanati-

DRAWING ON written and oral reports, Dr. Lifton describes both the immediate and the long-term impact of the bomb on Hiroshima. The silence, the fires, and the total disorder immediately following the atomic explosion were terrifying and incomprehensible to those who found themselves still alive. Dr. Lifton presents vignettes then of what he terms heroic responses: among them, for example, a minor city official who, attempting to organize and rescue in the midst of flames, forgot himself and ordered people about, including the deputy mayor. Understandably, given the dimensions of the bomb, people who were desperately trying to save themselves and their kin behaved in that all too human way we term inhuman, closing themselves off from the cries and mute appeals of others beyond their strength to save.²

In Japanese society, more than in other Oriental and highly populous societies, people do consider themselves in some measure obligated to those who are not their kin. Still, survivors could not easily blot out the suffering of schoolmates or fellow workers or others trapped and calling for water, and years later, they accuse themselves and recall the staring eyes of the bereft and dying.

Dr. Lifton describes the way in which suffering shuts people off from each other, making solipsists of us all. Here was a disorganized world, in which nothing took its natural course, in which children might die before their parents, and in which people lingered with mysterious illnesses which might or might not prove contagious (and with known ones such as leukemia). On the psychosomatic border there remained many victims who could only survive through the mercy of others, and who came to feel even as they improved that they were marked—literally as well as figuratively—and that they were no better than beggars. Destitute,

cism seemed to me to have been more important in this decision than the effort to impress Stalin and the Soviet Union, which Gar Alperovitz emphasizes in *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, important as that book is in stimulating re-examination of the origins of the Cold War.

² During the bomb-shelter building in this country, the United States had a kind of imaginary dress rehearsal of these sorts of inhumanity, when people spoke of guarding their shelters with guns.

some survivors including children and orphans, along with adventurers from elsewhere, engaged in looting and black marketing. Feeling weak and humiliated, some *hibakusha* masochistically identified with the aggressor, admiring his power and technological proficiency, but many more identified with the dead. In Japanese culture, these reactions were intensified by the fact that Japan, even more than America, is what might be termed a physiological democracy, that is, a culture in which outward appearances tend to count for more than ancestry and in which scarred people, or even mildly or potentially sick people are almost totally devalued in the market for jobs, marriages, and happiness—recall *The Makioka Sisters* in this connection. These reactions led some *hibakusha* to try to flee the city or to hide their impairment, only to feel guilty, while others magnified their impairment or sickness, only to feel guilty. Dr. Lifton also discusses the reaction of Japanese physicians to the seemingly excessive complaints of *hibakusha*, the younger, more scientifically trained men tending to reject the understandable belief that all later illness and malaise could be linked to the bomb; whereas many of the older physicians, succumbing to pressure from their patients, tended to see the bomb as being the pervasive cause of illness with radiation effects everlasting—a temptation resented by the beleaguered but sometimes insensitive American doctors of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission.

In considering the complicated give and take between the *hibakusha* and their sources of succor, Dr. Lifton develops the subtle and interesting concept of “counterfeit nurturance,” a relationship in which the dependent person is resentful of help which he sees as only confirming his own weakness, while the helper is regarded as a condescending person who could not really be interested in an authentic relation with a contaminated and weakened one. It would seem possible that some Japanese may regard Dr. Lifton’s book itself as another example of counterfeit nurturance, analogous to the way some American blacks feel toward whites who write about their problems, no matter how discerningly, when Negroes “should have” done it themselves. Indeed, this concept has helped clarify for

me the reaction of many black Americans toward the solicitude of white civil rights activists, or the suspicions which Peace Corps volunteers often encounter when they are trying to help others—or more generally, that teachers, therapists, and parents discover in their relation with those who are younger or weaker or self-mistrustful.

EVENTUALLY, AS everyone knows, the bomb gave rise at Hiroshima and elsewhere in Japan to political as well as personal protests. Many of the survivors accused those who joined political movements of “selling the bomb”—a purist reaction related to their guilt feelings about the dead and whose counterparts, for different reasons, one can find among idealistic young Americans. This reviewer has some familiarity with the various strands of the Japanese peace movements, and regards Dr. Lifton’s account as clarifying and straightforward. These movements, like those here at home, are fragmented, and quite recently there have been Japanese scholars and publicists who have taken their cue from American strategists like Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, and who have dismissed the pervasive Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons as sentimental and unbecoming a great power. My own view is that the Japanese commitment to disarmament, far greater than that of any other victim or victor in the Second World War, is a great potential resource, with which it is unwise to tinker, even by introducing strategic considerations that might in the different political climate of the United States serve to limit rather than promote belligerence.

I say this not as an emotional Luddite, opposed to systems thinking, and Dr. Lifton is no such Luddite, but because I share with him the belief that Hiroshima has changed fundamentally our understanding of the future and our potentialities. And these potentialities, for good as well as for evil, are evident in *Death in Life*. They are potentialities which reflect the very fact, underlined by Dr. Lifton, that life exists on the edge of death and can only be lived with sanguinity if we can conceive a future, an immortality not for us specifically as individuals, but for the group, for those with whom we identify: with

our children, in the first instance; with the work we leave behind; above all, with the world we leave behind. Dr. Lifton discusses the way in which life returned to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, often in ways regarded as obscene, as when flowers grew out of graves or maggots crawled in corpses, prostitution thrived, and babies were born of impaired mothers. Or, the other extreme, later, when beautifully rebuilt, the city seemed to be no longer Hiroshima for many because it was too new and strange, and the very beauty of it seemed to deny the horror of their suffering. He describes the efforts to memorialize the bomb in some fitting way: yet what was the right symbol—the Cenotaph or the Dome, or the anniversary anti-bomb meetings every August, now splintered into several Communist and anti-Communist factions: all ambivalent, all incommensurable with the disaster? Twenty years later these questions are far from extinct. And how to cope with omnipresent America? Every new bomb test, every threat of escalated war, agitates survivors. When I was in Japan in the fall of 1961 during the resumption of bomb-testing by both the Soviet Union and the United States, I was aware that quite unideological and ordinary Japanese felt that any rain shower might contaminate, any vegetable poison them as the Bikini fishermen had been poisoned. I did not then encounter racial interpretations of the bombs having been dropped on Japan, though I am told they are latent. Perhaps the Japanese turn their anger inward rather more than most Americans would. Many leftists, for example, have tended to blame their own military or the “monopoly capitalists”—but the heightened conflict in Vietnam, to which some Japanese were already sensitive at that time, may now have altered their attitudes in some measure.

This overwhelmingly compelling book is the work of a man with great capacity for introspection, for empathy and vicariousness, and for comparative analysis. Continuously, he reaches beyond his immediate material, drawing as I have noted on the concentration camp literature, or on the experience of parents whose children are dying of leukemia, or on records of the plagues in earlier epochs—on anything that will help us understand

such processes as psychic numbing, or counterfeit nurturance, or the ways in which minds and bodies react to damage and loss, by efforts at repair which sometimes become new forms of disease. Occasionally I felt that interpretations were forced; however, long quotations from interviews and other firsthand material permit the reader to venture his own, perhaps less cosmic, conclusions. Yet overall, the author appears in this work as candid, without flamboyance, quite unwilling to "sell the bomb." And the generalizations about which he forces us to ponder are imperative ones. He makes us see in a more intimate way than even the readers of *DISSENT* are likely to have done hitherto that it does not impair our sense of immortality to realize in some abstract way that eventually the sun may cool, but that the bombing of Hiroshima does impair it. The author speaks both for the best American and most universal values in reminding us through this book, which is both sober and evocative, that we, the relatively unharmed, are also survivors for whom hope is a duty, prevention a mandate.

Alan Lelchuk

Shaky Dissenting

THE DISSENTING ACADEMY, ed. Theodore Roszak. New York: Pantheon Books. 304 pp. \$6.95.

DURING THIS PERIOD OF escalating madness in American life, one of the few institutions from which the voice of sanity has clearly sounded has been the university. Recovering from the apathy of the 50's, the university has become a center of serious criticism for liberals and leftists. Civil rights agitation drew heavily upon courageous college students; the upsurge of New Left radicalism was fomented on the campus; the cries against Vietnam policy were begun with the teach-ins. Measured against the increasing radicalism of the university, the conservatism of other institutions—notably business and labor—present a depressing spectacle.

All this is not to say that the university does not have considerable faults. Quite the contrary. But not to recognize that it is in the midst of enormous change, and that there have been signs of hope, is to fail to place the academy in a realistic perspective. *The Dissenting Academy*, a collection of essays devoted to what's wrong with the academy is in part disappointing just because this perspective is absent from the essays. This lack of perspective is tied up with poor organization. Not one essay deals with the university as an institution. And surprisingly, the physical sciences remain totally unexplored.

The essays vary greatly, from shrill nonsense ("Civilization of the Dialogue," by John Wilkinson, a self-parodying gem worthy of a freshman English primer) to cogent analytical survey ("Keynes Without Gadflies," by Sumner Rosen) to impassioned polemics ("Responsibility of Intellectuals," by Noam Chomsky). A recurrent shortcoming is that many of the book's writers are simply not in the same league with the established experts who have written on the same topic. The difference lies basically in level of sophistication. Robert Engler's piece on social science is competent enough, but one would do better to read Barrington Moore's criticism of empirical sociology. "On Academic Delinquency," a long-winded tirade by the volume's editor, is at best watered-down Riesman and Goodman. Roszak's major proposal, that academicians transform themselves into Enlightenment citizen-*philosophes*, is an admirable fantasy; more relevant would have been a critical investigation of the state of higher education's burgeoning teaching unions.

A similar inability to translate moral wishes into political proposals is evidenced in Louis Kampf's rambling attack on literary scholarship and departments of English. Any sensible person would share Kampf's wish that a scholar be more interested in beauty and truth than in mere pedantry. If there were some foolproof way of gauging a man's sensitivity, the problem of what to do with mediocrity would be partly solved. Kampf's naiveté here extends further when he bemoans the lack of self-criticism in English studies. All one has to do, for example, is to look upon a speech by Morris Bishop, an

English professor and president of the MLA in 1965, to witness both a severe indictment of pernicious trends (especially the "publish or perish" policy) and some suggested remedies. Now this speech was delivered not by some esoteric radical, but by the head of the MLA, a fact that at the least should have caused Kampf to modulate his analysis. Even more misleading is the implied assessment of English departments concerning Vietnam. Kampf's fantasy of 15,000 colleagues deciding "to storm the White House" is less relevant than the *fact*, omitted here, that English professors have been among the most outspoken in denouncing the Vietnam War.

- The absence of serious thought is particularly significant in Staughton Lynd's "Historical Past and Existential Present," if only because Lynd is a leading spokesman of the New Left. Now there are certain admirable qualities about the essay. The personal reminiscences of his origins as a "radical historian" are told with candor. The proposals that the tasks of the historian are not merely with the past, but with the present ("chronicling in depth the important events of his own lifetime") and the future ("by projecting alternative scenarios for the future") are provocative, even if not that original. And no one on the Left would want to argue with Lynd's final point, which states that the central question for our time is whether a "humane socialism" is at all possible.

Still, the impetus for this essay derives from its weighty title; and it is here that Lynd falls far short of any serious discussion of the relation between man as helpless victim of history and man as active historical agent. One has only to look at Harold Rosenberg's argument on the same subject ("Marxism: Criticism and/or Action") to see clearly the difference in conceptual power. Lynd's is a beginner's approach to the problem, couched in and clouded by Sartrean abstractions; the other is an incisive articulation of the immensely complex formulations started by Marx, and a careful delineation of how those century-old remarks have had to be modified in the past 50 years. Indeed, reading these two essays is in itself a small lesson in history, for in their very different styles and

levels of thought they represent, not unfairly I think, characteristic differences between the Old Left and the New Left. Lynd's piece depends a great deal upon personal tone and personal commitment, while frequently slipping into oversimplistic and surprising formulations. (See the remarks on how Castro and Mao came to power, or a statement like "Marx . . . did not fully appreciate the fact that any revolution . . . requires a decision by human beings to begin to determine their own destinies at any cost.") Rosenberg's essay, a critical history of an idea, is ultimately an intellectual polemic forcing all Marxists to re-examine the framework of their ideas and the direction of their activity.

- More useful are the contributions by two political scientists, Marshall Windmiller and Christian Bay. "The New American Mandarins" and "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics" are important examinations of the conservative mentality of political science professors in America. Both essays are marked by careful documentation and this alone helps to account for their success.

Windmiller attempts to explain the rise of a new elite: those academicians whose ties are closer to Washington agencies than to the university and its values. This creeping collusion, he asserts, has had an enormous influence on his colleagues, and on the assumptions and procedures of their research. Furthermore, it helps to explain (as Windmiller demonstrates) why the large majority of them has supported the Vietnam policy, either by words or silence.

Windmiller places the growth of the elite in a historical perspective. After the decline in the 1950's of moral-legalistic ideology (known in the profession, tellingly enough, as the "utopian or idealist school"), there emerged the academic idolators. Slowly the idea grew that, in a complex technological age, foreign-policy formulations could only be made by experts. A new breed of political scientists had therefore to be trained, a breed that would be more concerned with operational efficiency than with the traditional concerns of political scientists. And inevitably, because of the nature of their enterprise and their basic antidemocratism, these elitists

would stay in close touch with the government's security agencies.

Windmiller supports these remarks with quotations worth their weight in gold. The words of Ithiel de Sola Pool, an influential MIT political scientist, are a case in point. After heralding the social sciences as the "new humanities of the Twentieth Century," Pool helps to define the companions the new humanism can look forward to:

The CIA, as its name implies, should be the central social research organization to enable the Federal Government to understand the societies and cultures of the world. The fact that it uses as little social science as it does is deplorable. We should be demanding that the CIA use us more.

Windmiller closes with several proposals, which include moving all military and intelligence research off the campuses and into institutions like the RAND Corporation, and pressing for legislation that would finance research that is independent of the intelligence and military services.

- Let me focus on two impressive qualities in Christian Bay's contribution. The first is his unabashed humanism. Terms like human needs and human suffering are used often by Bay, who refuses explicitly to destroy them in the grinder of social science jargon. It is to his credit that he can make convincing his "naive view" of the purpose of politics as being "identical with the proper purpose of medicine: to postpone death and to reduce suffering."

This humanism is complemented by Bay's ability to be concrete. After positing the notion that no real human politics will emerge from political scientists for whom the existing political system "remains . . . inviolate," Bay demonstrates his point by analyzing a current standard text, Almond and Powell, *Comparative Politics*. For these professors the problems of "systems maintenance and adaptations" replace the responsibilities of constructing basic evaluative standards. The result is not "value-free" social science at all, but rather an implicit acceptance and defense of the existing political system—as if the system were an end in itself and the only one available. Precisely because Bay acknowledges

the competence of these authors, his analysis of their conservative assumptions is reinforced.

- Chomsky's "The Responsibility of Intellectuals" is clearly the centerpiece of the volume. The piece was originally given as a talk, before being expanded into an essay, which may account for the fact that it is more impressive for its fierce moral passion than for its sustained argument. Written in a disjointed style, leaping from point to point, the essay could be criticized for omitting significant transitions, for leaving undeveloped controversial themes (see the remarks on the welfare state or on industrialization in the have-not nations), for progressing more by association than by systematic logic. But I think it would be an error to read it this way. Rather, "Responsibility of Intellectuals" is a moral testimony, a kind of *The Fire Next Time* for Vietnam—the summation of the sapping frustration, self-questioning, and unchanneled anger that afflicts us all these days.

In exploring the question of how intellectuals have contributed to the ideological climate that helped make Vietnam a reality, Chomsky deals with a wide range of Establishment liberals. In attacking "pseudoscientific" figures like Herman Kahn and Walter Rostow, Chomsky unmasks persuasively the "cult of the expert." In exploring liberals like Bell and Schlesinger, Chomsky shows how their anti-Communism has poisoned their liberalism, allowing it to be an instrument used by the Establishment. What is indicted here is American liberalism as it appears in practice, not as it appears in textbook formulas. And certainly this indictment now reads stronger than ever.

But Chomsky has proved to be more intuitive than political. For if he sensed a year ago the collapse of liberalism, he has not since then, with his program of tax-refusals and resistance gestures, helped to create an alternative politics. For what Chomsky offers is a politics of morality: admirable for the depth of its personal commitment, but insufficient for promoting serious institutional change. Yet, if no substitute for a political program, its worth and influence in these days should not be underestimated.

Edward T. Chase

Three Autobiographies

MAKING IT, by Norman Podhoretz. New York: Random House. 360 pp. \$6.95.

NORTH TOWARD HOME, by Willie Morris. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 438 pp. \$5.95.

STOP TIME, by Frank Conroy. New York: Viking. 320 pp. \$5.95.

THE LITERATI'S SCHADENFREUDE over reviews of Norman Podhoretz's autobiography certifies *Making It* as the most provocative book so far in 1968. This very fact might be said to attest to the validity of Podhoretz's theme: that nothing counts quite so much among intellectuals as fame and its accouterments. They would hardly be so provoked if Podhoretz's "dirty little secret" didn't really cut through to some painful truth, he might say.

The information is relayed in *Making It* that it may take \$60,000 a year to live in New York City decently, presumably as befits a celebrated intellectual. Sixty grand is a depressingly steep admission price to the good life. It is true that in the old American Puritan Calvinist tradition material success was considered the sign of election. The presumption was that one did not deserve the good life if he didn't earn the material wherewithal, and vice versa. On the other hand, down through the centuries the mystical principle that one gains one's life by losing it has been the sustaining rationale for impoverished scholars and poets as well as religious martyrs—also for plain masochists, whose number nowadays appear to be legion.

But in the post-industrial society, the society which gives rise to the new class—Coleridge's "clerisy," evolving beyond what Galbraith used to call the consumption society (a society that has mastered the production problem)—one has assumed that the new idiom of success is membership in an elite who find self-fulfillment. In John Dewey's phrase, it is those for whom "earning one's living is at the same time living one's life," like Norman Mailer or Bart Starr or Dr. Michael De Bakey perhaps. This,

I take it, is the new badge of success in America, at least among the most promising of the new generation. Sidney Hook once formulated it very precisely: "the unalienated man is the creative man, any man engaged in significant or meaningful work voluntarily assumed as a means toward self-realization."

Podhoretz manages at once to cast doubt on this belief—by asserting the indispensability of the extrinsic rewards of achievement—and yet to accommodate it—by stressing over and over again the revelation that has come to him late and strangely strong that worldly achievement is by no means invariably incompatible with the intrinsic variety, quite the contrary in fact. He allows as how he himself has attained success, indeed in its closing words that his autobiography itself may be a path to fame, literary distinction, and money, all at once.

So in the end Podhoretz forces upon us the task of making a fundamental judgment about both his work and his value system: on the evidence of his autobiography, does his claim to success stand up, is it commensurate with reality? If it is not, then to a measurable degree the book is awry, possibly even an embarrassment. To judge from conversation in the intellectual kibbutz of Manhattan's Upper West Side, or throughout most of the Midtown publishing community for that matter, Podhoretz has faltered and for some has offended. The sober question arises, *is* the editorship of *Commentary* at 30 so grand a deal? Is "My Negro Problem And Ours"—by his admittance the best thing he ever wrote—of very substantial importance?

THE ANSWERS to these questions are not simple, and certainly the frenzied attacks on Podhoretz do not address themselves to such matters. Taking the second question first, as one who much admires Podhoretz's work, I doubt if the Negro problem piece is his best. He has too much difficulty isolating his article from the publicity that attended it to see it in proper perspective.

The crucial stage it marked in his inner life, so assiduously recorded in his autobiography, hardly helps him arrive at a cool estimate of its true worth. And if it did pioneer in exposing certain burdensome liberal senti-

mentalities, it invoked a few new ones of its own.

On the first question, though, the big one, the order of success of his becoming *Commentary's* editor, here I would say Podhoretz is about right. The fact is that Podhoretz does himself disservice throughout *Making It*. How? Because despite all its candid self-congratulation, *Making It* rather disguises the fact that he is a superb editor. For all his savoring of literary-circle politicizing and gossip, he does assume the ascendancy of the life of the mind, naturally, like breathing. It is no pose. Even novelists and the malevolent should accept this. So the unvarying posture of protective self-mockery throughout the book and its occasional naivetés and gaucheries (so quickly pounced upon) should not be allowed to obscure the fact that Podhoretz enjoys, by merit and circumstance, a wonderful job. By God, he *has* made it—though it would have become both him and his sense of reality if he would concede more to luck's role. *Commentary* is an indispensable journal, and the prerequisites it gives the editor-in-chief are formidable, no mistake about it.

This is not to say, however, that his *book* is a work of very great distinction. It isn't. Yet it is consistently impressive. On a much more demanding and interesting level than Willie Morris's autobiography, it is sharply responsive to what goes on in the real world; it is on a high order of intelligence; it is wonderfully alert to nuance.

I did not find it very daring, though, really not much like Norman Mailer's work. It is actually a bit apologetic—nor is the style as poetic or penetrating as one might have expected in so ambitious a book. Nonetheless the writing is always clear, strong, supple, and very often arresting. I cannot believe that his telling of his journey from boyhood is not engrossing for fellow intellectuals. Why do so many hate to admit it? And Podhoretz's insights and comment about the evolving radical groupings of the 50's and 60's is shrewd, sophisticated, and frequently downright brilliant. But the book's merits will, alas, elude more thousands of the generality than it will entertain, and thereby will not make Podhoretz a fortune, by his lights. It isn't *that* easy to break out of the practice of writing

primarily just for the others in the intellectual establishment, an admirable principle but one, at least up till now, at odds with material success.

IT IS WHEN Podhoretz provokes thoughts on the ancient question of the relationship between intellection and action, ideas and conduct, that he gives one real pause. I do not find the book itself an act of any identifiable commitment except a strictly private one. Indeed, its outlook is conservative, somewhat out of touch with the spirit of *élan*, the young's sense of gut commitment characteristic of the 1960's, as compared with the funky, silent Eisenhower 1950's. Understandably enough, Podhoretz is at a loss when the President asks him what to do. He reflects that he felt alienated from his country because "as an intellectual I was as ghettoized as my ancestors in Eastern Europe had been as Jews"—at least till President Kennedy changed the scene. He sees his mission as confined to making critical analyses and understanding problems thoroughly, not as "manipulating" or "affecting" them. (For all his implied fascination with the type, Podhoretz eschews being an egghead "operator.") Now this is fair enough. But this polarization of roles is a bit self-serving. After all, Galbraith and Schlesinger, for examples, are intellectuals who have "made it," bigger than Podhoretz I would judge by his own point system, and, along with Pat Moynihan, their mastering of the concrete particulars of public affairs has not notably debased their intellectual performances.

Nor does it quite do for Podhoretz to patronize Irving Kristol's and Dan Bell's magazine, *The Public Interest*, as a glorified "suggestion box." Yes, Kristol and Bell are meliorists who may irritate Podhoretz as indeed at times they do us all. Yet the kind of hard attention and close respect they pay implicitly to the complex realities of government practice, of technological change, of manpower policy, new concepts of social accounting and of economic practice, as well as political theory—this kind of responsibility seems underrated or missing from Podhoretz's concern. The free-swinging essays that distinguish *Commentary* are the best of their kind published anywhere today. I would bet in the future, though,

that in our ever more specialized world, ever sterner standards of hard-headed, substantive expertise will be needed for the magazine to retain its leadership.

It is alarming, in this connection, to hear both Podhoretz and *Harper's* editor-in-chief, Willie Morris, in a recent symposium, agree that what's needed today to please the readers of their magazines is "the personal essay." This is "*the* art form of our time. It is emerging as the central form," states Podhoretz, because "we tend to testify personally today. We dwell on 'who-I-am.' The implied appeal to the reader is: 'This is the way it has been with me. Hasn't it been that way with you?'" Podhoretz feels that "testimony flowers when there is no very widely shared set of assumptions. We find this in conversation more and more. What can I say to you except how I feel? Let me tell you who I am. We feel the impulse to communicate in this way rather than in the objective mode. More and more of this kind of writing should be done. I think all of us crave it—the honest testimony." His fellow autobiographer, Morris, agrees: "No longer is the sophisticated reader satisfied to be informed and instructed. He wants to be challenged, enraged, and involved." The risks here, that the reader may be stupefied with feverish and irrelevant anecdote—too often the curse of the "old" *Harper's*—strike me as very high indeed.

Making It reveals no single episode in Podhoretz's rather sheltered life when he was engaged in commerce, say like book publishing or television, except for an inconsequential interlude as a potential juveniles publisher. This may be the key, then, to what makes one most uncomfortable with *Making It*. To witness the daily outrages and little tragedies in publishing or in the popular arts, for example, where under the relentless dictates of the market the excellent gets the axe or the shortest shrift and the commercial, the least-common-denominator-entertaining, gets the money and the prizes, or to work with huge corporations, as I have, and witness the wasteful absorption of great talent in ignoble or petty tasks—these experiences make a man wary of Podhoretz's relish of success. The price of literary and intellectual excellence remains about as Richard Hofstadter evaluated

it five years ago, eternal vigilance, and if not by mortally suspicious intellectuals, then by whom? The cottoning up to, the lionizing of the gods and goddesses of the popular arts and of miscellaneous careerists by intellectuals and Presidents, for instance, may be a step up from the kind of snobbery that high-brows used to indulge, which made them often quite provincial. But this love feast of intellectuals and "celebrities" is exacerbating the public confusion over what is worthy and what's meretricious.

STOP TIME BY FRANK CONROY may serve as an example. No young man's autobiography in recent memory approaches it in artistry, but of course it is relatively unknown and its sales predictably modest. At 31 Conroy has produced a unique book, totally private as Podhoretz's is in a way totally public; piercing in its evocation of life in America in the 40's and 50's and thus, one senses, a surer guide to the reality of America than either Podhoretz's or Morris's. Every inch a novelist, Conroy persuades one that he has captured the quintessence of his boyhood and adolescent experience, not narrating it but expressing it in passages of extraordinary sensibility. He recreates his consciousness. He associates moods with events, often inexplicable moods, but they seem inevitable, exactly right, and so his book carries a stamp of authenticity like successful lyric poetry.

What is it "about"? Well, it is about Conroy from childhood to young manhood, mostly his relationships with his bizarre Danish-born mother and those in their lives like his roguish stepfather (his wealthy, insane, alcoholic, cancer-ridden father is dead at the outset), with the scene shifting from Florida to New York, to Connecticut, Europe, from school to running away, to jobs, discoveries of treachery, friendship, sex—very special experiences in Conroy's case yet somehow made to seem common to us all. Conroy writes of himself without a trace of affectation. He remains profoundly personal always yet somehow suggests a kind of self-restraint that is terribly winning, a balanced appraisal of self and the world and never any explicit avowal of whatever his "dirty little secret" might be. There is an untold secret, more than a hint of menace in

Conroy's world: the book opens and ends with his speeding home from London at 3 A.M. at 115 m.p.h. in his Jaguar "driving in the wrong lane, cutting corners on the wrong side of the pylon, mounting the sidewalks, missing red lights—anything at all to keep the speed, to maintain the speed and streak through the dark world."

FOR ALL THE UNIQUE HONORS and positions earned by its young author, Willie Morris's autobiography, *North Toward Home*, seems extremely conventional after Conroy or for that matter after Podhoretz. Certainly one cannot imagine him taunting death on a 100 m.p.h. streak through the dark world. He is a sensible man, a born winner, a certain survivor, with the ingratiating qualities common to winners, such as an amiable old-American frontier-Southern sense of humor-by-exaggeration. He has a great feel for the colorful in people and events, and a remarkable gift as a raconteur that allows him to endow the slightest anecdote with interest. He is on the right side of every question as we follow him from boyhood in Mississippi, college in Texas and Oxford, editorship of the *Texas Observer*, the final move to "The Big Cave," New York City, and editorship of *Harper's Magazine*. But what are the questions? Somehow he never raises any as interesting as Podhoretz's or Conroy's. This is partly so because his book is a chronicle, a memoir of considerable poignancy and unfailing intelligence, but not an analytical account of making it nor an evocation of one's innermost emotional life. One is entertained, but not gripped. The main reason, though, is that Morris confronts political and social problems that are of such heroically unobvious dimensions—the incredible caricatures of Southern and Northern racists, colorful Texas Neanderthal politicians—that the reader's response is confined to amusement or horror. His first impressions of the New York literary scene are acute enough, but predictable. His great gift, as I say, is as a story teller and he realizes this gift quite beautifully in remembering Yazoo City, Mississippi.

Apart from the fact that these three books evidence literary achievement among men in their thirties, there could hardly be a more

hybrid threesome. For all their common involvement in the New York literary scene and their friendships and collaborations, Podhoretz and Morris seem to be on utterly different wave lengths. As for Conroy, his is another America altogether from theirs. And as for "making it," his chances of one-upping them both are pretty fair because the day should come when his fiction will be celebrated in their magazines' critical columns. For if "honest testimony" is the essence of the "art form of our time," Conroy is clearly an artist of the very first rank.

Nelson P. Valdes

Version of Che

REMINISCENCES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR, by Che Guevara. New York: Monthly Review Press, 288 pp. \$6.95.

EPISODES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, by Che Guevara. New York: International Publishers. 144 pp. Cloth, \$4.95; paper, \$1.65.

CHE GUEVARA SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, edited by George Lavan. New York: Merit Publishers. 159 pp. Cloth, \$4.50; paper, \$1.95.

SOME MEN SUFFER THE FATE of becoming the symbols of generations which misunderstand them. "Che" Guevara is a case in point. Suddenly, after his death he has become a folk hero of some young radicals in America and elsewhere. Guevara apparently brings to life the romantic hero, the type liberal historians have called obsolete. The hero who fails in his task but whose mere act of revolt achieves liberation—this is how *el Che* is viewed by many people.

The Guevara myth is soon to be exploited by magazines, publishing houses, and movie makers. Valentino Orsini, an Italian film maker, is already in Bolivia. MGM is working on the same subject. The bibliography on Che's death fills pages; three books have already appeared.

• *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War* and *Episodes of the Revolutionary War* are both translations of Guevara's *Pasajes de*

la Guerra Revolucionaria published in Cuba in 1963. In it Che realistically explains the many sufferings and upheavals of guerrilla warfare. The Monthly Review Press translation is much better than that of International Publishers, but neither changes the main points made by Guevara. This is an important book, but not a comprehensive study of the revolutionary organizations that fought against the former dictator. Interestingly, the role played by the urban underground is downgraded, as well as the guerrilla movement of the Escambray Mountains.

• In his introduction to *Che Guevara Speaks* Joseph Hanson promises "a faithful reflection of Che as he was or, better, as he developed."

The book represents, however neither the evolution nor the whole of Guevara's thought. Most of the selections have appeared before in radical publications in the United States. And if one is acquainted with Che's thought, the book is rather superficial. That the editor chose to print a discussion on Cuba's economic planning, seemingly because Guevara attacks the *Posadistas* (a split-off Trotskyist group), while disregarding Guevara's position on Trotskyism in general, shows that the editing serves a factional bias.

The translation of parts of Che's speech at Punta del Este, Uruguay, is another interesting case. In this speech Guevara outlined his economic plan for Cuba in which he projected a net growth of 12 per cent for the country, or 9½ per cent more than the goal set by the Alliance for Progress. In the same speech Guevara also stated that in 1965 Cuba would become the first nation in Latin America in per capita production of steel. These statements do not appear in the translation, for they would have betrayed Che's naiveté.

There are similar important deletions throughout the book. On the ideology of the Cuban Revolution the editor omitted the section in which Guevara states that the 26th of July movement was the "direct heir of the Orthodox Party" (a reformist social-democratic party in Cuba); and the essay on Cuba's "exceptionalism" is cut in half, omitting Guevara's views on the role that the national bourgeoisie has in a revolutionary process. Of the 20 selections only 4 are important:

Guevara's notes on "Man and Socialism in Cuba," his message to the Tricontinental Conference, his speech to the Afro-Asian Conference, and "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method." Everything else has been edited to the point of extinction.

THE THEME OF STRUGGLE which permeates the thought of Ernesto Guevara has not yet been considered by anyone. Future writers on the subject should try to ascertain the impact that his guerrilla experience had on his revolutionary ideology. To Guevara a socialist society could be achieved only in the guerrilla struggle where every man lives in constant asceticism and develops a consciousness of sacrifice which allows Communist morality to surface. To Guevara, in the guerrilla struggle the feeling of fellowship develops and every man becomes equal as class differences are transcended. This is what Guevara wanted on a national scale: to create a *guerrilla-nation*, a guerrilla communism. This is why the theme of struggle, of fighting in the trenches of production, of combating illiteracy and yankee imperialism appear in almost everything he said or wrote.

Perhaps this is why Che left Cuba: he realized that the "guerrillalization" of a whole nation was futile. A similarity between Che's dropping out of Cuba because, as he hints in his last essay before leaving the country, he did not seem to be able to create the "new man of the 21st century" and the hippies dropping out of American society has escaped most observers. Drop city is the utopia of hippieism, guerrilla warfare became the utopia of Guevaraism.

But far more obvious aspects of Che's thought seem to have been overlooked by most radicals. If one favors decentralization or "participatory democracy," he should not have as an idol a man who considered strong centralization the only way in which a socialist society could be created. And can one demand U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam while carrying a poster of the man who called for more Vietnams?

It appears we have reached the stage of "confusion in the revolution." In the meantime, the duty of a revolutionary seems to be to buy a revolutionary poster . . .

Sanford V. Levinson

*Intellectuals
in Politics*

ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, annotated by Max Freedman. Boston: Atlantic, Little, Brown. 772 pp. \$17.50.

MAX FREEDMAN, THE EDITOR of this volume, tells of a visit to Felix Frankfurter on February 20, 1965, just two days before the latter's death: "Tell the whole story. Let people see how much I loved Roosevelt, how much I loved my country, and let them see how great a man Roosevelt really was."

This volume is only partially successful in fulfilling Frankfurter's wishes. To take the last hope first, the book cannot really be said to demonstrate Roosevelt's greatness. Most of the President's letters are short notes rather than full reflections. More impressive than his views on political issues is the jauntiness of tone he achieved so often.

In 1943, as the President was fending off Frankfurter's suggestion that he indicate his identification with the Poles by serving as honorary chairman of the Copernican quadricentennial, Roosevelt remarked, "Strictly between ourselves, I have little sympathy with Copernicus. He looked through the right end of the telescope, thus greatly magnifying his problems. I use the wrong end of the telescope and it makes things much easier to bear." As an example of the marvelous personality of Frankfurter's beloved "Frank," this is superb, but there is little in the collection to aid the reader in evaluating the actual political content of the New Deal or Roosevelt's role in it.

Frankfurter was at least partly typical of the intellectuals who, with labor and the ethnic minorities, made up the heart of the "Roosevelt coalition" that came to power in 1933 and that now lies wrecked in the streets of Detroit and Saigon. A reformer in the tradition of American progressivism, he also shared the simplicity of analysis of that tradition. His first involvement in Presidential politics was in 1912, when he supported Teddy

Roosevelt and his "bully pulpit" conception of the Presidency; Frankfurter reached the heights of the American polity through his involvement with FDR, whom he saw emulating TR as a vigorous leader doing battle with "the interests."

Although praise of Lincoln's "common people" runs through the volume, Frankfurter stressed the importance of an educating leadership to give the people direction. The content of the education was left largely unexamined, however. Except for Frankfurter's often cogent remarks on the mistakes of the Supreme Court, what emerges is a paucity of substantial social analysis. He spends more time condemning money-grubbing lawyers (not that they did not richly deserve the condemnation) than he does in any comment about much more fundamental defects in the American social and political structure.

Frankfurter's "childlike" patriotism, to quote Paul Freund, was altogether typical of the optimism and high morale of the New Deal ethos, in which faith in the possibility of jaunty leadership to overcome the problems manifested by the Depression substituted for insight into basic structural defects. We are paying the price now of the similar hopes of New Dealish ideologues like Arthur Schlesinger that Harvard-educated leadership, with a becoming mixture of "style" and "pragmatic" policies, could solve the problem only papered over by the World War II-induced prosperity.

Frankfurter's philosophy of "judicial restraint" itself rests on the progressive faith that the United States was a fully open society, with Congress and state legislatures, when aroused, serving to mirror the popular will. It is peculiarly appropriate that Frankfurter's last major opinion, his *Canute-like* dissent in the Tennessee Reapportionment Case in 1962, demonstrates the inadequacy of such optimism in dealing with the problems of America in the 1960's. Maintaining his fidelity to judicial restraint, he denounced even the Court's treating the issue as justification: "In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives." Frankfurter, the admitted "romantic believer in reason," was un-

willing to understand the nature and distribution of power in the United States. In the sharp words of political scientist Barney Frank, "By abandoning the helpless to a reliance on self-help, Frankfurter unwittingly pronounced his own *reductio ad absurdum*."

LOVE OF COUNTRY is only one theme of the volume; the other is love of Roosevelt. "It cannot be mere accident that not since Lincoln has there been a President who possessed in equal measure such a combination of the democratic faith, antiseptic humor, and largeness of view." Whatever opportunism might have been involved in such comments is surely secondary to Frankfurter's native generosity of spirit. This close relationship between the two men helped make possible Frankfurter's important contributions to American life, but it also had a more negative consequence.

Frankfurter's favorite word was surely "disinterested." The word carries with it not only its obvious meaning of not being influenced by personal or group advantage, but also the implication that, insofar as possible, "disinterested" advice will reflect one's dispassionate view.

The most important revelation of the correspondence concerns the response of Frankfurter the Harvard Law School professor to the President's court-packing plan of 1937. Frankfurter had carefully preserved the impression that both in public and private he had been completely neutral toward the plan. It turns out, however, that he agreed to advise Roosevelt regarding the plan after the President surprised him with it in February, 1937. No doubt, Frankfurter would have opposed it had Roosevelt asked for his advice before the public announcement. Once the battle was joined, however, Frankfurter, by now a loyal lieutenant in the Roosevelt Administration, gave him whatever help was asked for, though his battle station continued to be the Harvard Law School. As Alexander Bickel has noted in the *New Republic*, this meant that the most important law professor in the U.S. refused public comment on the most important issue of 1937.

Ironically, Frankfurter's already touchy relationship with Walter Lippmann was exacerbated when the columnist devoted a 1936

piece to an examination of "disinterestedness." Writing on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Harvard, Lippmann stressed the necessity for academic independence from partisan political involvement.

Frankfurter had become "interested" by 1937; Lippmann's words were vindicated when a man so devoted to political independence capitulated unquestioningly to his friend, the President. In many ways the most significant letter in the entire volume is a short note, written on July 20, 1937, regarding Herbert Lehman's statement of opposition to the court-packing plan. "I was—and am—hot all over regarding Herbert Lehman's letter. Some things just aren't done—they violate the decencies of human relations and offend the good taste and the decorum of friendship." Bickel, a former law clerk to Frankfurter, suggests merely that this episode should encourage a "caution" regarding the relationship of knowledge and power. On the contrary, the inability of Frankfurter to maintain public disinterestedness, in spite of his personal integrity, suggests that more than "caution" might be called for.

DURING THE 1930's, it was still somewhat unusual for academics to involve themselves with government. The image of a Harvard professor dutifully taking the train to Washington appears archaic when compared to what has since become commonplace: full-scale institutes of politics, advisory committees, White House fellowships, and, most important of all, the increasing dependence of universities on the federal government for their finances.

While a savage war rages in Vietnam, and this country finds itself on the brink of a second domestic civil war, one still waits for many of the academics whose careers have become intertwined with the destinies of particular politicians to violate the "decorum of friendship" by engaging in public analysis of fundamental problems. Their reticence is especially ironic, as was Frankfurter's, in light of their proclaimed faith in democracy. By refusing to treat the public with the same candor and respect they show the ambitions of

(continued on page 281)

LETTERS

Kudos for Abel

Editor:

Thank you for Lionel Abel.

On an exacting day, when fire and brimstone rained down from heaven, rigorist judgment had stipulated for ten.

But I believe the March-April issue of *DISSENT* can be saved by just this one.

And, if a margin of saving grace is desired, one can adduce a few sentences from the letter by Michael Walzer.

OSCAR GASS

Civil Liberties on the Campus

Editor:

In "A Word About 'Bourgeois Civil Liberties'" (Jan.-Feb. 1968) Irving Howe, the self-styled "defender of liberty," echoes the arguments used by liberal university administrators to justify punishment of New Left activists who obstruct military, para-military, and Dow Chemical recruiting. Students for a Democratic Society, it is argued, is violating the "liberty" of the recruiter and the individual when it prevents the process of recruitment from occurring. Such an obstructionist tactic, especially if a campus majority favors open recruiting, is, it is held, "authoritarian," "elitist," and "antidemocratic" in essence.

One expects university administrators to define the issue of military, para-military, and Dow Chemical recruitment in terms of the abstract "right" of the individual to see the recruiter and the theoretical "injustice" of a "minority imposing its will on the majority." A bureaucrat's task is to administer according to a given set of universal rules, not to examine the moral consequences of specific applications of these rules. Yet one does not expect an intellectual like Mr. Howe, who considers himself a democrat and a socialist, to define the issue of recruitment in such narrow terms.

When SDS obstructs military, para-military, and Dow Chemical recruitment it does so not because it wishes to deprive all men of their liberties. On the contrary, SDS obstructs in order to make explicit the proposition that communities of people are justified in resisting those organizations and institutions engaged in anti-libertarian, anti-humane activities. Dow Chemical Company is obstructed, not because the men who control that company think differently than New Leftists or

utter words with which we disagree, but because it *acts*: it makes napalm for an unjust, immoral, anti-libertarian war. Because student activists feel that "making napalm for an unjust, immoral war" is an anti-libertarian, anti-humane activity, SDS asserts that resistance to Dow Chemical Company by communities of people is both justified and democratic—even if 51 per cent of the community believes otherwise.

If the New Left possessed the power to blow up with impunity all Dow Chemical plants making napalm (along with the plants of Lockheed, Boeing, etc. which make weapons) it would do so; and the Dow Chemical recruiter would likely be ignored when he appeared on most campuses. In 1968, however, the New Left lacks this power. It is thus obliged to limit itself to symbolically resisting Dow Chemical at the place where it can act with the greatest possible impunity, the campus, by obstructing Dow's campus recruiting process.

In his article Mr. Howe displays little understanding of New Left sentiment. Student activists are not against civil liberties; for politically free men such liberties are necessary and in a truly democratic society such liberties are desirable. What activists do assert, however, is that in situations where preservation of the libertarian form leads to toleration by the powerless of the anti-libertarian, anti-humane acts of those exercising power, "preservation of the libertarian form" is undesirable. In 1968, "preservation of the libertarian form," as defined by Mr. Howe, means that the powerful can continue to bomb villages, napalm human flesh, manufacture deadly weapons, and draft young bodies, while the powerless must feel compelled to stand idly by and tolerate such activities, in the name of "human liberty." The powerless are permitted to speak, to write, and to shout; but only the powerful are allowed to act.

Mr. Howe is content to let organizations and institutions which inflict human suffering operate freely, so long as he can verbally protest against injustice. SDS, on the other hand, is seeking to persuade people that verbal protest alone will not end the suffering inflicted by America's power structure, because the American men of power are basically unresponsive to appeals to their moral consciences; only resistant-type actions by the people themselves can effectively end the suffering.

Campus obstruction of recruitment can, of course, be opposed on tactical grounds. On many campuses the obstruction of recruiters has isolated many SDS chapters from liberal students and faculty members. Many liberal students and faculty members, although sympathetic to New Left goals, reject, for reasons similar to Mr. Howe's, the means which chapter members have democratically chosen to utilize.

Yet for a self-styled "democratic socialist" like Mr. Howe to oppose, on libertarian-humanitarian

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grounds, the attempts of SDS chapters to symbolically resist organizations like the Marines, the Air Force, Lockheed, and Dow, reflects on Mr. Howe's part an insensitivity to human suffering and an inability to empathize with committed leftists of a different generation.

The American power structure in 1968 is screwing the lives of many Vietnamese people, and many young men who do not wish to serve as conscripted killers. To quibble over the New Left's alleged "authoritarianism" and "elitism" when thousands are being murdered and hundreds are being drafted, jailed, or exiled against their will, reflects an extremely distorted value system.

BOB FELDMAN
Columbia Chapter of SDS

IRVING HOWE replies:

Mr. Feldman's remarkable letter deserves a more detailed reply than it will here get.

1) He says that "if the New Left possessed the power to blow up with impunity all Dow Chemical plants making napalm (along with the plants of Lockheed, Boeing, etc. which make weapons) it would do so . . ."

Why "with impunity?" If it is necessary to do what he says, then it must be done, with or without impunity.

Who precisely (leaving aside his lack of power) has authorized Mr. Feldman to "blow up" any factory?

How can any sort of democratic society be maintained if minorities, no matter how right or moral their convictions, assume the right to use such methods?

Or does Mr. Feldman care? If he supports his opinion through a Castroite or Maoist ideology, then let him, please, not invoke civil liberties and democratic values. If not, then let him think a little about what he is saying.

For he is playing with fire—play with it long enough, Mr. Feldman, *and it will be we of the Left, you and I, who will get burned*. If a tiny minority, New Left old Left or whatever, assumes the right to "blow up" Dow Chemical, on what ground can he object to some Birchites deciding to "blow up" SDS headquarters and perhaps Mr. Feldman too?

Does he suppose that this hypothetical Bircher would be any less *sincere*, any less convinced of his moral righteousness, in blowing up SDS than Mr. Feldman would in blowing up Dow Chemical?

2) Mr. Feldman makes much of the distinction between "speech" and "act"; he will allow Dow Chemical to speak but not act. Is he aware that this is precisely the kind of distinction which in the U.S. has repeatedly been used against radicals by repressive authorities? That when Marxists were sentenced to jail under various Criminal Syndicalism laws it was always on the

ground that they were free to "say" anything they wished but could not act, i.e., advocate or prepare insurrection? That right now Spock & Coffin will be tried on a quite similar charge? That when Clark Kerr at Berkeley banned "outside recruiters" he used precisely Mr. Feldman's rationale: Civil Right opinions could be expressed on campus but SNCC and CORE could not engage in actions on campus?

3) Mr. Feldman is very cavalier about "51 per cent of the [Columbia] community." He will not allow a trivial majority to interfere with his decision to obstruct Dow Chemical recruiters. But suppose what is the reality: that the majority of Columbia students voting to allow those recruiters to appear on campus is actually a good deal larger? At which point, if any, will our "participatory democrat" bow to the wishes of the majority of his fellow students? Concerning which let me quote a few lines from my article which aroused Mr. Feldman's displeasure:

"Mind, the issue is not whether SDS holds demonstrations against Dow Chemical, since no one can in principle be opposed to that. The issue is whether SDS will forcibly try to prevent recruiters from saying their wretched little piece, even though the majority of students favor allowing them to. And if so, will SDS reconcile that stand with 'participatory democracy'? Or are only right-thinking folk allowed to participate in 'participatory democracy'?"

ADA and the War

Editor:

It is regrettable when so responsible a magazine as *DISSENT* permits the publication of a statement in an article so obviously misleading as that which occurred in the piece written by Martin Peretz in your March-April 1968 issue.

In this article, and I quote in part, Mr. Peretz says in mentioning the war in Vietnam that ADA is "now belatedly against the war." Mr. Peretz should know that ADA has vigorously and without question opposed the war in Vietnam from its very inception and has indeed taken a leadership role in the opposition to the war ever since the military escalation began. For the information of your readers, as far back as the May 1961 national convention of ADA, the organization warned against the dangers of military involvement in Vietnam.

I do not believe in censorship, but I do believe that editors have some responsibility to check factual statements so easily ascertained.

Leon Shull
National Director
ADA

On Bonnie and Clyde

Editor:

Reviewer James Toback ("Bonnie and Clyde: Style as Morality," *DISSENT*, Jan.-Feb. 1968) sums up the movie: "More than simply providing slick entertainment, *Bonnie and Clyde* . . . serve[s] the cultural function of presenting heroes who express the current infatuation with style—style as a value in itself, a replacement of values." Toback's review, on the other hand, is "slick entertainment," period, if slickness is the measure of how much of "the line" one can cram into the space of two pages devoted to something only peripherally related to politics.

By implication, Toback has accused director Penn of serving as a factotum for some underground Ministry of Culture. I have no argument with Toback's thesis that America, and particularly its parvenu "radicals," are preoccupied with style. But it's not invariably true that "content" or "morality" are sacrificed on the altar of style. Toback takes the view that Clyde is such a successful antihero precisely because he commits every larceny with debonair nonchalance, every atrocity with an engaging finesse. But "style" doesn't triumph here. Bonnie and Clyde don't go out in style any more than Belmondo did in *Breathless*. Fate simply catches up with them; and, if anything, style becomes irrelevant to both the bullet-riddled corpses and the audience—unless, of course, the latter happens to be unwilling to suspend its biases either for or against "style" in the abstract.

So what if America's hippies dash out to the nearest boutique and array themselves as Bonnies and Clydes. It seems to me that a certain segment of America's coed population affected the "style" of Brett when *The Sun Also Rises* was published. Was Hemingway guilty of pandering to his bohemia?

Bonnie and Clyde does not celebrate anarchism à la mode. Why the apprehensive titter from the

audience when Clyde misconstrues Bonnie's hints that they settle down? We know there's no way out for Bonnie and Clyde but we sympathize with Bonnie's yearning for tranquility after what they (and we) have been through, not with Clyde's unalterable collision course with death. Nevertheless, Toback insists that Clyde's fatalism expresses "a replacement of values." It seemed to me, however, that the movie was profoundly anti-violence. It "puts the sting back in death" to quote Pauline Kael. Toback may think it a "simple-minded" conceit to equate Clyde's sexual impotence with his homicidal behavior . . . but the trouble with platitudes is that most of them are true . . .

D. F. ZICKERMAN

JAMES TOBACK replies:

I was not aware that I was laying out any "line." I wonder whose it is. *DISSENT*'s? Formalism's? Antiformalism's? Who knows, maybe I've been brainwashed by someone.

I should like to take issue with two particular areas of Mr. Zickerman's misunderstanding, the first of which is his attack on my supposed "accusation" that Arthur Penn is a self-appointed "factotum for some underground Ministry of Culture." How such an "implication" was inferred, I can explain only by assuming that Mr. Zickerman did not read the piece carefully.

The sole criticism I made of Penn (whom I regard as one of the two or three best directors in America or anywhere) concerns the *obviousness*, not the *validity*, of his use of the pistol-phallus metaphor. The disingenuousness of *Bonnie and Clyde* stems from the screenplay, not the direction. Second, even if one accepts Mr. Zickerman's facile summation of the film's ending ("Fate simply catches up with them"), that hardly negates—or even affects—the tone of the preceding two hours, a celebration of style as a self-sufficient mode of life.

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hopeful politicians, such academics not only compromise their own integrity, but threaten the integrity of the democratic process itself.

The "rule of law" so rightfully dear to Frankfurter does indeed depend, as he so often noted, not on legal statutes alone, but on an atmosphere of trust between political leadership and the led. An open intellectual life depends on the same kind of trust between academics and *their* constituents—students and elements of the public who regard academic opinion as the product of disinterested reflection, without regard to fear or favor.

Frankfurter's affection for a great President led him to abandon the very disinterestedness that he himself saw as the basis of integrity.

This collection of letters is always interesting and sometimes even exhilarating, as in Frankfurter's breathless reports from England regarding his efforts to "sell" the New Deal to prominent British intellectuals and journalists; yet the effect is ultimately saddening. The classical virtues of love of country and love of one's friends became immoderate in their excess. The possibility of adequate social analysis was the victim in the first case; that of truly disinterested conduct, in the second.

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